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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**SCRUTINIZING AND ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE GERMAN AND U.S.-LED PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN**

by

Andreas Kuehne

June 2008

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**SCRUTINIZING AND ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GERMAN
AND U.S.-LED PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN**

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(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB SAHARAN AFRICA)**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the performance of German and U.S.-led PRTs currently deployed in Afghanistan. The major conclusion of this thesis is that the PRTs are limited in their capabilities to significantly reconstruct or bring stability to Afghanistan. Despite their initial success between 2003 and 2005, they are currently unable to address the challenges in Afghanistan. Utilizing systematic case studies this thesis examines the structure, strategy, and experiences of German and U.S.-led PRTs. The assessment focuses on four different performance criteria: capacity building, stability, relationship-building, and aid projects and coordination. Research is based on reports of international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO, as well as on various NGO reports. It is found that the PRTs limitations are not only a consequence of their structural limitations, but also are a result of Afghanistan's dynamic environment, with all its facets and requirements. The main external factors influencing PRTs are Islam, tribal structures, poor governance and a sobering economic situation. This thesis contributes to an advanced understanding of how PRTs function, as well as updating available information on PRTs and Afghanistan.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghan National Border Police
ANCB	Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
AOR	Area of Responsibility
C3	Command, Control and Communication
CAT-As	U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams-Afghanistan
CATO	Cargo and Air Terminal Operations
CERP	Commanders' Emergency Response Program
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command Afghanistan
CHLCs	Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CJTF-76	Combined Joint Task Force 76
CMSS	Center for Military and Strategic Studies
COM	Commander
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Counter Terrorism
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilizing and Reintegration
DED	German Development Service
DIAG	Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ETTs	Embedded Training Teams

FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FO	Foreign Office
FP	Force Protection
FSB	Forward Support Base
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HA	Herat Airport
HIG	Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
HIK	Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam) of Maulvi Younis Khalis
HQN	Jihad Network of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOs	International Organizations
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Pakistani Intelligence Service
ITAS	ISAF Intra Theatre Airlift Support
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JRTs	Joint Regional Teams
JUI	Pakistani Jamaat-ul Islami Party
KAIA	Kabul International Airport
KfW	German State Development Bank
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development
MCS	NATO Military Command Structure
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoEC	Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI	Ministry of the Interior

MP	Military Police
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OMF	Opposing Militant Forces
OMLTs	Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
PATs	Provincial Advisory Teams
PMPTs	PRTs Monitoring Police Teams
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
RC	Regional Command
RCC	Regional Command Capital
RCE	Regional Command East
RCN	Regional Command North
RCS	Regional Command South
RCW	Regional Command West
SACO	Supreme Allied Command Operations
SFO	Special Forces Operations
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TACOM	Tactical Command
TAP	Trans-Afghan Pipeline
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDSS	United Nations, Department of Safety and Security in Afghanistan
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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This thesis is for Schatzi.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This thesis assesses the performance of the German and United States (U.S.)-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The thesis focuses solely on the PRTs of the United Nations (UN)-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The objective is to examine the approaches taken by the PRTs and the extent to which they are effective in dealing with the current situation in Afghanistan. Additionally, this thesis updates available information on NATO in Afghanistan and the deployed PRTs as well as contributing to an advanced understanding of the situation.

The overarching research question is: To what extent are the German and U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan fulfilling their declared objectives? The following questions concern key issues relating to the major topic:

- What are the declared objectives of the PRTs?
- What factors explain the shortfalls?
- How do the political culture and the economic and societal circumstances of Afghanistan affect the performance of the PRTs?
- How does the poor security situation throughout the country hamper PRT actions?

B. THESIS IMPORTANCE

NATO command of ISAF began in 2003. The request and the foundation of the ISAF mission can be traced to the Bonn Agreement in 2001. ISAF represents the military engagement of the international community in Afghanistan as well as the political, economic, development and aid efforts. The PRTs are the sole military asset on the ground throughout the country, whose mission it is to fulfil not only NATO's objectives, but also the goals of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). Moreover, the outcome of the PRT activities contribute to political, economic and development objectives as well. This makes the PRT itself an asset for post-conflict scenarios, including the capability to rebuild a country. It is of utmost importance to scrutinize the performance of PRTs and

assess their effectiveness due to their dominating importance in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. If the PRTs fail, the efforts of the international community could be in jeopardy.

The overall security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated since mid-2006. The Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist movements still use the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan for their purposes. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has not brought global security; the overall security situation in South and Central Asia has not improved significantly since 2001. Circumstances in Afghanistan still pose a threat to the Western world, and it is imperative to defeat this threat and rebuild Afghanistan.

C. EXISTING LITERATURE AND SCHOLARLY BACKGROUND

This section reviews the existing literature concerning Afghanistan and the PRTs. The intention is to highlight important arguments concerning PRTs in Afghanistan and to deduce propositions from the literature. The subsections of this literature review correspond to the key sections and propositions presented by this thesis.

1. General Concepts and Objectives of the PRTs in Afghanistan

In October 2003, the president of the United Nations Security Council distributed a letter to all members of the Security Council regarding NATO's political objectives and ISAF's desired end-state. The letter's attachments included the "Longer-term strategy for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in its International Security Assistance Force role in Afghanistan," approved by the North Atlantic Council on 1 October 2003. The desired end-state was defined as "A self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government, in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, able to exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan, without the need for ISAF to help provide security."¹ The desired end-state will be measured and assessed on a periodic basis and reported to the United Nations.²

¹ United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 7 October 2003 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council* (New York: [2003]).

² Ibid.

NATO's website offers a fact-sheet overview of all Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Regional Commands (RCs) and Headquarters ISAF (HQ ISAF) including participating nations and personnel strength. Furthermore, the ISAF expansion throughout Afghanistan and the mission itself are stated in the source.³

The *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan* explains the concept of the PRTs long-term strategy and states the strategic goals of the ISAF mission as security, governance and development.⁴

The U.S., UK, and German PRT concepts, as of 2005, are examined in Peter V. Jakobsen's study, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient*. He analyzes the contribution of the PRTs in relation to their mission statements. His main argument is that the PRTs can only be used in a transition phase. This initial phase is followed by a deployment of means and assets to overcome the insurgencies and rebuild Afghanistan over the long-term. Jakobsen points out that the military forces of the PRTs are not able to effectively fight the causes of the insurgencies in Afghanistan. In his view, the main destabilizing factors are the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the infighting between the warlords, the increased lawlessness and banditry, the booming opium poppy cultivation and the drug trade.⁵ PRTs, according to Jakobsen, have little impact on these phenomena.

Gerd Brandstetter argues that the heavy PRTs, such as the German one in Konduz, are generally more suitable for supporting the nation-building process due to the fact that such PRTs usually have more personnel and military capabilities available. Thus, the staff can operate 24/7 sustainably as well as concurrently lead and plan operations. Such PRTs have not only the capability to show force in the respective area of operations (AOR), but also special capabilities, such as information operations and human intelligence gathering. Additionally, liaisons have to be established and

³ NATO, "ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet," <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/> (accessed October 25, 2007).

⁴ NATO, "NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan," <http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html> (accessed October 22, 2007).

⁵ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, [2005]), www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf (accessed November 4, 2007).

maintained with all external interfaces, which are mainly civilian actors. Heavy PRTs can cover these demands better than light PRTs.⁶ Therefore, the “inherent capabilities [of the heavy PRT] guarantee a systematic and coordinated development process.”⁷ Brandstetter argues that light PRTs, such as the former UK PRT in Mazar-i Sharif and the U.S.-led PRTs, are too short on personnel to provide the requisite capabilities. Their main constraint is the shortfall in Information Operation capabilities, which hampers effective use of the media for information, education and influence.⁸

Myriame Bollen et al. briefly discuss the origins of the PRT concept and the operational objectives in general. They assert that it is still an evolving concept and point out that structures, capabilities and approaches differ due to the lead nations’ distinct policies and the environmental circumstances that the various PRTs are operating in.⁹ They recognize the PRT’s capacity “as a future model for peace building and development beyond Afghanistan.”¹⁰

Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers emphasize the strategic level and relate Security Sector Reform (SSR) to the introduction and role of the PRTs. Whereas SSR represents the responsibility of the governments of the U.S., the UK, Italy, Japan and Germany to improve conditions in one particular sector due to national interests, the PRTs focus on stability and reconstruction efforts with the short term goal of establishing a safe and secure environment as a prerequisite for the SSR. Noetzel and Scheipers argue that neither a joint strategy nor a common concept for PRTs have been agreed upon.¹¹

⁶ Gerd Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort*, [2005]).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Myriame T. I. B. Bollen, Eric T. Linssen and Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, “Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists?” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 17, no. 4 (December 2006), 438.

¹⁰ Ibid., 446.

¹¹ Timo Noetzel and Sibylle Scheipers, *Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing Or Disunity?* (London: Chatham House, [2007]).

2. Execution of PRT Activities

Michael McNerney focuses on PRTs as an organizational model to conduct security and reconstruction (S&R) operations. From 2002, when the U.S. developed the PRT model to enhance ISAF visibility throughout the country, to 2005, he systematically assesses the success of the PRTs along three criteria. These criteria are coordination, relationship-building and capacity-building. He defines coordination with international civilian actors, in a military-dominated environment, as a crucial and absolutely necessary measure for success. Relationship and capacity-building refer to the internal structures of the host-nation, such as local leadership structures plus government and administration capabilities.¹² These measures of effectiveness are more suitable than quantifying “funds spent and the number of assistance projects completed”¹³ because the latter approach does not assess the impact of these projects and does not consider whether they fit into the broader political, economic and military strategy for Afghanistan’s future. Additionally, McNerney refers to the U.S.-led PRTs, to the UK-led PRT in Mazar-i Sharif and to the German-led PRT in Konduz. The circumstances today differ from those in 2005 due to the establishment of another German force structure in the north. This means that the methodology McNerney used is still applicable, but his conclusions have been overtaken by events.

Paul Gallis of the Congressional Research Service provides arguments about the functions, operational approach, and objectives of the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan. He offers a political analysis regarding the participating nations, including their caveats.¹⁴ He assesses the policies of the main participating nations and explains their strategic and operational approach as well as their understanding of the PRTs. He covers Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the U.S.

¹² Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 35.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁴ Paul Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, [2007]).

Myriame Bollen et al. provide insight into the security commitments of the PRTs in combination with a discussion of the perceptions of these actions among civilians, both NGO personnel and Afghans. They differentiate between precise military viewpoints and the perceptions of the international aid community, namely the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau (ANCB). All of the above mentioned NGOs have serious concerns about the merged approach of development and security as the basic concept of the PRTs.¹⁵ “This [perception of the NGOs] is crucial to assessing the effectiveness of PRTs, since security is one of their main stated roles.”¹⁶ The authors explain the importance of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterviolence and poppy eradication operations in an effort to increase stability and security. Their main argument is that the military has the capability to engage in more violent conflicts and deal with hot spots, because of its training, equipment and weapons. Thus, ‘milder’ means of CT [counter terrorism], such as gathering intelligence in order to prevent surprise attacks”¹⁷ are too undemanding for the PRTs. Unless a stable environment is established, all other actions of the PRTs, especially the reconstruction measures, are ineffective and have no lasting impact. Therefore, the authors conclude that the requirement of “preventively and actively chasing terrorists with specialist forces”¹⁸ is a self-evident task of the PRTs. Additionally, as a side-effect, the acceptance and credibility of the presence of the PRTs would rise among the population, and this would be a fundamental contribution to force protection.

Touko Piiparinen, who served as a political representative within the Norwegian-led PRT in Meymaneh between 2005 and 2006, focuses on the internal relationship,

¹⁵ Myriame T. I. B. Bollen, Linssen and Rietjens, *Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists*, ? 442.

¹⁶ Ibid., 441.

¹⁷ Ibid., 446.

¹⁸ Ibid., 446.

structure and decision-making of military and civilian sections within the PRT.¹⁹ He attempts to “understand those inter-subjective rules and organizational conventions that enable and constrain the decision-making of PRTs.”²⁰ He emphasizes the gap between the military officials and civilian crisis management experts from a social standpoint and describes how different mindsets lead to different assessments. Moreover, while referring to the main objectives of the PRTs, disarmament in particular, he discusses a case of rivalries between the Jumbesh and Azadi tribes in Faryab province, and shows how a civilian approach could promote a sustainable peace process with long-term stability.²¹ His main argument is that the PRTs should act as modern civil-military organizations, based on a consensus regarding decision-making and on precise definitions of roles and functions within the PRT leading to the highest degree of cooperation. After this basic concept is established, national interests and caveats, announced within NATO as the superior organization, have to be defined, and finally, the PRT could be placed in the multinational environment.²²

3. Political Factors

The two previous sub-sections focus on internal arguments regarding PRTs whereas the following paragraphs provide arguments regarding external aspects of PRTs.

Thomas H. Johnson, in his article “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War,” discusses the Bonn Agreement²³ and the subsequent

¹⁹ Touko Piiparinen, “A Clash of Mindsets? An Insider's Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1 (February 2007), 143.

²⁰ Ibid., 143.

²¹ Ibid., 145.

²² Ibid., 155.

²³ The Bonn Agreement was the result of a conference held in Bonn, Germany, in which the “intense diplomacy of the United Nations and the United States got key parties to agree to a conference to name an interim administration and chart the future political transitions. The meeting began ... on November 27 and included representatives from four main Afghan groupings: the various factions of the Northern Alliance; the Rome group, composed of the family and supporters of the former King Zahir Shah; the Peshawar group, Pashtun mujahedin, tribal and religious leaders based in Pakistan; and the Cyprus group, a mixture of factions with close ties to Iran.” Antonio Donini, Norah Niland and Karin Wermester, *Nation-Building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004), 44-45.

nation-building process and argues that the Bonn Agreement left essential factors unconsidered, such as the representation of moderate Taliban within the interim and transitional government and the unresolved question of the role of regional warlords, who have continued to be active since the fall of the Taliban regime.²⁴ Additionally, Johnson provides a useful insight into the Afghan Constitution, with its major provisions concerning the role of the president, the form of the legislature, the supreme court, and the contribution to women's equality. He posits that the constitution has been too vague to establish democracy successfully.²⁵ Finally, he stresses the importance of the elections and the balanced representation of ethnic groups, especially between the Pashtuns and the Tajiks. He also states that President Karzai "recognized the extremely difficult task of assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups while meeting the country's desperate need for professional governance after years of ruinous conflict."²⁶

4. Economic Factors

The Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment provides hard data on Afghanistan's economy, which has grown in recent years. However, this growth has to be seen in relation to the pre-conflict period. During the years of Soviet occupation, from 1979 to 1988, the subsequent civil war, and the rule of the Taliban regime, a functional economy was eroded. Thus, economic growth under the Karzai administration has been tremendous, with growth rates up to approximately 13 percent. Nevertheless, Afghanistan is an economic dwarf. The main economic sector is agriculture. Crop shortfalls are, however, not unusual due to droughts. Moreover, farmland is limited owing to the mountainous topography and the plague of landmines inherited from the Soviet occupation. Afghanistan is not self-supporting and remains dependent on foreign

²⁴ Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War," *Central Asian Survey* 25, no. 1/2 (March-June, 2006), 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

donations, especially in the economic sector. Excluding the financial obligations to Russia, Afghanistan suffers from a debt burden that amounted to nearly 13 percent of the GDP in 2005.²⁷

Christopher Blanchard elaborates on Afghanistan's opium economy. He analyzes the roles of the farmers, landowners and traffickers who want to benefit from opium cultivation and also the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regarding production and logistical support.²⁸ By stating that "militia commanders, criminal organizations, and corrupt officials have exploited narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage,"²⁹ he establishes the relationship between opium production and security in general. Opium cultivation increased in 2006 and 2007, especially in the south-western region, concurrently with more activities of the Taliban; Afghanistan today provides 93 percent of the world's supply of opium.³⁰

5. Societal and Cultural Factors

Afghanistan is a deeply fragmented country. Instead of a central government, regional powerbrokers influence the majority of the population, which basically inhabits the rural areas. Among the easily-identified twenty-five different groups, a huge ethnic and linguistic diversity prevails. The four largest ethnicities are Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara. The Pashtun tribe is the most important one and encompasses approximately 45 percent of the entire Afghan population. All these groups are regionally concentrated due to the geographic circumstances of the country.³¹

²⁷ Jane's Information Group, *Economy, Afghanistan* Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, [2007]) (accessed April 26, 2007).; Jane's Information Group, *Natural Resources, Afghanistan* Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment,[2007]) (accessed April 26, 2007).

²⁸ Christopher M. Blanchard, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, [2007]), www.crsdocuments.com (accessed September, 27 2007).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Government Formation and Performance* Congressional Research Service, [2007]) (accessed July 19, 2007).

The Center for Strategic and International Studies published, in October 2007, a fact-paper by Anthony H. Cordesman entitled *The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan Pakistan War* in which facts and figures regarding the relationship between Pashtun-dominated areas and increased insurgency activities are provided. Moreover, data from different polls from December 2006 and more recently on ethnic, linguistic and sectarian differences are reported. Cordesman also discusses the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding the Pashtun tribe in the borderland areas as well as different polls dealing with Pakistani opinion on Islamic extremism, the war conducted by the coalition pursuing Taliban and Al-Qaeda sympathizers, and related factors.³²

Revolution Unending by Gilles Dorronsorio provides a deeper and more precise analysis focusing on Afghan society from 1973 to the present. He holds that Afghanistan was, in the 1970s, on a prosperous development track and that the occupation by the Soviet Union could have been prevented. He uses the terms “an alien society” and “an imaginary country” to underline his arguments about a tribal revolt and ethnic war. Moreover, he discusses the controversial cultural, military and religious aspects of Afghanistan’s conflicts.³³

6. Security Situation

Feroz H. Khan, in his article “Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan,” contributes several insights regarding the long lasting tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and explains the rise and fall of the Taliban. The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan dates from the division of the Pashtuns in 1893 by the Durand Line and the establishment of Pashtun nationalism, called Pashtunwali, which developed in the first half of the twentieth century. This smoldering conflict has continued until the present

³² Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), [2007]), www.csis.org/burke (accessed October 22, 2007).

³³ Gilles Dorronsorio, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present* (New York: Columbia University Press in association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2005), 370.

time as a destabilizing factor, and it was decisive in the rise of the Taliban.³⁴ The author attributes the sobering security situation to factors such as “conflicting group-identities, narcotics trade, small arms highways, money laundering, mineral smuggles and cultural clashes.”³⁵

The security situation in Afghanistan has recently been shaken by an increased number of insurgency activities, primarily conducted by the Taliban, beginning in mid-2006. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason discuss in their article, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” safe havens in Pakistan’s border areas that have been utilized by the Taliban, the tribal understanding of the Pashtuns’ code of honor, and the influence of Islamic scholars, especially in rural areas, to maintain the support and ability to continue insurgencies to destabilize Afghanistan. The authors deem the number of PRTs throughout the country as too little and they note that the ratio between military personnel and local inhabitants is the most insufficient of any recent post-conflict missions (i.e., Bosnia or Kosovo). Moreover, the authors hold that not only are the Taliban active, but also the Islamic movement Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbudin Hekmatyar.³⁶ In their view, “Afghanistan is anything but a stable country.”³⁷ The article rejects the superficial view of the Taliban as merely terrorist while analyzing the tribal circumstances in which they are operating. They conclude that an intensified support of NATO is necessary, including a significantly increased number of PRTs throughout the country, to win the counter-insurgency. They also suggest a variety of requirements that have to be fulfilled by the Afghan government, the United Nations, NGOs and other donors for a successful conclusion to OEF.³⁸

³⁴ Feroz H. Khan, *Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan* (Monterey, CA: Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC), [2003]), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/jan03/southAsia.asp> (accessed October 31 2007).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” *Orbis* 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 71.

³⁷ Ibid., 72.

³⁸ Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” 88.

7. Literature Assessment

The literature includes a huge variety of sources on Afghanistan and current commitments and operations by international organizations in this country. However, the literature dealing with the PRTs, in particular, is sparse, preliminary and limited because the concept of the PRTs is relatively new. The U.S. developed the concept in 2002, NATO adopted it in 2003, and each nation understands it differently. Additionally, NATO expanded its presence from 2003 to 2006 with several PRTs throughout Afghanistan, which means that a fundamental operational change took place before troop-contributing nations were able to gain extensive experience. Consequently, the evaluative and assessment literature is not currently representative and covers only the initial stages of the PRTs. Nevertheless, various reports, documentations and descriptions are available. In addition, literature dealing with Afghanistan itself, including political, economic, societal and cultural aspects, is abundant.

D. ORGANIZATION

1. Methodology

This thesis focuses on German and U.S.-led PRTs currently deployed in Afghanistan. By conducting case studies of the designated PRTs, their performance is assessed. The assessment follows four criteria: capacity building, stability, relationship-building, and aid projects and coordination.³⁹ Detailed definitions of these criteria are provided in Chapter IV. Due to the qualitative and dynamic character of these criteria, the assessment reflects trends.⁴⁰ The overall character of the thesis is explanatory and analytical.

³⁹ In this thesis, capacity-building means the improvement of state capabilities such as administration, institutions, ANP, ANBP and ANA. Stability implies the perception of the security situation in the respective areas of the PRTs among officials, NGOs and the Afghan population. Relationship-building implies the establishment of relationships between military personnel and local key-decision makers and their subsequent impacts. Aid projects and coordination means the capability of the PRTs to establish conditions in which projects can be executed, to conduct small scale projects, to provide expertise for certain projects, as well as to exchange and share information of planned and current actions between military personnel of the designated PRTs and the respective civilian aid actors.

⁴⁰ Trends in this thesis means that an improvement in the respective criteria is reflected by a “+”, a deterioration by a “-” and a “0” signals no change.

2. Sources

This thesis includes an assessment of the setbacks of the PRTs regarding the achievement of their goals. For this purpose, NATO's quarterly reports about ISAF to the UN, unclassified situation reports of the designated PRTs, UNAMA reports, NGO reports and CRS reports are consulted.

3. Thesis Content

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the analytical framework in which the PRTs are effective. PRTs are only a contributing asset and part of a composition of means that aim to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to see the PRTs in the context of the overall political process.

In Chapter III, the case studies of the German and U.S.-led PRTs, which are the subject of the investigation, are introduced, and the conceptual understanding and approach of the PRT's lead nations are described. Finally, the mission statements and the objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical level are discussed. This and the previous chapter are essentially descriptive.

Chapter IV assesses the setbacks of the PRTs. Due to increased Taliban activities since mid-2006, among other factors, the PRTs have not yet met their goals.

Chapter V analyzes factors that influence the approach and actions of the PRTs to explain why the assessed setbacks have occurred. Within this chapter, the focus is not only on the armed opposition of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, poppy growing, and the overall security situation, but also on government, economic, and socio-cultural issues. This chapter is analytical.

Chapter VI offers conclusions and recommendations.

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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan has been a corridor, base, or buffer for other powers or adjacent countries seeking their own interests and benefits for centuries. Alexander the Great, in the second century, was not the first invader of Afghanistan, but he was daring and brave enough to conquer this rangy, rugged and muddy land, with strong winters and hot summers, to establish and consolidate his empire against the Persians. He learned about the Hindukush and the tribes and gained even more experience on his way back from India. He was followed, for instance, by the Huns, Genghis Khan and his Mongols, the Moghuls, as well as the British, the Soviet Union and also Iran, Pakistan and India. All of them tried to alienate and utilize Afghanistan for their interests and purposes.⁴¹ The British paid a high price, especially during the first and second Anglo-Afghan Wars in the nineteenth century when they were not able to establish direct rule over Afghanistan and lost a lot of their sons. Additionally, the Soviet Union had been defeated in a Cold War scenario by the mujahideen who fought their jihad and applied guerrilla warfare techniques. Both, the British and the Soviets painfully experienced what it means to occupy Afghanistan.

“For the United States, September the 11th, 2001, cut a deep dividing line in our history, a change of eras as sharp and clear as Pearl Harbor or the first day of the Berlin blockade. There can be no lasting security in a world at the mercy of terrorists for my nation or for any nation. Given this threat, NATO's defining purpose -- our collective defense -- is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror. . . . In this war, we defend not just America or Europe; we are defending civilization itself.”⁴² Immediately after the disasters of 9/11, an undisputed and

⁴¹ Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*, ed. Palgrave Macmillan (London; New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks: Distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 9-36.

⁴² Federal News Service, “In Bush's Words: A New Call to Mutual Defense,” *The New York Times*, May 24, 2002 (accessed January 18, 2008).

common consensus prevailed among the international community⁴³ regarding the commitment against International Terrorism. This consequently led to the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States in October 2001.

We now recognize the commitment of the international community to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan after years of civil war and the reign of the Taliban regime. The rebuilding of Afghanistan is a combination of civil-military activities embedded in an overarching political process. The international community has learned their lessons from history and practices a light footprint on the ground to avoid impressions of occupation. The former UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, recommended this approach in 2001 regarding the presence of military forces.⁴⁴

The U.S.-led coalition of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) consisted, in the early stages, of eighteen⁴⁵ troop-contributing nations. After the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, the initial high intensity war-fighting phase of late 2001 was shortly finished. Subsequently, during the transition phase from high intensity war-fighting to stabilization operations, the U.S. designed a force presence avoiding "major troop deployments."⁴⁶ In this context and in the consideration of Brahimi's recommendations, the Bonn Conference in Germany, in December 2001, was held. The primary aim of the

⁴³ In this thesis, the term International Community means not only all in the nation-building process that involved countries on the political and military level, but also all organizations that provide aid of any kind to Afghanistan. These countries include Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are various IOs and NGOs which were coordinated by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and since 2007 NATO has gained coordination authority among those.

⁴⁴ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 8.

⁴⁵ Seventeen international troop-contributing nations according to U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Public Affairs, *Fact Sheet - International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, [2002]), www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/d20020226icwt.pdf (accessed January 21, 2008) plus the United States.

⁴⁶ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 8.

Bonn Agreement⁴⁷ was to establish a political roadmap to “promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability, and respects for human rights, as well as to cooperate with the international community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism.”⁴⁸ Finally, a solid state founded on “a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government”⁴⁹ along with sufficient state capacity⁵⁰ and autonomy⁵¹ should be established. However, the agreement is not a peace agreement among the adversaries who fought the civil war previously.⁵² It has laid down the timeframe for national elections, the role of the United Nations in rebuilding Afghanistan, the reorganization of the Afghan military forces, the establishment of ISAF, and the introduction of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.⁵³ Eventually, presidential elections took place on the ninth of October 2004, parliamentary elections on the nineteenth of September 2005, and the consensus of the Afghan constitution was promulgated on the fourth of January 2004.⁵⁴ Unfortunately, the Bonn Agreement and the subsequent Security Sector Reform (SSR) have shown only limited success and are in permanent need of re-stimulation.

⁴⁷ According to United Nations Security Council, “Press Release SC/7234,” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7234.doc.htm> (accessed January 28, 2008) the official name is “Agreement on a provisional arrangement in Afghanistan, pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions.”

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ According to Patrick H. O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York, N.Y: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007), 38-39. “Capacity is the ability of the state to wield power in order to carry out the basic tasks of security and reconciling freedom and equality.”

⁵¹ According to Ibid., 39 “autonomy is the ability of the state to wield its power independently of the public.”

⁵² Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada and Abby Stoddard, *Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document* (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, [2005]), <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/cling-afg-apr05.pdf> (accessed November 28, 2007).

⁵³ Johnson, *Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War*, 3.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 9.

ISAF still suffers from a low commitment in the deployment of troop personnel. “We need more time, more patience, and more commitment”⁵⁵ to succeed in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Army said, as the last commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan (CFC-A) on Bagram airfield on January 21, 2007, when authority over all U.S. forces in Afghanistan was transferred to the Combined Joint Task Force-76 (CJTF-76). Moreover, the international community lacks a joint strategy of military operations and civil activities. NATO has not yet defined a common concept of PRTs that might be a compulsory prerequisite, to enhance the effectiveness of PRTs on the ground, as some authors claim.⁵⁶ NATO’s approach is dominated by the lead-nation concept. Each nation has different understandings and interpretations of what PRT activities should be due to different political, economic and ethnic environments, and key figures, as well as different national mandates. Flexibility, instead of being a concept, is common sense among the participating nations. Thus, the PRTs are tailored to the respective needs of the Afghans and to the unique cultural environment in which the respective PRT becomes effective.

This chapter is primarily descriptive and provides facts and figures about the goals and differences of OEF and ISAF. This is followed by the U.S., NATO and the German concepts and approaches in Afghanistan regarding the deployed PRTs. It should be noted that the following framework focuses only on military aspects of the overall rebuilding process in Afghanistan.

B. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) VS. THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)

Operation Enduring Freedom was launched as a U.S.-led coalition, as a result of the incidents of 9/11, with the invasion of Afghanistan on the seventh of October 2001, independent from the United Nations and NATO. Major combat operations consisted primarily of U.S. air strikes as well as the launching of cruise and Tomahaw missiles

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, “Outgoing Commander Says U.S. Commitment Will Live on in Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2771 (accessed January 21, 2008).

⁵⁶ Noetzel and Scheipers, *Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing Or Disunity*, ? 4.

from U.S. and British platforms targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces and accompanied by a relatively small footprint of ground troops during the initial stage. In this stage, Special Forces operations (SFO) were conducted with 1,000 personnel and approximately 1,300 marines were deployed to the southern part of Afghanistan to conduct locally limited high intensity war-fighting against the Taliban forces around Kandahar. These major ground operations lasted from October to December 2001 and the ninth of December 2001 was the date when the Taliban regime surrendered. Unfortunately, the deployed forces were not capable of catching Osama bin Laden or the leadership of the Al-Qaeda network. Officially, major combat operations ended on the first of May 2003, after “Operation Anaconda”⁵⁷ had finished. Consequently, the U.S. invasion defeated the Taliban regime and dispersed the Al-Qaeda network. Remnants of both groups still remain in Afghanistan although the OEF mission is still ongoing. U.S. ground forces were basically not involved in huge high intensity war-fighting, as were the forces of the Northern Alliance who fought side-by-side with the U.S.-led coalition forces.⁵⁸

The ISAF mission was initiated during the Bonn Agreement. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, promulgated on the twentieth of December 2001, declared the mission robust and allowed the use of lethal force due to the fact that the situation in Afghanistan posed and still poses “a threat to international peace and security.”⁵⁹ The United Kingdom took the initial lead, whereas the mandate was limited to Kabul, and to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”⁶⁰ Table 1 provides an overview of different aspects of both missions.

⁵⁷ According to Kenneth Katzmann, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, [2007]) (accessed October 2, 2007) Operation Anaconda was the first major offensive operation since the invasion in 2001. It was conducted in early 2002 in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, south of Gardez, Paktia province against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces.

⁵⁸ Ibid.; Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, ed. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), 43-44.

⁵⁹ United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1386 (2001),” United Nations, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm> (accessed January 28, 2008).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Table 1. Different Aspects of the OEF and ISAF Mission

	OEF	ISAF
Legitimacy	Self-defense ⁶¹	UN-mandated (UNSCR 1386 under chapter VII) NATO-led ⁶²
Origins	Combat mission ⁶³	Peacekeeping, assistance and stabilization mission ⁶⁴
Aim	Destroy Al-Qaeda network and overthrow Taliban regime ⁶⁵	Assist the government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment, extend government authority and influence and facilitate reconstruction ⁶⁶
Leadership in theatre	U.S.-led HQ at Bagram airbase ⁶⁷	NATO-led composite HQ in Kabul ⁶⁸
Participating Nations	France, Japan, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates ⁶⁹	38 participating nations, including all NATO member states ⁷⁰
Area of Operations	Eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan ⁷¹	Initially limited to Kabul and since October 2003 throughout Afghanistan ⁷²

⁶¹ Katzmman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 7.

⁶² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1386 (2001)*, 2.

⁶³ Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 1; Katzmman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 20.

⁶⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1386 (2001)*, 2.

⁶⁵ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, 43.

⁶⁶ NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 1.

⁶⁷ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, 45.

⁶⁸ NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 5-6.

⁶⁹ Katzmman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 20-21.

⁷⁰ NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 1.

⁷¹ Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 1 However, the mission is not limited to the physical borders of Afghanistan.

⁷² United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1386 (2001)*, 2; NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 5-6.

NATO strengthened its commitment after the United Nations asked, on behalf of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, who requested NATO's presence in Afghanistan.⁷³ The main issue was command, control and communication (C3) of ISAF and, therefore, the deployment and establishment of a permanent ISAF headquarters under NATO command. NATO's commitment enabled smaller countries willing to participate, but not able to be a lead nation, into the force generation process of ISAF.⁷⁴ NATO took over C3 from ISAF on the eleventh of August 2003, and the planning of the phased expansion of NATO throughout the country began in October 2003 after the UNSCR 1510 had been promulgated, which gave permission to extend the force presence and influence beyond Kabul. The expansion was planned and conducted in four stages counter-clockwise throughout the countryside and started effectively in December 2003, at first in and around Kabul, where France became the lead nation, relieved Germany, and established the Regional Command Central (RCC).⁷⁵ Subsequently, the expansion continued as in Figure 1, shown below, and was completed on the fifth of October 2006 when NATO assumed authority over the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and over the Regional Command East (RCE).⁷⁶

HQ RCE is collocated to the CJTF-76 at Bagram airbase, which is the headquarters for OEF and for all U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and also functions as a "de facto HQ"⁷⁷ for RCE. Regarding planning and conducting operations under OEF, staffing tasks are received from ISAF HQ in Kabul, and it is reasonable to assume that this is a challenging workload for the staff personnel, and that it is really difficult to differentiate

⁷³ Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 3.

⁷⁴ NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 5.


⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, 45.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 45.

between OEF and ISAF, and stick to the respective mandates, due to a statement by the commander of CFC-A in October 2006, Lt.Gen. Karl Eikenberry, in which he said: “Our missions and forces on the ground remain unchanged.”⁷⁸

Figure 1. The stages and timeline of NATO expansion in Afghanistan⁷⁹



The other ISAF Regional Commands are RC North (RCN) in Mazar-e Sharif under Germany, RC West (RCW) in Herat under Italy and RC South (RCS) in Kandahar, which is led by the United Kingdom.⁸⁰ The lead nation concept has been applicable to the RCs and the PRTs since the involvement of NATO began.

NATO defined the desired ISAF end-state in a letter dated 2 October 2003 from the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson at that time, to the United Nations as “self-sustaining, moderate and democratic Afghan government, in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, able to exercise its authority and to operate throughout Afghanistan, without the need for ISAF to help provide security.”⁸¹

⁷⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, “NATO Takes Lead for Operations throughout Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=1462 (accessed January 21, 2008).

⁷⁹ NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 2.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 7 October 2003 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 3.

The entire evolution of NATO in Afghanistan was accompanied by a series of renewed UNSCRs to legitimize the use of force and the presence in a sovereign country. This important point ensures, besides the fact that the impression of an occupying force is avoided in Afghanistan,⁸² a sufficient level of acceptance among the population of the respective troop-contributing nations. Especially among the European NATO members, the parliament, the parties, as well as the population execute domestic pressure on the governments. They see the danger of a mission creep from peacekeeping and stabilization toward high intensity war-fighting within counter-insurgency operations.⁸³ Therefore, the existence of valid UNSCRs are essential, for instance, for Germany, where a national mandate of the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory to deploy armed forces outside the country and an approval of this would be very unlikely in the case of an expired UNSCR. The latest UNSCR is 1776 from September 19, 2007 and includes the United Nations' support for OEF.⁸⁴

Consequently, OEF and ISAF are diametrically opposed missions with respect to their origins and objectives. Thus, completely different approaches, force formations, equipment, and leadership are necessary to achieve their respective goals. It is correct that the "range of military missions in Afghanistan encompasses everything from humanitarian to highly kinetic conventional and special operations,"⁸⁵ however, regarding the big picture, it is, to a certain extent, useless to argue that "NATO and OEF forces have some degree of overlapping missions."⁸⁶ This becomes even more obvious with regard to their respective chains of command, in which no common points can be identified. NATO's strategic HQ is Supreme Allied Command Operations (SACO) in Mons, Belgium and is in the lead for ISAF, whereas U.S. Centcom in Tampa, Florida is

⁸² According to Katzmman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 28 NATO negotiated on 15 August 2006 an agreement to formalize the NATO presence in Afghanistan.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Afghanistan Study Group, *Afghanistan Study Group Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of the Presidency, [2008]), http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf (accessed February 2, 2008).

⁸⁶ Afghanistan Study Group, *Afghanistan Study Group Report*.

the comparable HQ for OEF. Although both are commanded by U.S. four-star generals, SACO receives guidance out of and reports to NATO Military Command Structure (MCS) and U.S. Centcom is part of the U.S. national chain of command. Thus, the coordination of the two missions is challenging, although liaison elements are established in both HQs. Both missions touch each other in Afghanistan, especially in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan, however, they are conducted separately and, therefore, “it is important that NATO military authorities regularly review command and control arrangements with the aim to simplify and streamline existing command structures wherever and whenever possible.”⁸⁷ Ultimately, coordination and cooperation are vital for the success of the military operations, but this has to be inter-communicative or in the words of the former Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson, “it is imperative that there be clear command and control arrangements between ISAF, OEF and PRTs.”⁸⁸

Simultaneously, the number of PRTs increased significantly with the expansion of ISAF throughout the country. The PRTs are the main civil-military asset, which conducts on the tactical level, stability operations and reconstruction projects and hence, combines military and civil activities in the regional environment. In the following sections, the different concepts, views and understandings of PRTs are discussed.

C. U.S. CONCEPT OF PRTS

U.S. officials developed the concept of PRTs in the summer of 2002. This in turn led to the establishment of the first U.S. PRT in Gardez, Paktia province under OEF in November 2002.⁸⁹ Prior to this, the OEF mission had so-called Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams-Afghanistan (CAT-As) available, which supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction activities,

⁸⁷ Afghanistan Study Group, *Afghanistan Study Group Report*.

⁸⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated October 7, 2003 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 5.

⁸⁹ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?* 32.

which were conducted by the civil aid organizations.⁹⁰ The reconstruction efforts of the civil actors were limited, due to a lack of security throughout the country,⁹¹ and as already mentioned above, the U.S. wanted to avoid major troop deployments to Afghanistan for good historical reasons and additionally, due to their belief that a traditional peacekeeping approach would be fruitless in Afghanistan.⁹² Within this framework, the concept of PRTs was born as “small joint civil-military teams to expand the legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by supporting security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process.”⁹³ In other words, the concept of PRTs was to spread the so-called “ISAF effect”⁹⁴ throughout the countryside.

PRTs consist mostly of military personnel, which amount to approximately 90-95 percent, and the U.S. did not initially define any certain guidelines on how a PRT should be structured and which capabilities should be encompassed. The teams are tailored in size and composition to the local requirements and circumstances of the respective region, however, the concept implies a permanent presence of forces in the region, which is contradictory to OEF combat operations.⁹⁵ PRTs play a role in stabilization and reconstruction measures and, therefore, they were originally called Joint Regional Teams.⁹⁶

The respective PRTs’ environments could, especially in the beginning in 2002, be characterized as highly volatile. The OEF mission was in its transition to the stabilization

⁹⁰ Michael J. Dziedzic and Michael K. Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, [2005]), www.usip.org.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle*, ? 32.

⁹³ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 11.

⁹⁴ Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, *Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document*, 56.

⁹⁵ Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort*, ? 6; Russell N. Wardle, *The Search for Stability: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, [2004]).

⁹⁶ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle*, ? 36.

phase, which, from a military perspective, is the most critical one. Thus, a large amount of flexibility was necessary to fit the PRTs into the respective environments where they could become most effective. This explains why the majority of the early organization charts of PRTs were dominated by military divisions and branches rather than other players, such as the “Afghan government, government organizations (e.g. USAID), State Department, NGOs, and UN,”⁹⁷ which initially represented a secondary role.

Due to the fact that the U.S. PRTs consist of low personnel strength (less than 100), the concept’s main focus emphasizes force protection, self-defense, as well as quick impact assistance regarding the civil side to win local confidence and contribute to force protection.⁹⁸ Although military tactical reserves, including the air assets of OEF, have been available in general, the PRTs had to rely on establishing liaisons and bargaining with regional key decision makers such as warlords, mullahs or regional commanders. Thus, the U.S.-led PRT has been more of a diplomatic asset with low enforcing capabilities.⁹⁹

The U.S. concept is based on the integration of civilian expertise to conduct reconstruction activities and pursue the goals of the security sector reform. Although there are often tensions between the military and civil side and the level of integration varies widely, agencies such as USAID, the U.S. Departments of Justice, Education, Agriculture and others have been involved.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, it is important to stress that the Afghan government was involved in the development of this concept. They requested the change of name from Joint Regional Teams (JRTs) to PRTs and participated in coordination matters between PRTs and the governmental level of Afghanistan, basically represented by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.¹⁰¹ Thus, from the beginning of the

⁹⁷ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?*, 36.

⁹⁸ Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace, [2005]), www.usip.org; Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 12.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?*, 36; Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 12.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

PRT concept, it was obvious that a high level of cooperation and coordination between the military and the civil actors was essential for success. Unfortunately, the established PRT Executive Steering Committee lost authority. It was to provide a platform for coordination measures among the Afghan government, UNAMA, ISAF, U.S. military representatives, and other donor countries. The same thing happened to the PRT Working Group on a different level. This was established on the HQ level of PRTs to enable an exchange of information. They suffered from both a low level of acceptance and ineffectiveness.¹⁰²

Another problem for PRTs was the lack of a clear definition of their role. PRT Working Guidelines¹⁰³ or Principles¹⁰⁴ were released by U.S. officials in which three main areas of activities were defined: reconstruction, central government support and stability. Thus, PRTs were not considered primarily military units conducting major combat operations to establish security, rather they were civilian-dominated groups pursuing developmental and political goals.¹⁰⁵ This is the main difference between Civil-Military-Cooperation (CIMIC) units deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, which conducted small scale reconstruction projects to support primarily military goals.¹⁰⁶ Although the U.S. concept of the PRTs enables flexibility to a large extent, it is extremely difficult to pursue the reconstruction and political efforts on the one hand, and establish

¹⁰² Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 2.

¹⁰³ Gerard McHugh and Lola Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save the Children, [2004]), http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Save_the_Children_UK_-_PRTs_and_Humanitarian-Military_Relations_in_Afghanistan_2004_09.pdf (accessed November 28, 2007).

¹⁰⁴ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 11.

¹⁰⁵ McHugh and Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan*, 19.

¹⁰⁶ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 12-14.

security on the other hand, in a country with little stability between the relatively calm situation in the north and west but with a more volatile environment in the south and east of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷

The next section shows how NATO has interpreted the PRT concept developed by the United States and how they gradually moved away from the original purpose of the PRTs.

D. NATO'S ADOPTED CONCEPT OF PRTS

NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, underscored the importance of NATO's commitment in Afghanistan in his statement, "Afghanistan is a top priority for NATO."¹⁰⁸ NATO is, meanwhile, very involved, and has successfully spread the ISAF effect throughout the country and gained initial success in the deployment of PRTs to extend the authority of the central government in Kabul. The ISAF mission is the first commitment of NATO outside the so-called transatlantic area. Moreover, it is a test, but also a chance for NATO to prove its capabilities to counter threats such as asymmetric warfare, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰⁹ NATO will perform as well and as effectively as their member states' level of ambition, and if NATO fails, the alliance will run into trouble.

When NATO was beginning to expand throughout the country of Afghanistan in late 2003, they utilized the U.S. concept of PRTs and adopted it in a slightly different way. NATO preferred the alternative approach to the U.S. concept and used the British approach, which they had practiced in their PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province. This model pursued a primarily diplomatic approach based on negotiations rather than more military activities such as patrolling, and active support of the DDR and SSR processes. Thus, it is an active peace support or even enforcement model, which is legitimized by

¹⁰⁷ Robert Borders, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: A Model for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Journal of Development and Social Transformation, [2005]), www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/dev/pdfs/borders1.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 1.

¹⁰⁹ Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 1.

the UNSCR 1386 and 1510¹¹⁰ as of October 13, 2003. Although it sticks to the integration of civilian actors to ensure the conduction of reconstruction efforts, NATO emphasizes the military capabilities of PRTs and hence, lays its main point of effort on security,¹¹¹ although NATO did not change the requirements to do so.

The British PRT varied not only in size, but also in its different focus on security rather than on civil affairs. Though PRTs are already more than five years in use, NATO has not yet determined a structure or organization chart or even defined capabilities. They developed the concept as a copy of the former British PRT in Mazar-e Sharif and related it after that to NATO's PRT pilot project in Kunduz, where Germany has been in the lead position since June 2003. The former British PRT in Mazar-e Sharif consisted of less than 100¹¹² personnel, whereas the PRT in Kunduz appears to have more than 450¹¹³ servicemen excluding the civilian actors. NATO's understanding is that the PRTs have to be tailored to the demands of the regional environment regarding their size and composition, but the role of the PRTs, to first conduct military activities to produce stability and then, within this context, reconstruction measures, remains the same.¹¹⁴ In comparison to NATO's understanding, the original role of PRTs, defined in the U.S. PRT Working Guidelines as of February 2003, focused on three main areas of activity. These were, in prioritized order, reconstruction, central government support, and stability.¹¹⁵ It

¹¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1510 (2003)* (New York: United Nations Security Council, [2003]), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html (accessed February 7, 2008).

¹¹¹ McHugh and Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan*, 58.

¹¹² Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort?* 7.

¹¹³ 12th German Contingent ISAF, National Briefing as of December 27, 2006, Mazar-e Sharif/AFG.

¹¹⁴ Steve Mason, *NGO/Government Dialogue on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance* (Canada: Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, [2003]), www.peacebuild.ca/whatsnew/PRT-Dialogue-FinalReport.doc (accessed February 7, 2008).

¹¹⁵ McHugh and Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan*, 19.

is not enough that NATO has already changed the original role of a PRT; each lead nation in charge of a PRT interprets its role differently due to their respective national understanding and political landscape.

The activities of PRTs under NATO command are clearly defined in ISAF's operational plan as of 27 June 2004, in which a clear division between military and civilian actions has occurred.¹¹⁶ NATO defined terms of reference on 27 January 2005 in which the mission statement emphasizes security more than reconstruction for the first time. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR and reconstruction efforts."¹¹⁷ Thus, NATO's strategy is three-fold, however, NATO stresses clearly that they play only the second role in creating a stable and secure environment due to the assisting and supporting nature of the ISAF missions.¹¹⁸ The first role in this context has been taken over by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), which require continuous cooperation and coordination. Consequently, NATO has, under a revised operational plan, deployed the operational liaison and mentoring teams (OMLTs) to enhance the provision of security. These teams are assigned to different levels of ANA units and are responsible for coaching, accompanying and training of these units.¹¹⁹ However, they are not the focus of this thesis due to the fact that they were deployed effectively in 2006 and are thus, too new to be assessed from the perspective of the author. But they were definitely deployed because the PRTs have not been able to provide this training and mentoring to ANA, which means that the PRTs' contribution to stability is, in this case, limited. Moreover, the OMLTs promote and stimulate again the SSR process where the U.S. is in charge of training the ANA.

¹¹⁶ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 15.

¹¹⁷ Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, *Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document*, 57-58.

¹¹⁸ NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 12.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.


According to ISAF's PRT handbook, the purpose of PRTs is "to enhance stability in the provinces of Afghanistan."¹²⁰ NATO describes PRTs as a civil-military institution and a conflict-dissolving mechanism "able to penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components."¹²¹ In other words, PRTs enforce stability in the areas or provinces where necessary and then apply political, diplomatic, economic, and reconstruction measures to make sure that these areas do not slip back into conflict regions, and contribute therewith to a sustainable stable and secure situation. "The PRT is neither a combat nor a development institution. [...] The PRT is an interim institution designed for a specific purpose."¹²² Therefore, a PRT can only be active in provinces where the situation is suitable regarding the capabilities of a PRT. A PRT requires a certain situation. This situation must be neither too volatile nor too stable and can be described as a transitional phase. Figure 2 shows the spectrum of intervention in which PRTs can engage. A situation more left or more right on the spectrum is inappropriate for PRTs.

¹²⁰ Michelle Parker, *Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangarhar, Afghanistan in 2006* (Washington/D.C.: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, [2007]), www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/pubs/Case%2010%20-%20PRTs.pdf.

¹²¹ International Security Assistance Force, *PRT Handbook* (Kabul/AFG: International Security Assistance Force, [2006]).

¹²² Ibid.

Figure 2. Spectrum of Engagement of PRTs¹²³




There are twenty-five PRTs currently in deployed in Afghanistan, all of which are under ISAF command.¹²⁴ The PRTs are run by a lead nation, but are can be comprised of more nations, are subordinated under the Regional Commands (RC), which is equivalent to a Brigade-sized unit. This means that an RC is commanded by a one-star general whereas the PRT commanders are lieutenant colonels or colonels. ISAF HQ is located in Kabul and represents the highest tactical level in theatre. The operational level begins with the Joint Force Command North in Brunssum, the Netherlands, which again is subordinated to SACO in Mons, Belgium.¹²⁵ Figure 3 provides an overview of the currently deployed PRTs in Afghanistan as of July 2007.

¹²³ International Security Assistance Force, *PRT Handbook*.

¹²⁴ According to NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 1-2 38 troop contributing nations with over 40,000 soldiers are involved in the operation.

¹²⁵ NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 9.

Figure 3. Current PRTs in Afghanistan¹²⁶



NATO's approach emphasizes flexibility, but the concept of PRTs serves multiple purposes for NATO. The acceptance of these small units among the NATO members is high and provides a suitable possibility for the smaller NATO members to participate in the ISAF mission with only a small contingent. However, this means that PRTs basically serve NATO's interests and not Afghanistan's, especially in sustaining the international engagement.¹²⁷ Additionally, NATO's commitment is accompanied by a lot of funding for Afghanistan, due to the fact that burden-sharing is an important point on NATO's agenda and each participating nation provides a remarkable sum of money.¹²⁸

However, the more participants are involved, the harder it is to create a consensus, and the more challenging it is to coordinate all the actors. There are not only the participating nations with their military commitment, but also all the non-military actors

¹²⁶ German Ministry of Defense, Fü S V, *Übersicht Über Aufgaben, Funktion Und Struktur DEU PRT in AFG* (Bonn/Germany, [2007]).

¹²⁷ Lara Olson and Hrach Gregorian, *Civil-Military Coordination: Challenges and Opportunities in Afghanistan and Beyond* (Calgary/CA: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, [2007]), www.jmss.org/2007/2007fall/articles/olson-gregorian-editorial.pdf (accessed February 15, 2007).

¹²⁸ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?* 38.

who conduct humanitarian relief, development, and nation-building activities. The UNAMA is primarily their representative and is to monitor and assist the implementation of the Bonn Agreement with all its facets. The UN's Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan provides guidance to the UNAMA, which thus plays or should play an important role in coordinating the activities of non-military actors. However, UNAMA has to rely on the voluntary willingness of the civilian actors to cooperate because the UN did not put obligations on the participating actors.¹²⁹ Consequently, the situation in Afghanistan regarding all actors is more than complex, and within this context, an absence of one real lead agency or nation for all actors of the international community prevails in a situation where coordination and cooperation is of utmost importance. These are only the objective facts, but additionally, personal resentments, sentiments, prejudices or even incompetence occur, which sometimes makes it impossible to cooperate with someone else.

For coordination and guidance purposes, several institutions have been created. On the strategic level, the PRT Executive Steering Committee¹³⁰ was established. Additionally, two more working groups subordinate to the committee were created. First, the PRT Working Group,¹³¹ which is to coordinate and discuss operational issues of the respective PRTs, especially regarding civil-military activities, and secondly, the NGO Civil Military Working Group,¹³² which should facilitate communication between NGOs, military forces and the Afghan government. In the latter group, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) plays an important role as the main NGO coordination

¹²⁹ Rubin, Hamidzada and Stoddard, *Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document*, 54-55.

¹³⁰ Chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and further participants are the Minister of Finance, Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development, COM ISAF, COM OEF (both co-chairs), the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, UNAMA, NATO's Senior Civilian Representative, ambassadors of PRT contributing countries and occasionally representatives of other contributing nations. Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 15.

¹³¹ Chaired by the Ministry of Interior and other members are UNAMA's civil-military coordinator, representative of OEF HQ and ISAF HQ as well as representatives of embassies of contributing nations. Ibid.

¹³² Chaired by the UNAMA's Civil-Military Coordinator and further composed of several representatives from different NGOs, military participants from OEF and ISAF as well as representatives of UNAMA and the Afghan government. Ibid.

body located in Kabul.¹³³ These coordination forums can be seen as remarkable efforts with a willingness to coordinate civil and military activities and are known as “3-Ds” (defense, development and diplomacy) or “whole of government approaches” or in terms of the UN “integrated missions.”¹³⁴ Furthermore, from an external viewpoint, it is reasonable to expect that an efficient teamwork would occur and prevail. However, these expectations are too simplistic and too high. Despite good intentions and a desire to help the Afghan people as common sense, coordination between the civil and military sides often clashes without fruitful results due to diametrically opposed approaches and understandings of civil and military strategies. Finally, information-sharing is the sole result that occurs from these coordination efforts, which is definitely too little to gain synergies.¹³⁵ Ultimately, security forces continue to conduct winning-hearts-and-minds projects as a kind of neighborhood support, although these activities are not authorized and do not fit in the overall reconstruction efforts of a PRT.¹³⁶ These efforts can lead to confusion among the population and to blurring effects between military forces and aid workers, especially when when aid workers appear in the same place and intend to conduct the same or even contradictory activities. The coordination between ISAF and OEF activities is also challenging, as a U.S. PRT commander once stated, “We do not want the State Department representative to meet with a tribal leader in the morning and have that person arrested by an Army Special Forces Team in the afternoon.”¹³⁷

E. GERMANY’S CONCEPT OF PRTS

Germany’s national parliament (Bundestag) mandated the establishment of its first PRT in Kunduz, Kunduz province, on October 24, 2003 and transferred the authority

¹³³ Olson and Gregorian, *Civil-Military Coordination: Challenges and Opportunities in Afghanistan and Beyond*, 9.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Personal experience of the author during the winter of 12th German Contingent, Mazar-e Sharif/AFG.

¹³⁷ Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 8.

to NATO in December 2003.¹³⁸ This PRT was the pilot project for NATO. Germany's large commitment in Afghanistan, prior to NATO's expansion, is based on its strong ties to the trans-Atlantic alliance as a fundamental pillar in German security policies and the self-evident support of other NATO member-states. However, the increased engagement can also be seen as a substitute for the deployment of German forces to Iraq due to the policy of the former German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, who stated "Kunduz instead of Baghdad."¹³⁹

The German concept differs from the U.S. concept and it is not solely a military one, but rather a consensus among four different ministries of the German government. Therefore, Germany has released its Afghanistan concept of the German government in which the intra-ministerial strategy is defined.¹⁴⁰ The relevant ministries are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC). The entire concept represents an intra-ministerial venture; however, there is a clear distinction between the military and civil chains of command.¹⁴¹ The German PRTs are comprised of two commanders, the military commander, usually a colonel, is the head of all military assets and receives guidance not only from the national chain of command, but also from ISAF HQ via the respective RC. All German military assets are TACOM¹⁴² under COM ISAF, which imposes some limitations on COM ISAF regarding tasking these units. A representative of the MoFA is usually at the head of the civilian side of the PRT. This

¹³⁸ Julia Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell* (Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations, [2005]), www.zif-berlin.org/Downloads/PRT_20.04.05.pdf (accessed January 24, 2008).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, *Das Afghanistan-Konzept Der Bundesregierung* (Berlin/Germany: Bundesregierung, [2007]), http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1264/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/09/2007-09-05-fortschreibung-afghanistan-konzept.html (accessed February 18, 2008).

¹⁴¹ Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort?* 9-10; Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 15.

¹⁴² The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority" according to MC 57/3 and AAP-6(V) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions as of July 16, 1999.

team is supported by a representative of the MoEC who provides recommendations and coordination measures of all development and reconstruction activities.¹⁴³ This structure is the result of the German constitution, in particular the German understanding of the ‘primacy of politics’ especially in military issues, which makes it impossible to subordinate other ministries or agencies under the authority of a military command. Additionally, there is no possibility within the PRT for the military commander to task civil activities, although there are coordination talks on a regular basis.

The German concept describes the activities of the PRTs as primarily diplomatic work in the form of establishing liaisons to key decision makers in the respective regions, conducting dialogues to convince and strengthen the local population, as well as enabling and supporting the activities of the UNAMA. Secondly, the PRTs should focus on security by supporting the SSR and finally, conduct development and reconstruction in accordance with other international and national actors in this sector.¹⁴⁴ Although political efforts are in the foreground, the military size of the German PRTs is larger than the U.S. PRTs; the main difference is that the U.S. PRTs show up with a unity of command, whereas in the German PRTs, a strict division between the military and the civil chains of command prevail.

F. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the evolution of the PRT concept from the U.S., NATO and German viewpoints is described. It is of utmost importance to understand that the PRTs in Afghanistan are only a small contributor or enabler in an overall political process. Moreover, the original intentions as well as the goals and objectives, determined by the first document, the Bonn Agreement, have to be kept in focus. Within the political framework, further processes such as the SSR, DDR and the PRTs have evolved.

¹⁴³ The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority” according to MC 57/3 and AAP-6(V) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions as of July 16, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

It is the nature of these commitments that the original focus blurs over time and missions creep; a smooth shift to other objectives takes place. However, PRTs can only conduct satisfying work when they pursue goals for which they have been originally structured and for which they are enabled. Otherwise they are overworked. The message of this chapter is that the blades of the scissor are disintegrated; on one side are the original intention and purpose, and on the other side are the current tasks and activities, due to the understanding of the respective lead nation, although they are all subordinated under COM ISAF.

Flexibility regarding the structure, capabilities and also the activities of the PRTs is compulsory due to the unique environment that they are acting in. The PRTs have to be tailored to meet the needs of the respective Afghan population. Therefore, a consensus on a common structure or even a common joint strategy is not necessary. The respective lead nation knows the goals and what to do to rebuild Afghanistan. If not, several documents, beginning with the Bonn Agreement or the different UNSCR exist to double-check the overarching objectives. However, when flexibility is used to serve the needs of the lead nation due to resource shortfalls, the international community represented by the UN and NATO has to intervene.

The main arguments in this chapter are.

- The political outcome of the Bonn Agreement does not provide a solid base for the establishment of a long-lasting democracy. Furthermore, it is exhausted and does not offer more space for improvement. The constitution as one outcome of the Bonn Agreement, especially, is too vague.
- The SSR suffers from its multi-sectoral approach and from the absence of one lead agency as all sectors are deeply intertwined with each other.
- The OEF and ISAF missions are diametrically opposed and face huge challenges to combine their efforts.
- The United States developed the concept of the PRTs in 2002 to be able to conduct primarily small scale reconstruction projects to win the hearts and minds of the local Afghan population and to avoid major troop deployments to Afghanistan. The overall intention was to limit the operational footprint.

- NATO's and Germany's concept of the PRTs differs from the original concept of the U.S. without addressing structural and enabling requirements.
- Different roles of the PRTs prevail.

The next chapter conducts case studies of the U.S. and German-led PRTs in particular as part of the overall political process. A detailed description of the U.S. and German-led PRTs is offered, including not only their mission statements, structure and approach, but also their respective environments as well as the general policy of the respective lead nation and its national caveats.

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III. U.S. AND GERMAN CASE STUDIES

A. INTRODUCTION

All currently deployed PRTs in Afghanistan represent unique compositions of civil and military personnel including different military activities and reconstruction efforts. Due to the lead nation system, national policies prioritize projects and approaches rather than the tactical chain of command in theatre. Often, the available funding for PRTs is linked to specific purposes or certain projects, which are pre-determined by the respective donor. Consequently, the lessons learned prevail, which have to be analyzed in the respective context of the PRTs.

The theoretical framework is discussed in the previous chapter; however, the reality is different and situations, structures and capabilities, which cannot be found in the concepts, often prevail. Of course, the perceptions differ due to other viewpoints, cultural values and intentions. “Lt. Col. James Bramble, a reservist from El Paso, Tex., with a job there as a pharmaceuticals executive, [...] going to the nearby village of Morad Khan Kalay. He is a thoughtful man commanding a NATO provincial reconstruction team, [...], at a base in Qalat. His team is supposed to deliver the development and good governance that will marginalize the Taliban.”¹⁴⁵ “No! No,” says Sardar Mohammed, [an Afghan local official] stepping forward. “We don’t trust the governor. If he gets food, he gives it to 10 families. He puts money in his pocket. We trust you more than him. Bring aid directly to us.”¹⁴⁶ Then again is another point of view, of an Afghan official, Mahmoud Saikal who is involved in the central government in Kabul in security and development. “I used to think that devoting myself was the best way to help the country, but now I’m beginning to think that there is really no point until we have got security

¹⁴⁵ Roger Cohen, “A Once and Future Nation,” *The New York Times*, October 22, 2007 (accessed October 22, 2007).

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

right first. It feels like we haven't made any progress at all in the last six years, like we're back in Taliban times."¹⁴⁷ These impressions could be continued with further different perceptions.

Consequently, not only do the PRTs vary internally, but also the perception and the impact of PRTs is different. The Afghans expect certain things from the PRTs, mostly security and development. Therefore, the overall question of this chapter is to what extent the internal structure and the capabilities of the German and U.S.-led PRTs enable an effective addressing of these needs. The main argument is that the PRTs' capabilities and capacities are limited and can only maintain gained successes over a certain period of time.

The U.S. developed the PRT concept whereas Germany provided the pilot project of NATO's PRTs. The U.S. PRTs are deployed in the conflict-ridden eastern parts of Afghanistan where the Pashtuns are dominant. The situation in the east demands a more robust deployment and equipment of forces, whereas Germany's PRTs are in the northern region where a more calm and stable situation prevails. Due to an ethnic diversity between Uzbeks, Tajiks and also Pashtuns in the north, the situation is more complex and challenging regarding diplomacy and liaison. These two poles on a spectrum of war-fighting intensity and ethnical diversity offer sufficient lessons learned for NATO PRTs in Afghanistan. No PRT in this spectrum provides more lessons identified or learned than the U.S. and German PRTs do.

B. U.S. CASE STUDY

1. U.S. PRTs

The U.S. currently has twelve PRTs deployed in Afghanistan under the banner of ISAF and NATO command.¹⁴⁸ Ten of them are under the command of RCE where Maj. Gen. D. Rodriguez, U.S. Army, is in charge, and who is also the commander of OEF and the national commander for all U.S. troops in Afghanistan. One U.S. PRT is located in

¹⁴⁷ Stephen Fidler and Jon Boone, "Fields of Little Glory," *The Financial Times*, November 19, 2007 (accessed November 19, 2007).

¹⁴⁸ NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 1.

Qalat, Zabol province under the leadership of RCS, and another U.S. PRT is RCW's area of responsibility in Farah, Farah province.¹⁴⁹ Table 1 provides an overview of all deployed U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan, and their locations, as of October 2007. The U.S. personnel strength as of October 2007 has been more than 15,000 servicemen for ISAF and thus, the U.S. has been the largest troop contributor in the commitment in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁰

Table 2. Location of U.S. PRTs¹⁵¹

	Location	Province	Command and Control
1	Asadabad	Konar	RCE
2	Bagram	Parvan	RCE
3	Farah	Farah	RCW
4	Gardez	Paktia	RCE
5	Ghazni	Ghazni	RCE
6	Jalalabad	Nangarhar	RCE
7	Khowst	Khowst	RCE
8	Mether Lam	Laghman	RCE
9	Nuristan	Nuristan	RCE
10	Panjshir (Jabal o-Saraj) ¹⁵²	Panjshir	RCE
11	Qalat	Zabol	RCS
12	Sharana	Paktika	RCE

2. Mission

The mission for each PRT is given by COM ISAF and is defined in the PRT's Terms of Reference as Appendix 2 of ISAF's PRT handbook.¹⁵³ The mission statement

¹⁴⁹ NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 1.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 24; NATO, *ISAF Key Figures: Factsheet*, 1.

¹⁵² Katzmann, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 57.

¹⁵³ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?*, 36.

is already mentioned in chapter II-F of this thesis, however, it is important to emphasize additionally that the mission statement is not only of military origin, but encompasses both military and political dimensions. The mission statement was agreed upon on 27 January 2005 by the PRT Executive Steering Committee.¹⁵⁴ Finally, the mission statement can be reduced to three main objectives, which are governance, security, and reconstruction, whereas beyond “this basic guidance, the essential tasks of the PRT were left open to allow them flexibility to adapt to local conditions.”¹⁵⁵

As U.S. PRTs consist of fewer personnel, and are capable of conducting self-defense as well as force protection measures, the U.S. commanders understand their primary goal is in assisting the central government and ensuring its influence in the provinces. Their primary effort is governance and diplomacy. Consequently, the provincial governor and the police chief are assisted and supported in ruling the policies of Kabul. This means that in practice, military commanders have to personally appear with the respective governor or official police chief to show and underscore the relationship with each other as well as with other local officials. These activities send deterrence messages to warlords, religious leaders and tribal elders not to hamper Kabul’s policies. As long as there are competent officials in charge who are in line with the central government in Kabul, this system is and will be successful. However, when former warlords, regional power brokers, corrupt officials or even incompetent personalities with dubious motives pursuing their own interests or unable to conduct the necessary rule occur in the respective office, the system fails. Of even greater danger is the possibility of getting mixed up with these disloyal and questionable personalities.¹⁵⁶ This would consequently lead to a non-acceptance of the presence of international military forces and to illegitimate officials. Subsequently, the power would shift to other power holders, which would destabilize the situation further and endanger the international military forces. Therefore, the PRT has to identify and screen all official and

¹⁵⁴ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?* 36.

¹⁵⁵ Sharon Morris and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, [2006]).

¹⁵⁶ Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 6-7.

non-official key decision makers in their respective AOR. For this purpose it is important not only to gather intelligence information, but also to have access to more background information and analyzing capabilities. Furthermore, recommendations have to be provided to the central government in Kabul to replace governors or other officials if necessary.

The second field of PRT activities for U.S. commanders is security. Due to the fact that the military component of U.S. PRTs is often only a platoon-sized unit, the main focus is self-defense and force protection¹⁵⁷ although a tactical reserve in theatre, including air assets, is generally available. This means that PRT personnel can be escorted as well as the PRT facilities can be protected, however, an active promotion of security by pursuing elements of the SSR cannot be conducted. Consequently, one of the two major pillars of the PRT concept, security, neglected though the entire ISAF mission becomes an assisting mission, which calls primarily for the Afghan security forces to establish and maintain security. To coordinate the activities between Afghan security forces and the PRTs, a Governor's Provincial Security Committee was established, which is held on a monthly basis and is to share information and coordinate operations.¹⁵⁸ However, the U.S. PRT security forces are not able to establish long-term stability or security to create situations in which other activities or projects could be carried out. A secure and stable environment is not only part of ISAF's mission statement, but also a fundamental prerequisite for conducting reconstruction and nation-building efforts. Therefore, the international community established Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and PRT Military Police Teams (PMPTs) to speed up or at least facilitate the creation of effective and robust Afghan security forces and their training.

¹⁵⁷ Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 6-7.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Figure 4. ETTs of 3 (AFG) Mechanized BDE¹⁵⁹




Figure 4 provides an example of the ETTs assigned to the third (AFG) Mechanized BDE, which shows that although the United States is the head of training for the ANA, Germany trains the third (AFG) Armor Battalion¹⁶⁰ stationed in Kabul. Romania will take over this task during the first half of 2008. However, these additional military elements have been deployed and currently play an important role in ISAF's efforts to provide security.¹⁶¹ Obviously, they have also been deployed to fill a capabilities gap, which cannot be closed by the PRTs, and to promote the SSR process, which makes only slow or no progress. This is clear evidence of an insufficient and ineffective political process that can provide nothing but limited success in rebuilding Afghanistan. Thus, the political process either has to be developed further or reinitiated. Nevertheless, the presence of the PRTs throughout the country forced former warlords and regional power holders not to upsurge and struggle for power again, especially due to the reachback capabilities of conducting offensive air operations.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ German Army Command, Briefing, May 24 2007, Hannover, Germany.

¹⁶⁰ The Battalion level is in the Afghan National Army called Kandak.

¹⁶¹ NATO, *NATO Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan*, 7.

¹⁶² Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 9.

Finally, the third objective of the PRTs is reconstruction. A PRT focuses on small scale projects such as building schools, clinics, village infrastructure or wells.¹⁶³ By doing these projects, the PRT leadership intends to show goodwill but also wants to establish favorable situations and a good relationship with the Afghans to increase the acceptance of the presence of the PRT as a major contributing factor to force protection. PRTs often suffer from short term deployments (six months or less) especially of key personnel such as the commander. Consequently, the commanders are interested in projects that can be finished during their respective tours of duty and are often under pressure to show progress. Thus, hasty constructions of doubtful projects are carried out in an uncoordinated manner.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, in an environment where confidence between military personnel and local populations prevail, intelligence information can be gathered more easily and properly.

3. Structure and Capabilities

Figure 5. PRT Core Task Organization¹⁶⁵




Figure 5 depicts the general structure of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan. Due to the above-mentioned flexibility in interpreting the basic tasks of the PRT and the requirements of the respective environment, to be effective not all U.S. PRTs have a full

¹⁶³ Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 9.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Morris and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 28.

complement, especially on the civil side and within the enabler branch.¹⁶⁶ The commander, as part of the Department of Defense, is directly supported by at least one representative of the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Agriculture. The commander is usually the rank of lieutenant colonel and forms a command group with the representatives of the other agencies. Additionally, the Afghan Ministry of Interior seconds a senior officer to establish a liaison between the PRT and the Afghan government for coordination purposes. The commander is either named PRT commander in U.S. terms, or military commander in ISAF terms, which describes the most important difference.¹⁶⁷ According to the U.S. understanding the “military has authority over the individual civilians regarding security matters, but not over the other agencies’ programs or activities.”¹⁶⁸

The Admin/Ops section is worth mentioning because it represents the staff of the PRT. The S2 branch consists only of an officer and an NCO, which means they are not able to analyze intelligence information; however, all activities in Afghanistan are intelligence driven. Information gathering and reporting along the chain of command is merely possible. PRTs rely on sophisticated intelligence information regarding local key personnel in their respective provinces. Therefore, access to this information is essential. Additionally, the S3 branch is also short on personnel. Concurrent military operations and planning of further operations will lead this section to the limit of what it can provide. According to the personnel in the Admin/Ops section, the staff is not able to conduct military activities 24/7 by relying on a day and night shift system.

The combat service support (CSS) and the force protection (FP)/security section provide not only real life support,¹⁶⁹ but also protected transportation, self-defense and force protection for civilians or other units that have to be active outside the PRT

¹⁶⁶ Morris and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 28.

¹⁶⁷ Michelle Parker, *The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams* (Santa Monica/CA: RAND Corporation, [2007]), armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI090507/Parker_Testimony090507.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Real life support is food, lodging, medical support, gas and maintenance.

compound. The limitations of both sections are also a 24/7 duty, and according to the personnel strength and the equipment of the FP/security section, it is reasonable to assume that active patrolling, establishment of temporary checkpoints, quelling riots, controlling, disarmaments, or even measures higher on the intensity scale are not possible to conduct. Therefore, the reachback possibility on quick reaction forces, and perhaps also on air assets, is vital for the U.S.-led PRTs. These kinds of U.S. PRTs are also called “light” PRTs.¹⁷⁰

The enabler section consists of civil affair teams and military police teams. Besides the command group, the enabler section is the most important with regards to the purpose of PRTs and their contribution to stability. Stability, as it is understood by the U.S., is not primarily established by military means, but rather by diplomatic, economic and reconstruction efforts. Thus, the U.S. PRTs are more suited to become effective in areas where conflicts and hot spots do not prevail and where other means to enhance stability are necessary.

To sum up, although the U.S.-led PRTs originated under the OEF mission, they widely mirror the requirements of the mission given to them by COM ISAF. A slight shortfall in military capabilities has to be mentioned, though Figure 2 “demonstrates the military centric nature of the PRTs in Afghanistan.”¹⁷¹ Thus, the operational work in the field is done by a minority and in the case of the U.S. PRT in Jalabad, “was comprised of seven people who conducted the substantive work.”¹⁷²

4. Environment

Ten out of twelve U.S.-led PRTs are located in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and are thus, under the command of RCE.

¹⁷⁰ Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort?* 12.

¹⁷¹ John Drolet, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams Afghanistan Vs. Iraq - should we have a Standard Model?* [2006].

¹⁷² Parker, *The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, 4.

Figure 6. Area of Responsibility RCE¹⁷³



Figure 6 shows the designated provinces (yellow highlighted) in the eastern part of Afghanistan where RCE is in charge and where U.S.-led PRTs are established. Exceptions are Vardak province where a Turkish PRT is run and the New Zealand PRT in Bamian province. Additionally, Kabul province has to be excluded because RCC is in charge there. Bagram airbase embraces different functions. Besides the use of the airfield, it serves ISAF as a forward support base (FSB) of RCE as well as the U.S. national HQ, tactical OEF HQ and RCE HQ. The HQs are collocated and pooled together. The establishment of a PRT in Bagram district, Parwan province is consistent with the necessity for stability as a force protection measure for that base.

It is remarkable that the U.S. PRTs have been established predominantly in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, which are along the Afghan-Pakistani border and adjacent to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Although

¹⁷³ Source of the map: http://www.nationalgeographic.com/landincrisis/020312/political_central.html (accessed January 13, 2008).

FATA is explained in Chapter V of this thesis, it comprises several sub-tribes of the Pashtun tribe and consists of seven agencies.¹⁷⁴ FATA is primarily a tribal area that is not directly governed by the Pakistani government and which has retained its semi-autonomous status as a legacy of the British colonization from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁷⁵ The Hanafi school of law of the holy religion of Islam prevails homogeneously on both sides of the border. However, the border¹⁷⁶ is of porous character and divides the tribes arbitrarily.¹⁷⁷ The terrain on both sides is very rugged and mountainous and therefore, non-permissive for mechanized military operations. Additionally, the Taliban and other Islamic fundamentalist movements¹⁷⁸ have found new homes in the designated borderland after their dispersal in late 2001 occurred with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, these groups use the borderland for training, recruiting, and planning attacks to destabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, the first Afghan provinces that are affected when elements of these groups want to penetrate Afghanistan are the ones in which the U.S. have established PRTs. The PRTs in Jalalabad, Asadabad, Gardes and Khowst are strategic locations in terms of controlling movements from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa. For instance, Jalalabad in Nangarhar province is not only economically important, the only trade route from Pakistan to Kabul goes through that province, and the economic center of the eastern provinces is established in Jalalabad. But Nangarhar province is also a huge contributor to heroin production, although the province is considered one of the most educated parts of Afghanistan. Nangarhar encompasses fertile lands, to a large extent, and is therefore

¹⁷⁴ According to Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*, 21 these are from north to south Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 21.

¹⁷⁶ Durand Line delineated in 1893 between Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rahman.

¹⁷⁷ Ainslie Thomas Embree, *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order*, Repr ed. (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), 126.

¹⁷⁸ According to Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, *No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier* International Security, Vol, 32, No. 4, Spring 2008, [2008] and Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, [2007]), www.csis.org/burke. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami (HIG), jihadi network of Maulawi Jallaludin Haqqani, the Tora Bora Front, fighters from the Hezb-e Islami of Khalis (HIK) as well as the newly created Pakistani-Taliban and other foreign and domestic jihadi forces are operating from those areas.

called the breadbasket of Afghanistan. Jalalabad welcomed Osama bin Laden in 1996 after he had been forced to leave Sudan, and on the Pakistani side of the border, the next huge town is Peshawar, where bin Laden has also found refuge.¹⁷⁹

Furthermore, the area of operations for the U.S. PRTs is probably a legacy of the OEF mission, which has been to chase key personnel as well as remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network in the mountainous region of Tora Bora. During the initial phase of OEF in 2002 and 2003, most of the PRTs were located in hot spots lacking the presence of any International Organization (IO) as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the region under U.S. responsibility is very volatile due to the following recent hot spots and headlines.

On 08 February 2008, a suicide car bomb killed two and injured five in Ghazni province. In Khost province, a car bomb injured three NATO soldiers, roadside bombs killed four and another roadside bomb killed a child and five police in February 2008. Moreover, a roadside bomb killed seven in Konar province on 23 February 2008. In Paktika province, IEDs were dismantled in Bermel on 06 February 2008 and two Polish soldiers were killed on 26 February 2008. Finally, a hot spot occurred in Laghman province on 27 February 2008 where the Taliban ambushed an official's convoy.¹⁸¹ Figure 7 shows that the security assessment of the United Nations in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan is dominated by areas of high risk (orange/amber). There are also a few regions where only a medium risk prevails, however, extreme risk areas can also be found. And worse, there are three areas (circles in the borderland) in which accessibility deteriorated from 2006 to 2007.

Thus, the AOR of RCE is volatile and insecure. This environment requires robust forces to counter those threats and to stabilize the region. The fact that the situation there actually deteriorated proves insufficient military means and the ineffectiveness of


¹⁷⁹ Parker, *The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, 1.

¹⁸⁰ Dziedzic and Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*, 4.

¹⁸¹ Source: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4233&from_page=../index.cfm (accessed February 9, 2008).

diplomatic and reconstruction efforts of the PRTs. Regarding NATO's spectrum of intervention as shown in Chapter II the overarching objective should be the elimination of insurgency. The military assets of the U.S. PRTs are unsuitable for those operations. A reach back on OEF capabilities is crucial and absolutely necessary to counter these threats effectively, however, it also indicates limited success. The U.S. PRTs are more suitable in environments where a stable situation prevails and where political and economic efforts could get a grip on the development process.

Figure 7. Security Accessibility Map¹⁸²



5. National Policies and Funding

The Bush administration changed its policy toward Afghanistan in 2002. The shift was from a strictly military approach to a more assisting, development and helping character.¹⁸³ “In April 2002, President Bush addressed the U.S. commitment to help the Afghan people recover from the Taliban rule. He referenced the success of George C. Marshall’s vision to rebuild Europe and Japan after World War II, referring to a “Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.” In the summer of 2002, the need to accelerate

¹⁸² Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 39.

¹⁸³ Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort?* 5.

reconstruction in Afghanistan led the U.S. government to seek a way to “spread the ISAF effect” through the deployment of small U.S.-led coalition elements.”¹⁸⁴

The broad U.S. national interests in Afghanistan are creating a stable government with capacity and legitimacy, preventing the development and spread of political extremist ideology and countering insurgent and terrorist elements.¹⁸⁵ To ensure these interests, the U.S. pursues the approach of the international community regarding the NATO commitment and finally assigned its PRTs in October 2006 under ISAF command. However, the national chain of command is dominated by the Department of Defense (DoD) in comparison to the other involved departments. This is expressed in the enormous financial resources of FY 2007 when the DoD had 439.3 billion USD available in comparison to the budgets of the Department of State (DoS) with 9.5 billion USD and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with 3.15 billion USD.¹⁸⁶ Consequently, the DoD dominates the decision making process in Washington as well as the decisions on the tactical level regarding Afghanistan. The DoD considers stability operations more fruitful than combat operations in the environment of Afghanistan and interprets the PRTs as a tool for winning hearts and minds by conducting small scale and short term reconstruction projects, also called quick impact projects (QIPs).¹⁸⁷

The U.S. funding for the PRTs in Afghanistan is made available from the DoD’s Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is part of the DoD funding. This fund is totaled in FY 2007 with 1.5 billion USD.¹⁸⁸ The Economic Support Fund (ESF), as part of non-military funding, amounted 510 million USD for Afghanistan, however, USAID assigned, in FY 2007, only 42 million USD to the PRTs in

¹⁸⁴ Dziedzic and Seidl, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*, 3.

¹⁸⁵ Nima Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, [2008]).

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Katzmann, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 54.

Afghanistan.¹⁸⁹ The total funding without supplemental money was 2.5 billion USD in FY 2007.¹⁹⁰ In September 2007, the U.S. initiated a program called Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) and replaced the QIPs for all projects that were funded by the ESF. The LGCD focuses on capacity building, encouraging civil society activities, and promotion of security and stability.¹⁹¹

It is remarkable how enormous the sums that the DoD makes available for their PRTs in Afghanistan are. The PRT commander has the money “in his hands” and is immediately able to spend money for certain projects when he is in the field and talks to key personnel in his AOR. This effective and convincing means strengthens the authority of the commander through the lens of the local population due to the implied perceptions of a powerful man. This is a fundamental factor in establishing stability.

C. GERMAN CASE STUDY

1. German PRTs

Germany has currently deployed two PRTs in Afghanistan. The first and larger one is located in Kunduz, Kunduz province, and it was established in November 2003. The other PRT is located in Feyzabad, Badakhshan province in the northeast of Afghanistan. The latter one was established in September 2004.¹⁹² Both PRTs also consist of other multinational military forces. Although Germany is the lead nation in both PRTs, and provides the bulk of the personnel, Belgium, France, Hungary and Romania participate in the PRT’s HQ in Kunduz, whereas the Czech Republic and Denmark have deployed forces in the HQ of the Feyzabad PRT and in the operational forces.¹⁹³ Additionally, Germany is the lead nation in RCN and runs its own multinational HQ in Mazar-e Sharif separate from the national HQ, which is collocated but physically separate. An FSB is also run in Mazar-e Sharif to enable ISAF forces from

¹⁸⁹ Katzmann, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 54.

¹⁹⁰ For more details, see Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 49.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ German Army Command, Briefing as of 24 May 07, Hannover, Germany.


the AOR of RCN, but also from other locations, to sustain their commitment. Germany also provides other assets such as ISAF intra theatre airlift support (ITAS) with fixed and rotary wing air transport assets, a reconnaissance capability with its RECCE Tornados as well as extensive reconnaissance, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and logistical and medical support to ISAF. Moreover, Germany has deployed one OMLT assigned to 209 (ANA) INF Corps in Mazar-e Sharif and an OMLT that is located in Kunduz and supports the two (ANA) INF Kandak.¹⁹⁴ Germany has planned to increase the deployment of the OMLTs to a total of seven until 2009, which would then represent 15 percent of ISAF requested OMLTs in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, Germany plans to establish an infantry training center in the northern region and a logistics school in Kabul to provide effective training possibilities for the ANA. Also worth mentioning is that Germany is going to take over the quick reaction force (QRF) of RCN in accordance with the withdrawal of the Norwegian forces who built this force before.¹⁹⁶ These high value assets and the described engagement underscore the role as lead nation in the northern parts of Afghanistan. Figure 8 shows the PRTs in RCN as of July 2007.

¹⁹⁴ Personal knowledge of the author as part of XII. German contingent ISAF from October 2006 to March 2007 in Mazar-e Sharif.

¹⁹⁵ Dr. Franz Josef Jung, "Langer Weg Am Hindukusch," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* February 8, 2008 (accessed February 08 2008).

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

Figure 8. PRTs in the AOR of RCN¹⁹⁷



2. Mission

The mission statement given by COM ISAF is the same for the German PRTs as it is for the U.S. PRTs. It is defined in the PRT's Terms of Reference as Appendix 2 of ISAF's PRT handbook.¹⁹⁸ It is already mentioned in Chapters II-F and III-B-2 of this thesis, however, it is important to reemphasize that it is comprised of a military and political dimension leading to three main objectives, which are governance, security and reconstruction.¹⁹⁹

Germany's understanding is the same as the U.S.'s. First and foremost, the support of the central government in Kabul is the essential task and role of the PRTs. Consequently, the support of the pro-Kabul local power-holders is essential. In the beginning of the PRT in Kunduz in 2003 and 2004, it was very difficult to identify who was who. The presence of German forces in Kunduz province would have hardly been possible without supporting the local militia commander, Daoud, who had dubious

¹⁹⁷ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg) and others, *Übersicht Über Aufgaben, Funktion Und Struktur DEU PRT in AFG* (Berlin, Bonn/Germany:).

¹⁹⁸ International Security Assistance Force, *PRT Handbook*, 2.

¹⁹⁹ Morris and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 8.

motives, although he showed compliance with the DDR process.²⁰⁰ Daoud, who had been the former governor of Kunduz province and also active in drug issues, was referred to as State Secretary in the Afghan Ministry of Interior by President Karzai in mid-2005.²⁰¹ This shows the obvious importance of the correct selection of the local key personnel based on available intelligence information.

This overall goal is flanked by two lines of operations or guidelines; first, the civil tasks and secondly, the military tasks of the German PRTs. Civil tasks refer to the civilian exposure²⁰² of German PRTs and are conducted solely by civilians. The civilian effort is focused on promoting the political, economic and societal development and rebuilding, coordinating measures and giving recommendations regarding the development and training of the ANP, supporting the establishment of logistical, medical and economic infrastructure, and strengthening the societal structures, as well as supporting and coordinating the measures of multilateral associates, IOs, and NGOs. The military goals are primarily focused on the Afghan population. Although force protection is a huge issue for the German contingent, the overall military objective is to promote stability in cooperation with the Afghan security forces (ANA and ANP) and to establish favorable conditions for all aid organizations to become effective. Consequently, German military forces pursue an active support of the SSR process by patrolling and by conducting checkpoints and information operations as well as by gathering information in the field. Additionally, the reconstruction measures of the German PRTs, which are understood to be QIPs, focusing on short-term impact, play only a minor role in the entire concept. In accordance with the civilian leadership of the German PRTs and all other aid organizations, the military forces of the PRTs conduct limited small scale reconstruction projects to increase its acceptance among the local population. The German MoEC pursues a strict separation between military deployment and development and nation-building measures. Therefore, military CIMIC teams have not been deployed in the

²⁰⁰ Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 21.

²⁰¹ Source: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,384913,00.html> (accessed February 1, 2008).

²⁰² See Chapter III. C. 3.

PRTs. Information operations are a vital asset for PRTs and thus, German PRTs produce and distribute a newspaper²⁰³ on a two-week basis and run a radio station with the same name.²⁰⁴

The German approach depicts two things. First, long-term development measures conducted by civilian aid agencies are more important than short-term projects realized by the military. Secondly, the military forces play only a secondary or complementary role due to the fact that the Afghan security forces are primarily responsible for restoring and maintaining a secure and stable environment. Additionally, Germany intends to strengthen the Afghan society as a fundamental contributor to self-responsibility for their own nation. Thus, Germany emphasizes Afghan ownership. Regarding ISAF's spectrum of intervention,²⁰⁵ the German PRTs operate somewhere between stability and transformational development. Hence, it is important to retain this situation with the ANA and ANP involved, neither of which has been developed as they should have. Even though the ANA evinces an initial operating capability and will be fully operational in 2010,²⁰⁶ the question is to who are the respective commanders loyal and to what extent is the force corrupt? This can also applied to the ANP, which means that the German approach carries a huge risk and has to be sensitively assessed.

3. Structure and Capabilities

Figure 9 provides an overview of the structure of the German PRT in Kunduz. The leadership of the German PRTs is not solely a military nature; it is dominated by two chains of command, the civilian and the military. Neither side is subordinated to the other. Thus, the leadership of German PRTs is double-headed and consists of a military full colonel (O-6) and a civilian diplomat from the German Foreign Office (FO) who has a rank comparable to his military counterpart. Both are deeply intertwined and coordinate

²⁰³ According to Ibid. is the name of this newspaper "Stimme der Freiheit" or "voice of freedom."

²⁰⁴ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg) and others, *Übersicht Über Aufgaben, Funktion Und Struktur DEU PRT in AFG*, 1-2; Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 17.

²⁰⁵ See chapter II. F.


²⁰⁶ German Army Command, Briefing as of May 24, 2007, Hannover, Germany.

their own activities; however, the military commander is not able to give orders to the civilian leader and vice versa. Both are separately responsible to conduct the tasks mentioned above. The civilian part of the PRT embraces representatives of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC) as well as additional representatives of the FO, and in combination with the military commander as the highest representative of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the inter-ministerial approach of the German Afghan policy becomes clear.²⁰⁷ Including representatives of the German Development Service (DED), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the German State Development Bank (KfW), the personnel strength of the civil exposure in Kunduz is more than twenty.²⁰⁸ To coordinate the political, economic, military and societal guidance from Germany, an inter-ministerial steering group meets on a weekly basis and develops and implements, under the leadership of the FO, Germany's Afghan policy.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Michael Schmunk, *Die Deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Ein Neues Instrument Zum Nation-Building* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, [2005]); Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 15-16.

²⁰⁸ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 28; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg) and others, *Übersicht Über Aufgaben, Funktion Und Struktur DEU PRT in AFG*, 3.

²⁰⁹ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 27.

Structure PRT Kunduz²¹⁰

The military part of the PRT in Kunduz includes 417²¹¹ German servicemen as of April 2007. Although the main work of the PRT is concentrated in the civil sector, the Kunduz PRT is the largest one in all of Afghanistan. The PRT commander is integrated in ISAFs and in the national chain of command. All German PRTs are considered completely self-sufficient for at least thirty days, and as long as there is no interruption in the follow-on supply. Moreover, the CSS capabilities are so sustainable that other nations can fall back and rely on that support.²¹² The HQ is organized in two shifts operating 24/7, sustainable over an extended period of time and sufficiently equipped to take care of current operations and to plan further operations.²¹³ The main enablers of the HQ support company are a small CIMIC unit and a Belgian cargo and air terminal operations

²¹⁰ Schmunk, *Die Deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Ein Neues Instrument Zum Nation-Building*, 17 and German Army Command, Briefing of May 24, 2007, Hannover/Germany.

²¹¹ German Army Command, Briefing as of May 24, 2007, Hannover, Germany.

²¹² Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 20.

²¹³ Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort*, ? 11.

(CATO) unit as well as an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team. The military police (MP) are able to conduct not only force protection, escorting and patrolling measures, but are also able to train officers of the ANP. The mechanized infantry is comprised solely of infantry elements and a reconnaissance unit.²¹⁴ Overall, the military organization can be considered a robust structure able to enforce measures when necessary and able to actively pursue the establishment of security. However, the military forces are not able to maintain favorable situations over an extended period of time in terms of the size, population density of the respective provinces, nor the insurgent tactics that prevail in Afghanistan. For instance, the military forces in Kunduz, which can execute operational tasks outside the camp and conduct work in the field, numbers approximately 200. In comparison to the population of Kunduz and Taloqan province, for which they are responsible, a force to local population ratio of nearly 1:5675 accrues. This is “the lowest per capita commitment of peacekeeping personnel to any post-conflict environment since the end of World War II.”²¹⁵ Even in Bosnia and Kosovo²¹⁶ the ratio of peacekeeper to citizens was 1:48 and 1:58.²¹⁷ Consequently, the number of military peacekeepers or – enforcers is probably too high to be generated and deployed by the international community, considering the difficulties of NATO member states’ readiness to provide more troops. Therefore, a sole military solution is unlikely and other assets and activities such as political, economic and social measures have to be strengthened to establish and maintain stability and security. This is mandatory, because security is the prerequisite for everything else.

²¹⁴ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 28-29; Schmunk, *Die Deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Ein Neues Instrument Zum Nation-Building*, 18 and personal knowledge of the author as part of XII. German contingent ISAF from October 2006 to March 2007 in Mazar-e Sharif.

²¹⁵ Johnson and Mason, *Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan*, 84.

²¹⁶ See Figure 7 for the difference in the size of the Kosovo and the northern region of Afghanistan.

²¹⁷ Johnson and Mason, *Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan*, 84-85.

The PRT in Feyzabad, Badakhshan province consists of the same organization but has fewer personnel. As of April 2007, the personnel strength was 277 German servicemen and around 10 civilians.²¹⁸

The above mentioned structure and strict separation is presently the largest challenge as far as cooperation and coordination. This means that the PRT not only has to coordinate its activities with external players such as other IOs and NGOs, which are not directly linked to Germany, but also internally between the military and the civil side of the PRT. A continuous and confident cooperation between the military commander and the civil leader is a necessary prerequisite to perform successfully. Subsequently, the coordination of all activities within the international community has to be managed, which is even more complicated. This approach and structure is a mirror of the German constitution as a result of the post-war scenario. The founders of the republic established a mechanism to avoid that any section, department or group can get a violence monopoly over others. The German Armed Forces is compulsory-bound to the primacy of politics and, therefore, subdivided into a civil part and the forces. One of the control mechanisms is the military budget, which is not under the control of the military, but rather under civilian administration. This “constitutionally-enshrined principle of Ressortprinzip (department principle) grants federal ministries a high degree of autonomy in formulating and implementing policy.”²¹⁹

Another huge challenge is the matter of national caveats, which some authors²²⁰ refer to as restrictions and deficiencies. Caveats in military decision processes are not unusual, but are basically used as constraints/restraints. That national caveats make the

²¹⁸ German Army Command, Briefing as of 24 May 07, Hannover, Germany.

²¹⁹ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 26.

²²⁰ Piiparinen, *A Clash of Mindsets? an Insider's Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, 151; Noetzel and Scheipers, *Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing Or Disunity*, ? 1; Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, 3; Anthony H. Cordesman, *Assessing the Afghan-Pakistani Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, [2007]), www.csis.org; Afghanistan Study Group, *Afghanistan Study Group Report*, 17; Katzmann, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, 29-30; Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 26; Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 3-4; Bollen, Myriame T I B., Linssen and Rietjens, *Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists*, ? 445.

deployment and engagement of certain military forces more complex and inflexible is obvious. Military forces are an expression of a state's sovereignty and contribute to a state's capacity to conduct policies as well as being a vital part of a state's capacity to defend itself. What state would give parts of such a crucial asset into the hands of a multinational commander without any control over its forces? It is reasonable to assume that no state would act in such an inappropriate manner. Thus, multinational HQ responsible for tasking those forces needs sufficient planning capacities to consider these national caveats as they are given.

This means, in the case of Germany, that first and foremost the German parliament has to mandate the commitment that was made on 12 October 2007. This mandate expires after twelve months and limits the German commitment to the northern region and to Kabul. ISAF support can only be conducted out of these designated areas of operations (AOO) when it is time-limited, the support is appropriate, and the extent of this support is limited to certain capabilities and mandatory for the entire success of the ISAF mission.²²¹ Consequently, no German servicemen can be tasked to AOOs outside the northern region or Kabul unless explicit permission is given. To the knowledge of the author, three more constraints prevail besides the above mentioned. First, force protection for each German soldier is compulsory whereas the national commander determines dress and vehicle codes independent of ISAF's regulations, secondly, dangers to the local population have to be excluded as much as possible,²²² and thirdly, German servicemen cannot participate actively in counter-narcotics operations.²²³

²²¹ Deutscher Bundestag, 16. Wahlperiode, *Antrag Der Bundesregierung Zur Fortsetzung Der Beteiligung Bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte an Dem Einsatz Der Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF)* (Berlin/Germany: Deutscher Bundestag, [2007]) (accessed March 22, 2008).


²²² Personal knowledge of the author as part of XII. German contingent ISAF from October 2006 to March 2007 in Mazar-e Sharif.

²²³ Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 20.

4. Environment

Germany is the lead nation in the northern region of Afghanistan. According to the existing literature, this region is calmer and more stable and a development-friendly situation prevails. Figure 10 provides hard data on the AOR of RCN and compares it to the size of Kosovo. Other than a small strip in the north where nourishing soil prevails, the eastern parts are dominated by rugged and mountainous terrain. Elevation differences vary from 300 meters to 5700 meters in the Hindukush. Badakhshan is a high mountain region where parts are definitely no-go terrain. Huge parts of the AOR are not reachable or it simply takes too long to penetrate certain areas.²²⁴

Figure 10. Dimensions and Population of the Northern Region²²⁵



The region embraces other huge challenges. The northern region is the most fragmented region in Afghanistan. Not only Uzbeks and Tajiks prevail in the north but there are also several Pashtun pockets spread throughout the entire northern region in which the Taliban finds safe havens. Moreover, several prominent warlords have established themselves in the north. Some of them are Dostum and Parwhan, who are

²²⁴ Schmunk, *Die Deutschen Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Ein Neues Instrument Zum Nation-Building*, 20.

²²⁵ German Army Command, Briefing as of 24 May 07, Hannover, Germany.

active in Faryab and Jawzjan province, Atta in Balkh province, Mohaqqeq in Samangan province, who controls the northern entrance of the Salang tunnel, and finally Daoud and Nazir who operate in Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan province where poppy growing, processing, and drug trafficking prevails.²²⁶ The above mentioned warlords and other smaller warlords make the situation more complex and intertwined than anywhere else. Several opposing military forces (OMF), locally and regionally, conduct organized crime against the international community as well as against the central government in Kabul, in spite of the presence of dangerous drug barons, especially in Badakhshan province, which is one of the largest poppy cultivation areas in Afghanistan.²²⁷ Within this complex environment, insurgent activities have been carried out periodically into the northern region.²²⁸ Additionally, the remnants of the Northern Alliance continuously try to expand their influence and therefore clash with other warlords.²²⁹

This environment vitally needs information about who is who. Thus, strong intelligence cells are necessary. Additionally, mobile air forces are required to quickly counter the power struggles between the warlords and the partial insurgents in that region to avoid a deterioration of the situation. In the northern region this is more likely than in the other regions, due to several key personnel and to the complex environment.

5. Policies and Funding

Germany's commitment is rooted politically in several factors. First, although the Bonn Conference was not chaired by Germany, it was held and hosted in Germany and Germany played an active role in initiating the process to rebuild Afghanistan. Failure in

²²⁶ Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 21; Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort*, ? 9.

²²⁷ Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 20.

²²⁸ United Nations, Department of Safety and Security in Afghanistan, *Half-Year Review of the Security Situation in Afghanistan* (New York: United Nations, [2007]).

²²⁹ Brandstetter, *Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team Concept--Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort*, ? 9.

this process is not allowed.²³⁰ Secondly, Germany realized that NATO increased its commitment in Afghanistan and that was the signal for Germany to tighten the alliance with NATO. Thirdly, the former chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, assured in May 2003, to the former U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, an increase in Germany's commitment to Afghanistan outside the boundaries of Kabul. Kunduz was obviously more unpleasant than Baghdad.²³¹

Germany's government developed an Afghanistan concept that was updated on 05 September 2007 and related to the Afghanistan Compact,²³² which was agreed upon in London on 31 January and 01 February 2006.²³³ This inter-ministerial consensus-based document of the German government defines the slogan "No security without rebuilding and development. [...] No rebuilding and development without security"²³⁴ The German understanding is based on the importance of civil aid and strengthens the civil sector by reducing reconstruction conducted by military CIMIC teams to the lowest level to ensure as much force protection as necessary. Areas of concerns are the establishment of state institutions and the development of capability and autonomy for the government to execute its policies, adequate application of rule of law and human rights, refugees and settlement issues, and improvement of livelihood and job opportunities, as well as humanitarian mine clearing. These first and foremost considerations show Germany's primary goal to promote good governance of the central government in Kabul and extend its influence in the rural areas. However, the security situation is also considered very carefully and the intention is to retain the civil-military approach of the PRTs, but also to expand their presence, especially in provinces where no PRT is operating. Therefore,

²³⁰ Hett, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Das Amerikanische, Britische Und Deutsche Modell*, 14.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Afghan Government and International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact* (London: , [2006]), www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/20060130%20Afghanistan%20Compact%20Final%20Final,0.doc (accessed March 24 2008). The Afghanistan compact is to define a vision of Afghanistan in 2020 using benchmarks as well as coordination procedures.

²³³ Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, *Das Afghanistan-Konzept Der Bundesregierung*, 1-48.

²³⁴ Ibid.

Germany intends to create and deploy Provincial Advisory Teams (PATs) in those areas. These PATs are small units encompassing approximately fifteen personnel and are used primarily to establish liaisons and communicate with local key personnel in the designated areas. In 2008, Germany will establish a PAT in Taloqan, Takhar province, where currently only an outpost of the PRT Kunduz is present. Other nations (Czech Republic and Sweden) also plan to initiate PATs in the northern region.²³⁵ Additionally, Germany emphasizes the assisting nature of the ISAF mission and takes on the ANA and ANP in their promise, as primary contributors, to stability and security in Afghanistan, although the combat readiness of the ANA is currently assessed at only 16,000. Considering the number of trained ANA personnel, at 37,000 as of 2007, it is unlikely that the target of 70,000 combat ready ANA personnel can be reached by 2010. This gap has to be filled with military forces deployed by the international community.²³⁶ Regarding the process of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) and counter-narcotics activities, Germany steps in in an observer role and will only provide recommendations to the Afghan government.²³⁷ The DIAG process is officially the subsequent process of the DDR²³⁸ process. Germany's Afghanistan concept stresses the necessity of coordination with all the aid and military efforts of the international community to gain synergies and coherence between all actors. Therefore, Germany promotes the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which was initiated by the Afghanistan Compact due to the fact that the PRT Executive Steering Committee, the PRT Working Groups and the NGO Civil Military Working Group lacked authority and effectiveness. This coordination mechanism is co-chaired by the Afghan government and the UNAMA and currently consists of seven Afghan secretaries and 234 international members and it is to coordinate civil and military efforts to improve effectiveness and report its decisions to the public.²³⁹

²³⁵ Bundesregierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, *Das Afghanistan-Konzept Der Bundesregierung*, 1-48.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Afghan Government and International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact*, 5.

German funding is not predetermined in a fixed budget. Due to the inter-ministerial approach, financial resources are assigned to certain projects for development and stabilization purposes. The military PRT commander has a small amount of money under his direct control to conduct low-cost QIPs. Although the MoD has a larger budget as do the other participating ministries, MoEC spent 70 million USD in 2007 focusing on long-term development projects. Additionally, 10 million USD, as part of the development-oriented emergency aids, were dedicated in 2007 to local needs in a flexible and quick manner to demonstrate visible and rapid progress. The latter pot is under the control of the representatives of the MoEC in Afghanistan, where the decisions as to how and for what the other money is spent have usually been made in Germany within the inter-ministerial steering group. Moreover, a Provincial Development Fund has been assigned, with more than 3 million USD in 2007, to the Communities Development Councils, which consists of officials in the northern region from the Office of the Governor, the Provincial Council, the Department of Women's Affairs, the Department of Rural Development and, of course, representatives from the German MoEC, FO, MoI and MoD. Afghans can get money from that pot by formulating an informal request that has to be approved by the committee.²⁴⁰

The inter-ministerial approach mirrors the post-war constitution of Germany. However, this approach requires close cooperation and coordination of the participating ministries in Germany, which is challenging, due to the ministries' high degree of autonomy. This approach is complex and the national decision-making regarding this issue is slow. Additionally, after consensus has been gained in the national inter-ministerial steering group, the coordination work has to be managed in Afghanistan with all the other Afghans, IOs and NGOs on different levels. This structure makes the entire approach idle and leads to a loss of effectiveness. German funding, in relation to the northern region, where the situation is mostly calm and stable, appears to be too low because this environment is suitable for long-term development projects to conduct

²⁴⁰ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 27-30.

effective rebuilding and contribute to sustainable stability and security. The situation in the north is at a decision point whether it improves to a self-sustaining situation or sets back into conflicts.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter has scrutinized the U.S. and German-led PRTs. Although both are guided and tasked along ISAF's chain of command, in the same manner and pursuing the same objectives, the national hallmark adjusts the PRTs in their daily execution of civil and military activities differently. Consequently, unity of command is not ensured, which gets even worse in the case of the U.S. PRTs, due to the responsibility of its national HQ for OEF. Despite all the national interests, which would never be given up by the participating nations, there is coherence within the multinational environment because the overarching objectives given by NATO are integrated and mirrored in both mission statements. The apparent point is that coordination and cooperation has to be conducted closely and friction losses have to be reduced. Additionally, the main findings in this chapter are as follows.

- The subsequent interpretations of ISAF's mission are different between the U.S. and German-led PRTs. The U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan are dominated and led primarily by the representatives of the DoD and focus more on reconstruction efforts assessed and motivated by the military, whereas many other "national programs in the provinces were poorly coordinated with the U.S.-led PRTs."²⁴¹ However, the U.S. pursues the approach of diplomacy, liaison and communication first. Germany emphasizes the importance of development and rebuilding efforts and assigns, therefore, the civil exposure of the PRTs a prominent role, whereas, the military is one of the enablers in this context and supports the SSR process actively.
- The U.S. PRTs are light, whereas the German PRTs are robustly structured. The military forces do not have the ability to assert themselves against riots or medium to large scale firefights and the operational work in the field is conducted by the command group, which is basically comprised of civilian personnel. Germany's operational footprint out of the PRTs' compound is larger. The military force is able to actively conduct a show of force and to enforce certain things when required. The

²⁴¹ Morris and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 11.

unity of command within the U.S. PRTs is more effective than the German inter-ministerial structure, which requires consensus for projects in the steering group in Germany.

- The U.S. PRTs operate in an environment that is more volatile than the northern region where Germany is engaged. The environment of RCE requires more sustainable forces, whereas the German military forces in the northern region are almost too robust. The deployment of the PRTs should be exactly the other way around. U.S. forces are more suitable for operating in the north and Germany's forces can face the threats in the east more properly. Reachback capabilities, such as tactical ground reserves (QRF) and air assets, are in both cases, ensured and absolutely essential.
- Germany provides limited monetary resources for development and rebuilding related to the needs of the northern region. This region is basically calm and stable and suitable for several projects of this category to gain long-term effects.

In this chapter the development of certain teams such as OMLTs, ETTs, PMPTs and PATs was described. The initiation and deployment of these teams is evidence that the overall political process needs stimulation and promotion, and perhaps some new aspects. Obviously, all the deployed PRTs are insufficiently equipped to fill those gaps. Consequently, PRTs in general are limited in their capabilities not only in the military sector to hold favorable security situations against insurgents, but also in other sectors, which would normally lead to stability and security and are, therefore, the responsibility of PRTs. Thus, PRTs are only an asset for a time-limited period in which the environment and other influencing factors enable effective PRT work. This period is in NATO's spectrum of intervention in chapter II-F., the yellow stability section. Left or right of this, other assets have to be deployed or the structure and capabilities of the PRTs have to be adjusted. This conclusion is related to the internal structure of PRTs.

The next chapter proves the claim that the capabilities of PRTs are limited, in a post-conflict scenario, by assessing the effectiveness of PRTs. Based on reports from 2006 and earlier, trends regarding the security situation, relationship-building and capacity-building will be given from an external point of view, which means that the impact of PRT activities are mirrored. Internal military assessments and evaluations of

the contributing nations are basically of a positive nature, although there is no doubt about the initial success of PRTs regarding the extension of the influence of the central government in Kabul.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGNATED PRTS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter emphasizes external views on PRTs to assess their impact and perception in the field, and in the central government in Kabul, as well as among the local population. Official military, NATO, and UN assessments usually speak of the initial successes of the PRT approach regarding the extension of the influence of the central government, the establishment of a certain level of security, and promoting the economic and developmental situation in the respective areas, although they also deal out critique regarding a missing common strategy, a lack of troop personnel and shortages on resources, especially funding, as well as too small an overall commitment by the international community. Military institutions term PRTs as an “effective, flexible, low-cost instrument that can easily be adapted to other conflicts.”²⁴² “They [PRTs] have played important roles in everything from election support to school-building to disarmament to mediating factional conflicts.”²⁴³ The question in this chapter is how external actors perceive the activities of PRTs.

“Western forces’ success in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and in achieving a satisfactory level of security throughout Afghanistan remains limited.”²⁴⁴ Moreover, external perceptions such as an insufficient cohesion of the multinational military forces or an elusive concept behind the civil-military approach in which coordination and cooperation are identified as crucial, but not yet resolved, prevail.²⁴⁵ Furthermore, the PRT activities of the military contribution to security have been recognized as too low due to the fact that local key personnel have not been sufficiently involved and thus, they

²⁴² Myriame T I B. Bollen, Linssen and Rietjens, *Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists*,? 437.

²⁴³ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle*,? 33.

²⁴⁴ Noetzel and Scheipers, *Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-Sharing Or Disunity*,? 1.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

have not met the local security needs properly.²⁴⁶ Regarding the aid efforts, the local perceptions in Afghanistan are three-fold: disillusionment, disempowerment and disengagement. Additionally, a disconnection between the present aid agencies and the local population prevails, which begins with different understandings of peace and security and continues with the nature of humanitarian agencies and the aid community.²⁴⁷ In general, the “great expectations have not been met.”²⁴⁸ In particular, the largest disappointments are concentrated in mismatched aids, in a non-trustworthy government, in a stagnation of the socio-economic situation, in a deterioration of the security situation and in a mismanagement of the international aid efforts.²⁴⁹ Antonio Donini calls this phenomenon a perception gap between externals and local communities. Consequently, the analyses and assessments of officials do not mirror the reality and often lead to an initiation or even a continuation of inconvenient approaches. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the international community decreases continuously and the local warlords gain power because they meet the local needs exactly. Thus, it is of utmost importance to analyze and then meet the local demands for the establishment of a sustainable security situation.

This chapter links the PRT activities to the perceptions of the local population and other aid agencies in a causal relationship. This means that the impact of these activities is measured from an external point of view rather than counting the number of built schools, hospitals, etc. By doing so, the effectiveness of PRTs can be deduced and will provide trends in certain categories. In military environments a commander assesses the performance of his subordinate units along the original tasks, committed resources and the time period. Thus, the performance and effectiveness of PRT activities are also assessed along their original tasks, which are mentioned above; however, they are of a

²⁴⁶ Myriame T I B. Bollen, Linssen and Rietjens, *Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists,*? 443.

²⁴⁷ Antonio Donini, “Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan,” *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1 (February 2007), 163-164.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 164.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 164-165.

qualitative nature and represent trends. “Determining impact is always complex.”²⁵⁰ The arguments and conclusions of this chapter are complementary to the ones posted in Chapter III.

B. DEFINITION OF THE CRITERIA

There are currently no metrics defined to assess the performance of PRTs. Reporting and assessing the activities and work of PRTs is usually based on a quantitative measure such as kilometers of newly built roads, number of trainings conducted, amount of tons transported, amount of money spent, number of wells dug, etc. As mentioned above, these reports and assessments usually describe positive effects on the respective environment. Consequently, assessments based on comprehensive outcomes or cost-benefit analysis are lacking. These assessments are difficult due to the volatile environments the PRTs are operating in and to different structures and thus different capabilities.²⁵¹ Therefore, this assessment emphasizes only the impact of PRT activities and the perception of these activities among external factors that are linked together. Due to this challenging approach, trends are derived from the impacts and the perceptions in certain categories, which are aligned to the tasks of PRTs mentioned in Chapters II-F and III of this thesis. The assessment focuses only on the U.S. and German-led PRTs and thus only on their respective environments and the IOs and NGOs that operate in those regions.

The PRT handbook does not offer metrics or measurements of the effectiveness or performance of the PRTs. They are targeted to the specific needs of the local environment and toward increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of the local officials and institutions.²⁵² The Afghanistan Compact provides, in its Annex 1, benchmarks and timelines.²⁵³ It differentiates between security, governance, rule of law and human rights, as well as economic and social development. In the category of security, the following

²⁵⁰ Abbaszadeh and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations*, 14.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² International Security Assistance Force, *PRT Handbook*, 9-13.

²⁵³ Afghan Government and International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact*, 7-13.

benchmarks are defined. By the end of 2010, ISAF, OEF and all the PRTs in Afghanistan should promote security and stability throughout the country including the support of Afghan security forces. The ANA should be fully operational by the end of 2010 with a personnel strength of 70,000 capable of meeting the security needs of the country as well as the ANP and the Afghan National Border Police (ANBP) comprised of 62,000 personnel. The DIAG process was already completed at the end of last year. The counter-narcotics efforts should be strengthened by the Afghan government and the governments of adjacent countries by enforcing laws and mutual counter-activities. Finally, the areas contaminated by land mines and ammunition dumps should be reduced by 70 percent by the end of 2010.²⁵⁴ These benchmarks are very challenging regarding the time period and represent a vision of the Afghan government and the international community. Concurrently, these benchmarks are not suitable for assessing the current performance of the PRT activities.

Due to the fact that no officially defined metrics exist, previous attempts to assess the performance of PRTs regarding the impact of their activities are followed. By doing so, redundancies are avoided and perhaps useful metrics can be established or further developed. Thus, this thesis follows Peter Viggo Jakobsen,²⁵⁵ Michael J. McNerney²⁵⁶ and the *Save the Children* article by Gerard Mc Hugh.²⁵⁷ The criteria are derived from the three core principles developed by the PRT Executive Steering Committee. These are: to strengthen and extend the authority of the central government in Kabul throughout the country, assist in establishing stability and security, and enable reconstruction including the coordination between civilian and military actors.²⁵⁸ Thus, the four performance criteria defined in this thesis are capacity building, stability, relationship-building, and aid

²⁵⁴ Afghan Government and International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact*, 7-13. For more details regarding the other categories see Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 1-54.

²⁵⁶ McNerney, *Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?* 32.

²⁵⁷ McHugh and Gostelow, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan*, 1-64.

²⁵⁸ Jakobsen, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient*, 30.

projects and coordination.²⁵⁹ Within these initially defined categories, changes can appear. Situations can improve, deteriorate or stagnate²⁶⁰ based on the impacts of the PRT activities and the perception among external actors. Moreover, indicators are named and related to the respective criteria to assess whether a situation has changed. Table 2 provides an overview of the metrics used for this thesis.

Table 3. Metrics to assess the performance of PRTs

Category	Performance Criteria	Indicators
Authority of the central government in Kabul	Capacity-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • support central government in Kabul • support of local government councils which are in line with Kabul • level of corruption • promote good governance • facilitate staffed and functioning offices, administration and institutions • train and equip the ANA, ANP and ANBP • encounter warlords, local power holders and corrupt officials
Stability and security	Stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of incidents regarding minor interferences, banditry, crime, riots, unrests, illegal actions • number of firefights,

²⁵⁹ In this thesis capacity-building means the improvement of state capabilities such as administration, institutions, ANP, ANBP and ANA. Stability implies the perception of the security situation in the respective areas of the PRTs among officials, NGOs and the Afghan population. Relationship-building implies the establishment of relationships between military personnel and local key-decision makers and their subsequent impacts. Aid projects and coordination means the capability of the PRTs to establish conditions in which projects can be executed, to conduct small scale projects, to provide expertise for certain projects as well as to exchange and share information of planned and current actions between military personnel of the designated PRTs and the respective civilian aid actors.

²⁶⁰ Improvements are marked with a +, deteriorations with a – and stagnation with a 0.

		<p>mortar attacks and other high intensity incidents, number of IEDs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • number of suicide bombings • number of abductions • amount of risky areas • amount of poppy cultivation and drug production • amount of show of force military operations • military interventions • engagement of QRFs • commitment of offensive air operations
Stability and security	Relationship-building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • liaison to local key decision personnel such as governors, police chiefs, official military commanders, economy people, maliks, scholars, warlords, local power holders, religious scholars, mullahs, moderate Taliban • relations to neighboring states
Reconstruction and development	Aid projects and coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIMIC activities of the PRTs regarding reconstruction • establishment of favorable conditions for the civil aid community to conduct their projects • levels of coordination • accessibility of specific areas • stimulate economic situation • promote social coherences and roots • amount of funding

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • extent of local involvement • extent of meeting the local needs • number of reconstruction and development projects • promotion of the educational situation • establishment of employment opportunities • situation on human rights • women's equality
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C. TREND MATRIX AND ASSESSMENT

The trend matrix and the following assessment draw conclusions from altering situations regarding the indicators and are related to the performance criteria mentioned in Table 2. This assessment differentiates between reports from IOs and NGOs due to their unique perceptions and considers only reports from 2006 and younger. In the case of reports that do not provide statements assignable to specific performance criteria, an “N/N” is put in the matrix.

1. Reports of IOs

Table 4. Trend Matrix of the Report from the UN.²⁶¹

Performance Criteria	United Nations	Remarks
Capacity-building	0	Deteriorations within the central government and improvements on the local governance level.

²⁶¹ United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security* (New York: United Nations, [2008]), <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm> (accessed March 3, 2008).

Stability	-	North and west security issues related to factionalism and criminality. Insurgency in the south and east.
Relationship-building	+	Government strengthened relationship to local communities.
Aid projects and coordination	0	Accessibility is limited due to land mines. JCMB effective tool and non-opium economy is growing.

Table 5. Trend Matrix of the Report from the UN Security Council.²⁶²

Performance Criteria	UN Security Council	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Failure of the central government and the international community to provide basic needs and good governance. Corruption prevails especially within the Ministry of Interior.
Stability	-	Upsurge of security related incidents in Afghanistan.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	-	NGOs and Afghans acting in dangerous situations. Situations regarding human rights and education deteriorated.

²⁶² United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 2006* (New York: United Nations, [2006]).

Table 6. Trend Matrix of the Report from NATO.²⁶³

Performance Criteria	NATO	Remarks
Capacity-building	+	NATO helped to improve governance at the national and the local level. Moreover, NATO provides opportunities for economic and political progress.
Stability	+	A predominantly stable situation has occurred in most parts of the country although the security situation remains challenging in the south and in the east.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	+	Number of health clinics and more children in schools appeared.

Table 7. Trend Matrix of the Report from the UNDSS.²⁶⁴

Performance Criteria	UNDSS	Remarks
Capacity-building	+	ANA has improved.
Stability	-	Average security incidents in 2006, 425 and in 2007, 525.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	-	Accessibility deteriorated basically in the east, south and west.

²⁶³ NATO, *Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008* (Brussels/Belgium: NATO, [2008]).

²⁶⁴ United Nations, Department of Safety and Security in Afghanistan, *Half-Year Review of the Security Situation in Afghanistan*, 1-11.

Table 8. Trend Matrix of the Report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.²⁶⁵

Performance Criteria	UN Office on Drugs and Crime	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Especially in provinces where poppy cultivation is a large field, anti-government elements have been active and collect taxes.
Stability	0	Prognosis is that poppy cultivation will decrease slightly. Provinces in RCN and RCE are either completely poppy free or cultivation decreased compared to 2007. Only in Samangan in AOR of RCN poppy cultivation increased.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	N/N	

Table 9. Trend Matrix of the Report from the UNAMA.²⁶⁶

Performance Criteria	UNAMA	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Corruption has to be decreased and the needs of the population have to be met by the central government.
Stability	-	Suicide bombing tactics appeared in Afghanistan in 2005 and increase each year.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	-	Socio-economic effects of suicide bombings

²⁶⁵ Afghan Government and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan: Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey* (Kabul: United Nations, [2008]).

²⁶⁶ United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, *Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan* (Kabul: United Nations, [2007]).

		have to be considered. Due to unpredictability, even in stable provinces the socio-economic situation can deteriorate immediately.
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Table 10. Trend Matrix of the Report from the USAID.²⁶⁷

Performance Criteria	USAID	Remarks
Capacity-building	+	There are initial successes in many locations where conditions have been established, which allow political, economic and social development.
Stability	+	PRTs are an effective tool for improving stability.
Relationship-building	+	PRTs strengthened local institutions and encouraged local leaders who support the central government in Kabul.
Aid projects and coordination	-	Civil-military coordination between all agencies within U.S.-led PRTs has to be improved regarding all facets such as guiding principles, management and information systems, access to funding and capabilities.

²⁶⁷ Morris and others, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, 1-32.

2. Reports of NGOs

Table 11. Trend Matrix of the Report from Anthony H. Cordesman.²⁶⁸

Performance Criteria	Cordesman	Remarks
Capacity-building	0	Government carries out its responsibilities well; however, corruption is a huge issue. Trust in ANA and ANP prevails but both still need foreign support.
Stability	-	Insecure situation prevails. Poppy cultivation increases and contributes to instability.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	+	Development perceived as headed in the right direction regarding reconstruction and rebuilding efforts.

Anthony H. Cordesman released several reports²⁶⁹ on Afghanistan and Pakistan; however, the content is redundant and repeats regularly. Therefore, no additional trends or assessments can be drawn from these reports.

²⁶⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Armed Nation Building: The Real Challenge in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, [2007]), www.csis.org/burke (accessed December 12, 2007).

²⁶⁹ Cordesman, *The Struggle for "Pashtunistan": The Afghan-Pakistan War*, 1-28; Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 1-131; Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: Threat Developments* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, [2007]), www.csis.org/burke/reports (accessed December 12, 2007).

Table 12. Trend Matrix of the Report from Amnesty International.²⁷⁰

Performance Criteria	Amnesty International	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Judiciary sector underdeveloped regarding detention facilities and treatment of detainees.
Stability	N/N	
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	-	Memorandum of Understanding has been signed between some ISAF participating nations, however, specific regulations after the transfer of detainees are missing.

Table 13. Trend Matrix of the Report from the ICRC.²⁷¹

Performance Criteria	ICRC	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Kabul discontented with ISAF and not able to face security challenges.
Stability	-	Security incidents have increased and are complex. Conflict has broadened and taken on new character.
Relationship-building	-	ISAF has not effectively established liaison to religious personnel. ICRC did instead.

²⁷⁰ Amnesty International, *Afghanistan, Detainees Transferred to Torture: ISAF Complicity?* Amnesty International, [2007]).

²⁷¹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Afghanistan Annual Report ICRC*, [2006]).

Performance Criteria	ICRC	Remarks
Aid projects and coordination	-	Absence of social and economic change, which fuels tribal factions.

Table 14. Trend Matrix of the Report from the CMSS.²⁷²

Performance Criteria	CMSS	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Central government corrupt and filled with former warlords on certain position. Taliban at least less corrupt! Lack of legitimacy of the government.
Stability	-	Continuing insecurity as a result of tribal factions, organized crime, banditry, corrupt elements within the government and insurgents.
Relationship-building	+	PRTs are really advisory teams within the local environment to officials.
Aid projects and coordination	-	NGOs retreated basically from the south due to conditions in which aid cannot get grip.

²⁷² Lara Olson and Hrach Gregorian, *Side by Side Or Together? Working for Security, Development and Peace in Afghanistan and Liberia* (Calgary/CA: Center for Military and Strategic Studies, [2007]).

Table 15. Trend Matrix of the Report from the SFB 700 Governance.²⁷³

Performance Criteria	SFB 700 Governance	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Development projects did not lead to more governance capabilities.
Stability	+	Rural population perceived over the last two years that the security situation has improved.
Relationship-building	-	Half of the rural population thought that the presence of foreign troops was a threat and foreign development projects pose a threat to the Islamic way of life.
Aid projects and coordination	+	NGOs have been credited by the Afghans due to improvements in potable water, education and road infrastructure.

Table 16. Trend Matrix of the Report from the Atlantic Council.²⁷⁴

Performance Criteria	The Atlantic Council	Remarks
Capacity-building	0	Legal and judicial reforms as well as the control of narcotics are not as highly prioritized as necessary.

²⁷³ Jan Koehler and Christoph Zuercher, *Assessing the Contribution of International Actors in Afghanistan: Results from a Representative Survey* (Berlin/Germany: DFG Research Center Freie Universität Berlin, [2007]).

²⁷⁴ The Atlantic Council of the United States, *Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action* (Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council Of The United States, [2008]), <http://www.acus.org/docs/012808-AfghanistanbriefwoSAG.pdf> (accessed February, 2 2008).

Stability	-	Without a remarkable improvement on the security sector, a coherent way forward cannot be conducted.
Relationship-building	-	Relations to Pakistan have to be improved and the issue of the Afghan /Pakistan border has to be solved.
Aid projects and coordination	-	Little amount of coordination between NGOs and military forces. Only 10% of international funding goes directly to the Afghans.

Table 17. Trend Matrix of the Report from the Afghan Study Group.²⁷⁵

Performance Criteria	Afghan Study Group	Remarks
Capacity-building	0	Coherent and resourced strategy to strengthen the central government's reach, capacity and legitimacy are missing.
Stability	0	Quantity and quality of deployed forces have to be increased and focus all resources on the training of Afghan security forces is the most suitable way to produce more stability. Security of the border to Pakistan is vital and has to be improved.
Relationship-building	0	Relations to moderate Taliban are lacking. Diplomatic relations to Pakistan and Iran are underdeveloped.

²⁷⁵ Afghanistan Study Group, *Afghanistan Study Group Report*, 1-48.

Performance Criteria	Afghan Study Group	Remarks
Aid projects and coordination	-	Military command structure between OEF and NATO is inappropriate. A high-level international coordinator under a mandate of the UN is mandatory to coordinate all aid efforts. There is an acute need for more international coordination.

Table 18. Trend Matrix of the Report from the Asian Development Bank.²⁷⁶

Performance Criteria	Asian Development Bank	Remarks
Capacity-building	+	Weak institutions and institutionalized corruption prevails.
Stability	+	Insecurity is one of the operational challenges.
Relationship-building	N/N	
Aid projects and coordination	-	Afghanistan is still one of the least-developed countries in the world regarding health care, poverty, education and gender inequality.

²⁷⁶ Asian Development Bank, *Afghanistan 2007: A Fact Sheet* (Kabul/Afghanistan: Asian Development Bank, [2006]), www.adb.org (accessed April 6, 2008).

Table 19. Trend Matrix of the Report from the Asia Foundation.²⁷⁷

Performance Criteria	The Asia Foundation	Remarks
Capacity-building	+	80% of the Afghan people thought that the central government in Kabul did not care about the needs of the rural people. Corruption is a huge concern.
Stability	0	Insecurity is the largest concern of the Afghan people on a national level. On the local level nearly 80% of the people did not feel threatened. Certain extent of trust in the ANP and ANA prevails.
Relationship-building	-	Liaison to religious leaders should be strengthened.
Aid projects and coordination	+	50% of the people perceived that they were more prosperous than under the Taliban regime.

²⁷⁷ The Asia Foundation, *Afghanistan in 2007: A Survey of the Afghan People: Key Findings* The Asia Foundation, [2007]), <http://www.asiafoundation.org/news/?p=9> (accessed March 3, 2008).

Table 20. Trend Matrix of the Report from the Swiss Peace Organization.²⁷⁸

Performance Criteria	Swiss Peace	Remarks
Capacity-building	-	Little democratic experience at national level and fragile or even non-existent state institutions prevail. Weak government especially in the provinces and uncompleted components of the Bonn Agreement are current major issues.
Stability	-	Warlords maintained their militias and private armies.
Relationship-building	+	Government attempted to negotiate with moderate Taliban.
Aid projects and coordination	+	Weak donor coordination and diverging interests of international actors.

3. Assessment

The above depicted trend matrixes are an attempt to derive changes regarding performance criteria to which indicators are assigned. Moreover, the matrixes are subdivided between reports of IOs and NGOs due to the fact that IOs perceive their commitments more positively, although there are also realistic descriptions. On the other hand, the evaluation of situations conducted by NGOs is usually pure and unpicturesque, although one has to analyze who is funding the respective NGO. These reports, which are comprised of descriptions of blurring situations mixed up with the perception and interpretations of the author, lead to a subjective element in the trend matrixes. Thus, the

²⁷⁸ Swiss Peace, *FAST Analytical Framework Afghanistan in December 2007* Swiss Peace, [2007]), <http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/countries/index.html#c968> (accessed April 06 2008).

assessment and the conclusions from these reports are limited, abstract, and of only a general character. Specific situations in certain PRTs might not be reflected in the trend matrixes. Moreover, all the reports represent an evaluation of the entire situation in Afghanistan except the USAID and the SFB 700 Governance reports. The latter one focuses more on the northeastern provinces of Kunduz and Takhar where the USAID report is related to all U.S.-led PRTs. Consequently, the conclusion cannot only be applied to the U.S. and German PRTs currently deployed in Afghanistan, but also to all others. Nevertheless, the question is to what extent the PRTs contribute to improvements in the performance criteria because these criteria are derived from the PRT tasks, as well as responsibilities, and should be directly influenced by their activities.

Regarding capacity-building, there is no doubt about the successful extension of the influence of the central government in Kabul with the presence of PRTs in the provinces of Afghanistan. The reports of the IOs see improvements on the local governance level in most of the provinces, but not in all. The PRTs contributed to the promotion of political development due to the local establishment of conditions that allowed the conduction of local policies. On the other hand, governance on the national level is seen as critical. The central government was not able to carry out policies that met the needs of the Afghan people. Moreover, corruption prevails not only in the government, although several positions have been changed over the years, but neither the ANA nor the ANP have been functioning as they should. The initial successes were not assigned to the policies of the central government, but rather to the presence of the international community. Without that presence, the Afghan people assumed that the government would collapse. The NGOs' reports underline this assessment by highlighting certain issues. The central government lacks a grand strategy for its country; the legal and judicial reforms are behind the expectations, the counter-narcotics efforts are prioritized too low and the government in Kabul lacks legitimacy, which can obviously not be strengthened by conducting development projects.

The message regarding the security situation is nearly the same in all reports.. The security situation has worsened for two years although stability is of utmost importance and a prerequisite for the effective rebuilding of Afghanistan. Of course, for

the long-term perspective, there are also other non-military factors that contribute to stability; however, in areas where high intensity hot spots occur, a robust enforcement of stability is essential. The overall number of security incidents has increased and the threats have become more complex due to the application of highly sophisticated insurgent techniques. The security situation in the northern and western provinces is dominated by factionalism and organized crime, whereas the eastern and southern provinces suffer from insurgents. This insurgency is dominated by anti-government elements and it is obvious, that the Taliban is not capable of fighting the international forces head-to-head, but on the other side, ISAF is also not able to hold victories over anti-government forces in any regard. The deployment of more and more troops to Afghanistan will definitely not solve this issue because it is not solely a military character. Due to the difficulties of generating forces within NATO, and with regard to the additional contributions of some NATO member states, it is unrealistic to request more and more troops to Afghanistan. Of course, there might be a number of personnel that will lead to a culmination of the security situation, but this number can never be generated. Moreover, the larger the international presence in Afghanistan, the more the character of the mission will change from assistance to occupation. This would consequently lead to a stronger resistance among the Afghans and might lead to the same experiences the British and the Russians gained in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The promotion of security by an indirect approach such as training and equipping the ANA and ANP, stimulation of economic markets, as well as development and aid projects are probably more effective. Figure 11 provides an overview of the additional contributions announced for 2008.


Figure 11. Additional Contributions of Participating Nations for 2008²⁷⁹

Australia:	20 forces for OMLTs
Azerbaijan:	21 forces
Belgium:	4 x F-16, 100 management staff
France:	20 forces for OMLTs
Germany:	4 OMLTs Manoeuvre Coy of 250
Hungary:	20 forces for OMLTs
Norway:	3 x helos + appx 70 personnel 100 infantry troops 100 special forces 1 OMLT (35 personnel)
Poland:	8 x helos and 400 management staff
Singapore:	2 officers
Slovak Republic:	4 personnel for OMLT 35 personnel (Manoeuvre unit members) 2 x 8 Medical staff

NATO estimates that the number of security incidents has increased but that 70 percent of all the incidents have been conducted in only 10 percent of the districts in Afghanistan. These districts are well known and correspond with extremist areas. Figures 12 and 13 show the distribution of security incidents across Afghanistan and the most affected districts in 2007.

Figure 12. Security Incidents across Afghanistan – 2007²⁸⁰

Security incidents across Afghanistan - 2007




²⁷⁹ NATO, *Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008*, 11.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

Figure 13. Security Incidents – Twenty most affected Districts 2007²⁸¹

Security incidents (SI) - 20 Most affected districts 2007



Figures 12 and 13 lead to a purely tactical conclusion. If there are only a few districts where security related incidents occur, make these districts more secure militarily and stabilize the others by non-military means. The availability of a robust and highly mobile force capable of fighting high intensity spots in combination with air assault capabilities seems to be the best suitable answer to those threats. This means that such a force should be assigned to the respective RCs as an in-theatre tactical reserve, deployable with stand-by air assets, to the respective hot spots.

The relationship-building efforts have not made progress as necessary. The liaison to officials within the provincial governments has been established and the perception is a well working cooperation. However, since that contact has not been sufficiently established with other key personnel in the local environment such as religious scholars or economic persons, the result is a slight distrust of the presence of the international force and the perception of a threat to the Islamic way of life. This means that the stagnation in establishing contact and conducting talks with important key personnel in

²⁸¹ NATO, *Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008*, 11.

the local environment has to be overcome. With the provision of sophisticated intelligence information, those personnel talks have to be conducted to increase the legitimacy and acceptance of the presence of the international force.

The development and aid situation is also sobering. Although the number of different projects has risen and the amount of the international funding is tremendously high, the aid environment is dominated by inaccessible regions to which aid cannot be given. This inaccessibility is largely caused by the amount of landmines throughout the country as well as the insecure situation. Only the consideration of possible insurgents could result in a backlash of already stabilized areas where development projects are planned, initiated and conducted. The unpredictability of insurgents might lead to a withdrawal of aid workers.

Finally, the overall assessment of the performance of the PRTs in Afghanistan is dominated by stagnation with the danger that the situation can relapse in certain sectors. Real improvements beside the so-called initial successes of the PRTs cannot be recognized. The PRTs are in saturation regarding the effectiveness of their respective activities and projects.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter is an attempt to reflect perceptions of the activities of the PRTs in Afghanistan with a remarkably subjective hallmark. Nevertheless, the message behind the given trends is important. The result is sobering and the seventeen reports are representative enough to prove the arguments provided in Chapter III of this thesis. The capabilities of the PRTs are limited. The PRTs are a very suitable asset for post-conflict scenarios to fill the gap when situations are mostly calm and conditions have been prepared for short term reconstruction projects, at least until a solid fundament has been established. Then development projects focusing on long-term impacts can relieve stability and military reconstruction efforts can be dominated by PRTs. The main findings in this chapter are as follows.

- The Afghanistan Compact is the most recent document that has determined benchmarks for Afghanistan.
- The performance criteria with the assigned indicators are an attempt to assess the performance of PRTs. They are based on existing literature and are developed further on to avoid redundancies.
- The overall assessment of the performance of PRTs is sobering based on various reports from IOs and NGOs from 2006 and earlier.
- This assessment is evidence for the structural limitations of the PRTs, which are in saturation after having gained initial successes. Consequently, capabilities have to be added and/or withdrawn from the PRTs or the entire PRT has to be replaced by other assets. A highly mobile QRF including air assault assets have to stand by on the RC level in every case as an in-theatre tactical reserve.
- PRTs within their current concept are only an asset for a small transitional phase in post-conflict scenarios.

The next chapter analyzes influencing factors in certain contexts. Chapters III and IV focus on the PRTs themselves, their internal structure and capabilities and their external perceptions within the international community and the Afghan population. However, PRTs become effective in environments that are not only determined by geopolitical conclusions but also consist of cultural, religious, economic and societal aspects of Afghanistan. These aspects provide several implications which cannot be neglected regarding the planning of military operations and development projects. Under consideration of these implications, final recommendations for the commitment in Afghanistan are suggested.

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V. SETBACKS IN PRTS CAUSED BY EXTERNAL FACTORS

A. INTRODUCTION

In Afghanistan, violent activities have surged since 2006 accompanied by a resurgence of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extreme²⁸² Islamic movements. In general, three major groups are active and promote instability in Afghanistan. These are the Taliban, the jihad network of Maulawi Jalaluddin Haqqani (HQN) and the Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam) of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG). The Taliban are the focus of the next section, however, one has to differentiate today between the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, which is responsible for the bulk of the insurgency conducted within the country, and on the other side, the Pakistani Taliban movement (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan) under Baitullah Mahsud.²⁸³ The latter movement is active within Pakistan although both have their bases on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda is linked closely to the Taliban, represents a major supporter for them and plays, therefore an important role in this context. However, they cannot be compared to the other groups.²⁸⁴

Secularism is unknown by these groups, and all can be categorized as extreme Islamic movements. The leadership of these groups interprets Islam in a certain way and motivates its followers to be good Muslims. Moreover, these groups struggle for power as they have done for more than two decades now, and they intend to establish a regime on the basis of a pure Islam. Thus, Islam appears as a political dimension, which also means that its leaders try to gain political control as well as political support. “In modern times, traditional Muslims seek hegemony over political, economic, and educational domains, leading to the establishment of authoritarian regimes in some Muslim countries

²⁸² The term “extreme” represents, in this context, a religious standpoint that intends to conduct a revolutionary change with violence, if necessary. “Radical” is less strict, however, the intent, in the religious context is also to guide followers its the roots. “Fundamental” embraces both terms and describes a standpoint away from the norm.

²⁸³ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 23.

²⁸⁴ Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 20.

and widespread violence in others.”²⁸⁵ Unfortunately, the Taliban, HQN and HIG do not limit their activities to Afghanistan; they use Pakistan as well. Islamabad has been linked more strongly to the Taliban than to Kabul for two years “by claiming that Pakistan provides a reliable, safe, and fertile recruiting, training and fund-raising haven just across the border.”²⁸⁶ The ill-defined border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn in 1893 and called the Durand Line, encompasses a salient feature, which is porosity. Therefore, the adjacent provinces on both sides of the border are very hospitable and suitable to those organizations applying insurgency tactics.²⁸⁷

Islam and its political dimension is only one driving factor; another one is tribalism, which has deep roots, especially in the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, the tribal elder or malik was and still is the sole authority able to guide and influence the tribe in whatever direction is most fruitful and profitable. Therefore, the malik gains the undisputed loyalty of his tribesmen, ensures the cohesion of his tribe, and maintains therewith his power. However, during the Soviet occupation, the power shifted from the maliks to the mullahs (local religious teachers) due to a jihad conducted by the Mujahideen.²⁸⁸ The most prominent tribe, who inhabits both Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan is the Pashtun tribe.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 led quickly to the disbandment of the Taliban regime, though the coalition forces were able to prevent neither an extraction of experienced Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders in mid-November 2001 in Kunduz province by the Pakistani air force, nor the escape of Osama bin Laden, who retreated with a bunch of his most important fellows into the mountainous region of Tora Bora.²⁸⁹ All remnants

²⁸⁵ Aziz Talbani, “Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education,” *Comparative Education Review* 40, no. 1 (February 1996), 81.

²⁸⁶ Thomas H. Johnson, *On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan* Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, [2007]).

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

of the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda sought refuge in the provinces on both sides of the middle part of the Afghan-Pakistani border. These areas are all inhabited by the Pashtuns. Figure 14 shows the ethnicities in general and the Pashtun distribution in particular in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the designated part of the borderline.

Figure 14. Ethnicities and part of the Afghan-Pakistani border²⁹⁰



Politics, religion and tribalism together lead to high dynamics in both countries and contribute to the volatile situation that prevails, especially in Afghanistan, where the state still lacks legitimacy, capacity and autonomy. The international military commitment in Afghanistan, with ISAF and the OEF mission, which contribute to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have to face daily threats, which are posed by these movements and rooted in religious and tribal causes. Their activities can be categorized as insurgency tactics or guerilla warfare using all kinds of highly sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as well as suicide bombings to nourish fear and instability and withdraw the legitimacy of the presence of the international community. Figures 15 and 16 provide an overview of the increased use of IEDs (Figure 15) and suicide bombings (Figure 16) in the last few years.

²⁹⁰ Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 49; Johnson, *On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan*, 120.

Figure 15. Afghan IEDs²⁹¹





Figure 16. Afghan Suicide Bombings²⁹²



In this context, the central government in Kabul attempts to establish the Afghanistan National Development Strategy combined with economic development. Not only have the political, ethnical, cultural and societal aspects affected the rebuilding of Afghanistan, but also the economy. Only a growing market with prosperous trade separate from the opium economy will allow the state to collect taxes, improve the employment situation and provide alternative livelihoods for the Afghan people.

²⁹¹ Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 34.

²⁹² Ibid.

Additionally, growing markets within a relatively secure situation will make the Afghan economy attractive for foreign investment. A sustainable economy will consequently lead to more development activities, and by collecting taxes, the government will be able to increase the wealth of the population through reimbursement. Thus, neither governance, security, ethnicity nor the economy may be neglected for the sustainable rebuilding and development of Afghanistan. All these pillars are intertwined and setbacks in one pillar will hamper the development in the other pillars.

Only by analyzing the root causes will PRTs be able to operate adequately and effectively counter any insurgencies. Thus, the Taliban, HQN and HIG, including Al-Qaeda, are analyzed in the context of Islamization²⁹³ and tribalism as well as in geopolitical circumstances. After that, the overall economic situation is analyzed as a huge contributor to the sustainable development of Afghanistan and related to the PRT activities.

B. TALIBAN

1. Origins

The Taliban appeared on the scene at the end of 1994, especially in the vicinity of Kandahar, initially providing peace and security, although they did not come suddenly.²⁹⁴ The Afghans suffered through wars for decades, either from their Mujahideen fight against the Soviet occupiers, or from their civil war and internal power struggles among the different warlords that arose after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of the Najibullah administration in 1992. In the mid-90s, the Afghans were war-torn and tired of suppression, war and violence. The Taliban initially disbanded warring tribal groups and fought against warlords such as Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek leader of the Northern Alliance, as well as Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Tajik hero who prevailed with

²⁹³ According to Aziz Talbani, "Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education," *Comparative Education Review* 40, no. 1 (February 1996), 66 Islamization is a movement to make Islam a relevant source of power and social control. It is not merely a religion. The ones who conduct Islamization are called Islamicists.

²⁹⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2001), 1.

impressive leadership skills during the jihad against the Soviets, and who was the military commander of the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani. Moreover, they disarmed the adversaries, opened the roads, and enabled not only trade possibilities, but also the smuggling of goods with large income margins. Thus, the Afghans saw hope and a chance to maintain their livelihood. In 1997, the Taliban, the Islamic warriors, had established control over two-thirds of Afghanistan.²⁹⁵

The majority of the Taliban personnel body has been young students of the Quran recruited from Islamic theology schools (madaris) along the Afghan-Pakistani border within or next to refugee camps. The ethnic group of the Pashtuns represents the majority of the Taliban. However, shortly after their initial successes, they “implemented an extreme interpretation of the sharia or Islamic law that appalled many Afghans and the Muslim world.”²⁹⁶ Even the prophet of Islam initially interpreted other tribes and religions, such as Christians and Jews, as natural allies and thus Mohammed accepted and approved of them.²⁹⁷ This message of tolerance and coexistence as traditional values of Islam was refused by the Taliban in a fundamentalist manner. The women were deeply suppressed by forbidding them to leave their homes and by closing down girls’ schools. Moreover, the Taliban banned all kinds of entertainment, media and activities that did not stick to their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

The origins of the Taliban movement can be drawn back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and thus to December 1979. The movement began as a resistance against the Soviets in the vicinity of Kandahar and was based on the tribal network of the Durrani Pashtuns.²⁹⁸ Generally speaking, the Pashtuns can be subdivided into five major sub-tribes; the Durrani (Abdalis), who are one of them, basically inhabit the southern part of Afghanistan around Kandahar and represent the ruling dynasty in Afghanistan. The Ghilzais are another sub-tribe, inhabit the eastern parts of the country, and have been the

²⁹⁵ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 5.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁹⁷ John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, revised 3rd edition ed. (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.

²⁹⁸ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 18.

warriors in the history of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are discussed more fully below.. The initial Taliban movement was limited to the vicinity of Kandahar and led by the respective chiefs of the Durrani and some senior religious scholars (ulema) who declared a tribal jihad. Moreover, the ulema brought in political parties to cover the political dimension of Islam. Two popular parties in southern Afghanistan with strong affiliations to the tribe were involved. First, Harakat-e Inqilab Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution) led by Maulvi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi and secondly, another Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam), which was led by Maulvi Younis Khalis (HIK). The latter split in 1979 with Hekmatyar and established his own faction of the Hezb-e Islami. Both leaders have run their own madaris within the Pashtun belt.²⁹⁹ Mullah Omar, who became the spiritual leader of the Taliban movement and who was a village mullah in Singesar, Kandahar province running his own madrassa, joined Khalis' faction of the Hezb-e Islami. As the war progressed, the tribes as well as the Islamic parties were not able to unite their efforts against the Soviet occupiers. The parties were stronger, emphasized the values of early Islam and marginalized the tribal structures. The parties and especially the Hezb-e Islami of Khalis "pursued a radical political ideology in order to bring about an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan."³⁰⁰ The outcome was deep fragmentation instead of unity. Two camps occurred, the traditionalists and the Islamicists, and they fought each other mercilessly.

The Taliban finally emerged on the scene in 1994. Meanwhile, the Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan by the Mujahideen, and the regime of President Najibullah collapsed in 1992. The Mujahideen captured Kabul that year and gained power by the venture of the Tajik forces under Burhanuddin Rabbani, his military commander, Massoud, and the Uzbek General Dostum, which was a trauma for the Pashtuns due to a non-Pashtun leadership in Kabul. However, the Rabbani government was not able to gain control over all of Afghanistan. The west was under the control of Ismael Khan, the east was controlled by a council of former Mujahideen commanders located in Jalalabad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was the leader of some provinces in the south

²⁹⁹ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 18-19.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

and east of Kabul, the Hazaras were in charge of central Afghanistan, and finally, the entire southern region around Kandahar was subdivided among several Mujahideen warlords. These warlords fought for individual supremacy and created conditions of anarchy in the vicinity of Kandahar.³⁰¹ Daily life was dominated by violence and arbitrary acts such as the seizing homes and farms, abusing the population at will, kidnapping kids, robberies, fighting and looting in the streets.³⁰² More people were seeking refuge in Pakistan and a lot of former Mujahideen rallied together and met Mullah Omar in Kandahar. They built a highly divergent group but merged into the Taliban movement after long discussions and declared their aims as “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.”³⁰³ Furthermore, they declared themselves an independent movement and split with the party. The initial leader of the Taliban movement was Mullah Omar, who named himself Leader of the Faithful (Amir-ul Momineen) after he had shown the Cloak of the prophet Mohammed to a crowd of his followers in 1996. The Shrine of the Cloak of the prophet Mohammed is located in Kandahar next to the tomb of Ahmad Shah Abdali (Durrani), the founder of Afghanistan. This is one of the holiest Islamic places to worship in Afghanistan. This procedure was conducted only on rare occasions throughout Afghan history, for instance in 1935 when the Afghans suffered from a cholera epidemic and requested help. Mullah Omar only showed the cloak at that time to increase his acceptance and to legitimize his role as the leader of the Taliban.³⁰⁴ The Taliban have their center of gravity in the rural areas in the south where the population is more conservative. Kabul is seen as the center of liberalism in the lens of the Taliban and both the socialist ideology as well as the traditional Islamic movement (Hanafi School of law) brought ruin and destruction to Afghanistan.³⁰⁵

³⁰¹ Peter Marsden, *The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan* (Karachi; London; New York: Oxford University Press; Zed Books Ltd, 1998), 61.

³⁰² Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 19-21.

³⁰³ Ibid., 22.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 20.

³⁰⁵ Marsden, *The Taliba: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan*, 64.

The name Taliban stems from the word talib, meaning an Islamic student who seeks Islamic knowledge.³⁰⁶ The Taliban applied their fundamental Islamic approach, but, it is important to mention that, of course, not every talib is an insurgent, or even a terrorist, since the original intention of the Taliban movement was to restore law and order.

2. Taliban's Islamic Understanding

The way the Taliban practice their Islamic fundamentalism can be described as aggressive, expansionist and uncompromising with the overall aim of a purified Afghan Islamic society as it was created at the time of the prophet Mohammed.³⁰⁷ Mohammed, as the messenger of God, was someone who did not evolve a new faith, but he was a reformer or revolutionist who changed the Arabian way of life. He also intended to purify society by banning polytheism and idolatry. Mohammed thought that the majority of the Arabian population lived in ignorance of God and His will and he defined the association of anything with God as the worst sin of all. Therefore, he conducted Islam as a reformation toward total affiliation and submission to God and His will. This required, and still requires from a Muslim, subordination as an individual and as part of the society due to the definition of a community or brotherhood of believers. By accepting this, the rule or the kingdom of God is established on earth. Consequently, this Islamic worldview already encompassed aspects of nation-building on a merged religious and political fundament. In the early days, Mohammed differentiated between believer and non-believer, black or white, and nothing in between. Moreover, he expected that a Muslim had to emigrate away from the non-believer (hijra) and struggle against them (jihad) and even give his life for this purpose in order to establish God's rule. This was seen as the ultimate profession of faith; the victim was rewarded with eternal life as a martyr. This early Islamic ideology offers a pattern of protest, resistance and revolutionary change.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁶ Rashid, *Taliba: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 22-23.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁰⁸ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 12-14.

The practice of Islam for Muslims is of utmost importance due to the subservient character of Islam. Therefore, following Islamic law and the correct practices of Islam are crucial, although faith is inseparately linked to it.³⁰⁹ Consequently, Islamic law means in every case God's will and is therefore His guidance. That is the path or the way, or in Islamic terms, sharia. It describes the expected behavior of the society of the believers, and is a common understanding in Muslim society, although there are different interpretations depending on which school of law³¹⁰ one follows.³¹¹ Thus, the question is whether the Taliban practice their jihad correctly.

Jihad means struggle and is part of the religious duties for every Muslim, although it is not one of the five pillars³¹² of Islam. Originally, jihad was the holy war; however, it can be characterized as a protection of Islam. Thus, it is self-preservation and an obligation for all Muslims, either as an individual or as part of the community. The jihad can be targeted against oneself or against an external individual, group, or organization that poses a threat to Islam. The struggle against oneself is called the "major" jihad as it is more difficult than fighting against an opponent. The other jihad, directed against others is called the "minor" jihad.³¹³ Jihad does not necessarily mean to conduct a war, rather it is where a Muslims strives to become a better Muslim or to preserve Islam by education,

³⁰⁹ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 68.

³¹⁰ According to Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 75-85 and Prof. Dr. Abbas Kadhimi, in a lecture on Islam, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on February 04, 2008 there are five schools of law. These are the Shi'a, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. The latter four are subsumed as Sunni schools of law. In the following, the term Sunni is used for all four schools of law together. The sources of law are the Quran, the sunna of the prophet (oral records of the prophet, hadith) and the analogical reasoning (application of comparable cases, qiyas). Moreover, the principle of consensus (following the opinion or consensus of the early community, ijma) is a complementary source of Islamic law. It must be stressed that the Shi'a school of law rejects the principles of analogical reasoning and consensus and refers, when the Quran and the sunna do not cover certain situations, to advanced religious scholars (Ayatollah or Grand Ayatollah) as the Shi'a regard only the Imam as the supreme legal interpreter and authority of Islam.

³¹¹ Ibid., 74-75.

³¹² According to Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 88-93 and Prof. Dr. Abbas Kadhimi, in a lecture on Islam, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on February 20, 2008 the official five pillars of Islam are testimony (unity of God, tawhid), prayer (salat), almsgiving (zakat), fasting of Ramadan (sawm) and the pilgrimage (destination is the Kaba in Mecca, hajj). These five pillars are common sense and accepted by all Muslims independently of their respective school of thought/law.

³¹³ Prof. Dr. Abbas Kadhimi, in a lecture on Islam, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on February 25, 2008.

for instance, or by avoiding sins.³¹⁴ It has to be emphasized that the call for jihad is not a small matter; rather it is a huge issue for Muslims. It can be compared to an emergency call for everybody. In every case, there has to be an Islamic authority who presents the competence to call for such a crucial religious duty.³¹⁵ Who this authority can be varies with the different schools of law. In the Sunni schools of law, which have to be applied in the case of the Taliban, the leader of the Muslim community (umma) should be selected on the basis of the best suited and most feasible person. If the umma achieves consensus on this person and he or she fits into the political order, the next leader is chosen. A direct blood lineage to one of the first four caliphs is not necessarily required as the Shi'a do.³¹⁶ Consequently, after a group of Sunnis has chosen their leader, he can call for a jihad and therewith legalize it for the respective group. With this understanding and in this context, Mullah Omar was authorized to call for a jihad due to his acceptance as the spiritual and religious leader of the Taliban. Therefore, his call ensured that every follower of the Taliban was to conduct a jihad. The call for jihad is directed at every Muslim subordinated to the one who has called and legalized the jihad. Over the years, jihad was picked up within the Muslim Brotherhood and has become popular. As a result, the Western notion of jihad is negative, whereas the original Arabic meaning had a positive character.³¹⁷

3. Islam in Afghanistan

Since 1979, Islam has become a unifying force in Afghanistan and a solid part of Afghan daily life. However, the jihad represents a mobilizing factor to motivate the Afghans to fight for certain goals, sometimes based on dubious motives. However, Islam in Afghanistan, especially prior to 1979, has been very flexible and tolerant due to the

³¹⁴ Clyde Mark, *Islam: A Primer* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, [2003]).

³¹⁵ Prof. Dr. Abbas Kadhimi, in a lecture on Islam, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on February 25, 2008.

³¹⁶ Christopher M. Blanchard, *Islam: Sunnis and Shiites* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, [2006]).

³¹⁷ Prof. Dr. Abbas Kadhimi, in lecture on Islam, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on February 25, 2008.

fact that 80 percent³¹⁸ of the Afghan population sticks to the Hanafi school of law, which has traditionally dominated in the Arab Middle East. The Shi'a population in Afghanistan encompasses 19 percent.³¹⁹ Hence, the Afghan population is relatively homogeneous regarding Islam. Islam did not face severe challenges in Afghanistan due to the presence of small minorities of non-Muslims.³²⁰ Abu Hanifa, the founder of the Hanafi school of law and a student of Ja'far al Sadiq, who was the founder of the Shi'a Jafari school of law, which is the most important among the Shi'a, developed Islam with regard to his own interpretation and in the context of a comprehensive way of life in the eighth century. Hanifa lived, practiced and taught in Kufa (today Iraq) although his family came originally from Kabul. He was influenced by several legal scholars, who were part of a younger Islamic community than in Medina. Thus, in his school of law, flexibility prevailed and he relied on jurist opinions and local law. However, in case of doubt he stuck to the consensus of the superior Medina law. The Hanafi school of law is easier to practice, has fewer restrictions, and encompasses more freedom and liberty as well as tolerance.³²¹

4. Islamization in Afghanistan

Since 1979, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, a process of Islamization occurred in Afghanistan. The Soviets intended to establish a socialist regime with Babrak Karmal as president and thus, spread their ideology of communism. This was seen as a threat to Islam and the Soviets were compared to unjust rulers. Islam requires, in this case, a resistance against the outsiders and consequently, the Mujahideen formed themselves into small units and started to rebel against the occupiers in the form of a jihad. The Mujahideen, "the soldiers of the Holy War—'bandits' in the eyes of the Soviet

³¹⁸ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 83.

³¹⁹ Blanchard, *Islam: Sunnis and Shiites*, 19.

³²⁰ Ali Banuazizi and others, *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, 1st ed. (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 127.

³²¹ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 76-77 and Prof. Dr. Abbas Kadhim, in a lecture on Islam Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA on February 4, 2008.

Union but ‘freedom fighters’ to everyone else,”³²² had already fearlessly fought the British in the nineteenth century in the first and second Anglo-Afghan War. This resurgence of the Mujahideen was accompanied by several internal and external dynamics, which have to be evaluated in this context.

During the Soviet occupation, fundamental Islamicists appeared or became stronger. Hekmatyar and Massoud were the most prominent ones among them and both had fled to Pakistan by 1975 before the Soviet invasion took place.³²³ Since they were backed externally by the CIA, the Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) and Saudi Arabia with funding and modern weaponry,³²⁴ both kept the jihad alive and especially Hekmatyar who was inspired by the ideology of the Pakistani Jamaat-ul Islami (JUI) party, who pursued fundamental political change in order to create a true Islamic society.³²⁵ Moreover, Hekmatyar received the bulk of the aid, which was basically guided by Zia ul-Haq, who became president in 1978 after a military coup in July 1977 in Pakistan.³²⁶ Zia-ul Haq was a devote Muslim and began immediately to implement Islam in Pakistani society, however, he gained sympathy from the West. In 1979, he promulgated “The National Education Policy and Implementation Program,” which defined the overall goal of education to “foster in students a loyalty to Islam, a sense of being a dutiful citizen of the Pakistani nation as a part of universal Ummah [Muslim community] with a full knowledge of the Pakistan movement, its ideological implications based on the precepts of the Quran and Sunnah.”³²⁷ Moreover, Zia-ul Haq implemented Islam politically as the core principle of his regime and thus, oriented Pakistan toward a fundamentalist understanding of Islam.³²⁸

³²² Schofield, *Afghan Frontier Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*, 282.

³²³ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 85.

³²⁴ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 695.

³²⁵ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 86.

³²⁶ Schofield, *Afghan Frontier Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*, 274-275.

³²⁷ Talbani, *Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education*, 75.

³²⁸ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 199.

Pakistan was a suitable opportunity to pose a counterweight against the Soviets' spread of communism. Moreover, Pakistan intended to avoid a two-front conflict due to the alliance between the Soviet Union and India during the Cold War era. Therefore, Zia-ul Haq was in favor of the uprising radical Islamicists, in general, and in Hekmatyar, in particular, because he pursued the same ideology as Zia-ul Haq.³²⁹ The United States' interests and motivation were apparent. By using Pakistan as an executer against the invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a proxy war could easily be established by washing one's hands of it. But moreover, the U.S. was also interested in the nuclear program of Pakistan, which had already been initiated during Bhutto's reign.³³⁰ Saudi Arabia identified the leadership of Zia-ul Haq and Hekmatyar as a suitable window of opportunity for implementing their Wahhabi ideology of Islam in the society and guiding it back on the right path of Islam. The Wahhabi movement, founded in the eighteenth century by Abd al-Wahhab, was introduced because of a moral decline and deviation from the straight path of Islam in the community. Wahhab believed especially that the worship of tombs and other saints, which was common in the eighteenth century, was nothing but idolatry and thus, the worst sin in Islam, according to the belief in unity of God. Therefore, he created a social and moral revolution based strictly on the Quran and the examples of Mohammed and the Medinan community.³³¹ All Muslims who resisted that practice were and still are considered to be non-believers (kafirs) and thus enemies of God. Wahhabism rejects everything except the pure Islam of Mohammed and his community. All other movements that may have occurred over the years are not accepted, including the Shi'a as well as the Hanafi schools of law and the mystic practices of the Sufi order, which prevailed in Afghanistan prior to 1979. Wahhabism today is represented in the state and society in Saudi Arabia.³³²

³²⁹ Raja G. Hussain, *Badal: A Culture of Revenge. the Impact of Collateral Damage on Taliban Insurgency* (Monterey/CA: Thesis U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, [2008]).

³³⁰ Schofield, *Afghan Frontier Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*, 281.

³³¹ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 118.

³³² Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 118; Hussain, *Badal: A Culture of Revenge. The Impact of Collateral Damage on Taliban Insurgency*, 22.

Besides that, internal dynamics occurred in Afghanistan as well. Other Mujahideens were guided by village mullahs, although they were often not really better educated than the Mujahideen fighters themselves.³³³ These mullahs joined more moderate Islamic parties after 1979. Since then until the end of the reign of the Taliban, the power centers shifted gradually away from the tribal elders (maliks or khans) and toward the mullahs and nothing was as it had been before. These events provide major reasons “why Islam has shifted from playing a relatively passive role toward an active role in integrating a diverse, multiethnic society.”³³⁴ The mullahs became more and more important as local religious leaders and their rise was nourished by the establishment of several religious madaris along the Afghan-Pakistani border where Islamic law has been stressed. The mullahs themselves autonomously increased their influence in the clergy as well as in politics and hence, a religio-political force appeared on the scene. Their role and influence over the society became even stronger under the Taliban regime, which, for instance, assembled jirgas (traditional assemblies comprised of tribal elders) only with mullahs. But even worse, this religious-political force with mullah leadership struggled for political power during the civil war in Afghanistan between 1992 and 1994 and concurrently, the traditional tolerance and flexibility of an ordinary Afghan practicing Hanafi disappeared. For the purpose of gaining power, Muslims fought Muslims throughout Afghanistan, and under the Taliban umbrella, massacres were conducted, such as the massacre of the Hazaras (Shi’a) in 1995. Islam was no longer a unifying force in Afghanistan and this religious-political force became a “lethal weapon in the hands of extremists, a force for division, fragmentation and enormous blood-letting.”³³⁵

5. Madaris

Since 1979 the number of madaris increased significantly in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, but they were concentrated along the border between the two countries. The system is not new, but was invented in the nineteenth century. A madrassa (plural is

³³³ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 83.

³³⁴ Banuazizi and others, *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, 124.

³³⁵ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 83.

madaris) literally means place of study and became a center of organized learning. The original curricula consisted of the Quran, the traditions of the prophet Mohammed (hadith), the jurisprudence (fiqh) as well as the Arabic language.³³⁶ During the Soviet occupation, mullahs ran their own madaris with specific curricula depending on who funded them and how many subsidies they received. Basically, the madaris were alienated to create jihadis and later under the Taliban regime to hold young personnel available for recruiting purposes rather than offering a broad education with religious aspects. Nevertheless, Zia-ul Haq, as well as Hekmatyar, saw education as the only suitable way to create radical Islamicists, which would consequently lead to a new Muslim society. However, only the younger generation was eligible for that education.³³⁷ The Taliban later broke with that radical Islamicism as well as with traditional Islam in Afghanistan and Sufism. Their ideological foundation is an extreme form of Deobandism, which is a branch of the Hanafi school of law although they have interpreted and understand it in an extreme way. The origins of Deobandi Islam can be retraced to Deoband near New Delhi, where in the nineteenth century, the first Deoband madrassa was established. The followers intended to unite Muslim society in British India to learn how to live in a colonial state and how to encounter non-Muslim rulers. Their religious curriculum was based on the interpretation of the sharia, which mirrored the realities of that time. Moreover, the Deobandis embraced a restrictive role for women, and rejected all kinds of hierarchy among Muslims as well as the Shi'a. In 1879, 12 years after the first madrassa was founded, twelve madaris were run in British India, which were also joined by several Afghan students. In 1967, 9,000 madaris had been opened across South Asia; however, most Deobandi madaris were created in Pakistan after they gained independence in 1947. The radical movement of the JUI was founded in the Deobandi madaris, which was turned into a political party in 1962 by its founder Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi.³³⁸ During the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan in the

³³⁶ Talbani, *Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education*, 68.

³³⁷ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 88.

³³⁸ Ibid.

1980s, the JUI, especially the faction led by Maulana Fazlur Rehmen Khalil,³³⁹ which was in favor of the Pashtun tribe inhabiting the region along the Pakistani-Afghan border, opened hundreds of madaris in the North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and in Baluchistan.³⁴⁰ The number of Deobandi madaris in Pakistan rose exponentially and the liaison between mullahs and the Mujahideen grew permanently during the 1980s. In the meantime, most of the madaris were run by mullahs who were not well educated and who did not know much about the original character of Deobandism. Under their leadership, education was reduced to learning reading and writing and about an idealistic Islam without any practical and realistic connections. Their aim was solely to train a new generation of Muslims prepared to fill a gap after the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan ended. Although they still labeled themselves madrassa, the real character gradually changed to a training camp teaching military tactics and techniques.³⁴¹ The majority of these madaris was established next to refugee camps in which women with their children and orphans that fled from the Soviets, arrived.³⁴² These kids, mixed with poor Pakistani boys and girls, joined the madaris as their only chance to receive an education. This generation, missing their fathers who were fighting as Mujahideens against the Soviets, did not know anything about tribal culture or Islam, which they would normally have learned in their family environment. Consequently, they were prone to that idealistic teaching of Islam and assumed it as reality with no connection to tribal customs and family life.

The Taliban base their ideology primarily on Deobandi Islam, however, Deobandi was mixed up in the madaris with its own interpretation of the sharia and the Pashtunwali, the code of honor of the Pashtuns, which is explained below. Moreover, a

³³⁹ According to Moniza Khokhar, "Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 4 (April 1, 2007), 357 (accessed February 13, 2008) there are madaris led by him which support Al-Qaeda directly.

³⁴⁰ Pakistan consists of four provinces. These are the North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP), Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan.

³⁴¹ Moniza Khokhar, "Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 30, no. 4 (April 01, 2007), (accessed February 13 2008), 356.

³⁴² Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 89-90.

fundamentalist understanding of the Hanbali school of law³⁴³ as well as Wahabbism, due to the funding of the Saudis, was added. These madaris “became a major training ground for Taliban leadership.”³⁴⁴ The madaris evolved over the years and some of them to highly sophisticated schools such as the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqania, which promotes cadre students especially for Taliban leadership. This school, located in Akhora Khatak in the NWFP, consists of a boarding school and a high school with a capacity of nearly 2,500 pupils, and additionally it offers an eight-year masters’ program as well as a PhD program when the residence time is prolonged for two more years. Moreover, it has established a network of smaller madaris, which are closely linked to the superior school and which teach their curricula.³⁴⁵ Throughout Pakistan, a system of madaris prevails. In general, the ones that follow the Deobandi school are militant ones and it was estimated in 2007 that they train approximately two million people in up to 6,000 madaris.³⁴⁶

Consequently, this hotbed of the Taliban has to be withdrawn. Although the Pakistani government has established new laws to gain control over the madaris, the international community has to provide more aid in the form of an adequate number of education facilities teaching moderate curricula and with access to modern information sources such as the Internet. If Pakistan closed all the madaris by force, thousands of children would have no opportunity to join any school and thus would become illiterate. Therefore, adequate substitutes in form of other schools are crucial. This approach will only be helpful when further development projects such as roads, public transportation and communication means are initiated. Additionally, a perspective for after school is also vital, which means that job opportunities have to be created. As previously mentioned, not all Taliban are insurgents or terrorists. The Taliban represented an official political regime in Afghanistan and, therefore, moderate Taliban have to be involved in

³⁴³ Khokhar, *Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan*, 354.

³⁴⁴ Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 90.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

³⁴⁶ Khokhar, *Reforming Militant Madaris in Pakistan*, 354.

current politics in Afghanistan by participation in the government. The Afghan constitution allows parties that are not against the holy religion of Islam,³⁴⁷ which is in the case of the Taliban, accurate.

Moreover, the madaris share the same ideological values and are, therefore, not only training ground for the Taliban leadership, but also a recruiting ground for Taliban fighters. The Taliban originated in the Pashtun tribal areas and the majority of the madaris has found its location within the Pashtun belt on both sides of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The political dimension of Islam, as developed by the Taliban, is therefore directly intertwined to the Pashtuns, which means to tribal structures and an environment in which loyalty and commitment is guaranteed to the clan. Traditional tribal understanding rejects huge authorities and strong centralized states. The clash of the Taliban authorities and policies with the Pashtun tribal customs and practices makes the situation even more complex and difficult to understand.

C. PASHTUN

1. Origins

Tribes in general and the Pashtuns in particular have had more than direct impact on political life in Afghanistan for nearly 300 years. “Afghan political life has sometimes been represented as being a ‘recurrent process of fission and fusion,’ where the integrating tendency of the state is opposed to the centrifugal force of the tribes.”³⁴⁸

The Pashtuns look back on a long tradition as an ethnic group although they have played an important political role in Afghanistan since the mid-eighteenth century.³⁴⁹ All Pashtuns link themselves to Qais Abdur Rashid who was a companion of the prophet Mohammed. Homogeneity has not prevailed among them regarding, for instance, the language. Not every Pashtuns is able to speak Pashto. The Pashtuns can be subdivided into five major sub-tribes. They are the Durrani (Abdalis), the Ghilzai, the Sarbani, the

³⁴⁷ Johnson, *Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War*, 10.

³⁴⁸ Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present*, 7.

³⁴⁹ Thomas J. Barfield, “Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” *Iranian Studies* 37, no. 2 (2004), 268.

Ghurghusht and the Karlanri tribes, where the permanently smoldering conflict between the first two is the best documented.³⁵⁰ The Ghilzais have been the traditional warriors in Pashtun history, always fighting for independence and against internal and external authorities who intended to subdue them. The Mughals as well as the Safavids in the early eighteenth century, and the British, had this experience during the first³⁵¹ and second³⁵² Anglo-Afghan wars.³⁵³ However, the Ghilzais were always satisfied when the suspicious outsiders had been defeated or forced to withdraw. They never claimed to rule, although they tried to do so after they defeated the Safavids in 1711. They were not successful in establishing an effective rule and thus, various powerful tribes arose from the political weakness of the Ghilzais. One of those tribes is the Abdali Pashtuns, which has been successful in establishing an effective administration. From this tribe, Ahmed Khan Abdali declared the Durrani empire in 1747 and the Durrani proved their ability to create state structures as well as an effective Pashtun rule. From that time onward, modern Afghan history begins and the Durrani have taken over the role of the Afghan rulers.³⁵⁴ This conflict is now 300 years old and the Ghilzais inhabit, meanwhile, the eastern provinces and the Durrani's center of gravity is in Kandahar, in the southern part of Afghanistan. Figure 17 shows the present dispersion of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

³⁵⁰ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 7-9.

³⁵¹ 1st Anglo—Afghan war took place from 1839 to 1842.

³⁵² 2nd Anglo—Afghan war took place from 1878 to 1880.

³⁵³ Barfield, *Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan*, 269-271.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 269-270.

Figure 17. Present Pashtun dispersion in Afghanistan and Pakistan³⁵⁵



2. Internal Structure and Organization

The Pashtuns are a segmentary ethnic group. Understanding this social behavior pattern is of utmost importance in order to determine whether they defect or cooperate with external authorities. The segmentary lineage system leads to a leaderless society, which means that no hierarchy exists.³⁵⁶ Therefore, it is in the nature of the Pashtuns to reject higher authorities. “This characteristic makes Pashtuns the perfect insurgents.”³⁵⁷ The segmentary societies organize themselves by an ideology of kinship. Consequently, the family is the smallest unit of these societies and the nearer the relative the more loyalty he (usually) or she gets. Also, in cases of disputes, a brother should help his brother against a cousin, for instance, who is further away. Thus, each person can identify his position in a segmentary lineage system by genealogy.³⁵⁸ Pashtuns are acting within this segmentary lineage system and it expands concentrically around the family with “the

³⁵⁵ Johnson, *On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan*, 120.

³⁵⁶ Embree, *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order*, 41.

³⁵⁷ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 8.

³⁵⁸ Embree, *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order*, 42.

extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy and major cultural-linguistic group.”³⁵⁹ The segmentary structure of the Pashtuns is the reason why external authorities, whether foreign invaders or the current central government in Kabul, lacks legitimacy. Figure 19 shows the segmentary lineage system and Figure 18 offers a simplistic model of the concentric circles of the extended family. Figure 18 shows, additionally, that policies of the central government in Kabul are ineffective as long as they do not reach the core of these circles.

Figure 18. Extended Family Model³⁶⁰





Figure 19. Segmentary Lineage System³⁶¹



³⁵⁹ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 9.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Dr. Monika Lanik, Zentrum für Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr, Afghanistan Briefing June 28 2006, Hildesheim, Germany.

Besides the internal organization of the Pashtuns, which promotes a rebellious behavior in the form of an insurgency, for instance, the penetration of their areas of life, by attempts to govern or administer those areas, directly provokes the Pashtun code of honor, the so called Pashtunwali.

3. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

The Taliban originated from the Pashtun tribe and especially after 9/11, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network was torn apart and pushed into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan as well as in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan along the border between both countries. These areas are inhabited by several Pashtun sub-tribes. Figure 20 provides a rough overview of the Pashtuns in the designated borderland. One can find the Mohmands, Afridis, Orakzais, Turis, Wazirs, Mahsuds as well as the Bitanis. The latter ones are Ghilzai Pashtuns whereas the Mohmands belong to the Sarbanis tribe. The other four tribes are part of the Karlanri tribe, which inhabit both sides of the border and are considered the wildest tribal groups.³⁶²

³⁶² Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 44-51.

Figure 20. Pashtun sub-tribes in FATA³⁶³



These inhomogeneous tribes in FATA are not governed directly; however, the Pakistani government has established four pillars to execute control over those areas. These pillars are the political agent,³⁶⁴ the maliks,³⁶⁵ the Frontier Crime Regulation³⁶⁶ and the Frontier Corps.³⁶⁷ All four pillars are linked together and if one gets weakened it has a direct impact on all the others. Due to the power shift from the maliks to the

³⁶³ Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 44-51.

³⁶⁴ The political agent (PA) is appointed by the responsible governor and becomes a government official.

³⁶⁵ The maliks are the tribal elders who have the undoubted loyalty of their respective tribe and who are the only authority accepted by the tribe.

³⁶⁶ The Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) is a law for governance based on collective responsibility and collective punishment.

³⁶⁷ Tariq Mahmood and Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), *The Durand Line [Electronic Resource]: South Asia's New Trouble Spot* (Monterey, Calif; Springfield, Va: Naval Postgraduate School; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2005), 62.

mullahs since 1979, it is the pillar of the maliks that is currently the weakest. In reality, the governance and control over those areas and those tribes is extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible due to the non-permissive terrain, the porous character of the border and the segmentary structure of the tribes. The tribes do not care about the border between the countries, which were delineated in 1893 and which are also known as the Durand Line. Besides the fact that the Durand Line is in permanent dispute between Kabul and Islamabad, it does not follow tribal areas, but rather geographical requirements.³⁶⁸ Daily life can be portrayed as frequent border crossings on several unmanned passes for the purposes of economic trade, employment, family meetings, etc., but also for uncovered penetration of the countries and smuggling. The entire region is underdeveloped; the people are poor and illiterate, but on the other hand, very proud.³⁶⁹ The Taliban as well as the Al-Qaeda network and other terrorist elements have not only found sanctuary in those areas, but also suitable bases for command and control issues, recruiting, and training as well as planning and conducting new operations.³⁷⁰ These elements continue to use their already (prior to 2001) established network of madaris and their religious-political force to suppress traditional tribal structures.³⁷¹ Consequently, the role of the maliks has to be strengthened. The maliks have to be able to practice their role as the tribal elders and also as the main contributors to stability if external forces have won their hearts and minds.

4. Pashtunwali

The reason why the Taliban are hosted in the Pashtun-settled areas is due to the Pashtunwali and their code of honor, or social code. The Pashtun society is fundamentally bound to this code, which determines its behavior and identity. A Pashtun

³⁶⁸ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 27.

³⁶⁹ Mahmood and Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.), *The Durand Line [Electronic Resource]: South Asia's New Trouble Spot*, 62-64.

³⁷⁰ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 16-17.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

has to stick to this code to maintain his honor, because honor is the overarching attribute of a person in the Pashtun rural and tribal environment. A person without honor is a non-person and someone who will be completely ignored. The Pashtunwali is the strongest force in the tribal areas that can facilitate and maintain law and order.³⁷² Consequently, tribalism was, is, and will definitely continue to be a unifying force in Afghanistan.

Besides some core values of the Pashtunwali such as “self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, forgiveness, and tolerance,”³⁷³ the Pashtunwali create some mandatory duties for the individual. The institution that judges law and order is the jirga. The jirga’s final sentence is based on the principle of consensus and is binding for the persons who are affected. This approach of social correlation is contradictory to Western understandings of independent judiciaries, however, it is a fundamental element in these tribal societies and it is vital to strengthen the jirgas and draw them into the nation-building process in Afghanistan.

The Pashtunwali refers to other individual principles such as freedom, honor, revenge and chivalry. The Pashtuns are proud of their freedom and will never tell another person what to do. Personal honor (nang) has to be maintained for a Pashtun. Nang can be violated by injuring one’s wealth (zewar), land (zar) or women (zan). If one of these factors is violated by an external force, the Pashtunwali requires a counter-action to restore nang. This action is called badal (revenge), which literally means exchange or revenge in the sense of killing or vendetta.³⁷⁴ Another concept of the Pashtunwali is hospitality (melmastia) and refuge (nanawatey). This has to be provided to everyone who is asking for it independently whether the person is a stranger, foreigner or enemy. In the sense of the Pashtunwali, nanawatey is an indicator for mercy. Melmastia and nanawatey have to be provided for a limited time, however, even if it means risking your own life.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 16-17.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.; Hussain, *Badal: A Culture of Revenge. The Impact of Collateral Damage on Taliban Insurgency*, 31-33.


³⁷⁵ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 22-23.

These factors invoke a certain behavior of the Pashtuns that cannot be changed by an external policy or law. The Pashtuns are inevitably bound to this behavioral code. Consequently, all external actions affecting the Pashtuns have to be considered in terms of the Pashtunwali to evaluate the expected reaction.

D. HAQQANI, HEKMATYAR AND AL-QAEDA

The three groups HQN, HiG and Al-Qaeda (AQAM) are also operating from the borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All are tremendous contributors to instability, not only in Afghanistan, but in the case of Al-Qaeda, worldwide. Figure 21 shows the areas of influence of these groups. All movements cumulate in FATA and the eastern provinces of Afghanistan where the Pashtun dominate and where the specifics of both, FATA and the Pashtun tribes have to be applied as discussed above.

Figure 21. Areas of influence³⁷⁶



³⁷⁶ Cordesman, *The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report*, 30.

HQN, HIG and Al-Qaeda have established their homes in the border region from where they operate and conduct the Afghan insurgency practice mujahideen-style guerilla warfare.³⁷⁷ HQN and HIG are not only Islamist movements, but also Pashtun movements.³⁷⁸ Consequently, jihad and badal can be evoked together and the motivation and mobilization is either religious or tribal-based. Both movements are extreme in seeking to purify the Afghan society from all sins. They apply the original Islam of the prophet Mohammed.

Al-Qaeda is globally oriented, however, they profit from weak governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, who lack the capacity to conduct effective counter measures against them. Al-Qaeda's aim is to free the Arab and Islamic world from Western penetrations and, therefore, conducts jihad wherever it is necessary.³⁷⁹

However, the roots of these movements, compared to the Taliban, are the same. Additionally, their bases and safe havens are located in the same areas where the Taliban has also found refuge and the alienation of the Pashtuns is also the same. This means encountering the roots of the Taliban movement leads automatically to a withdrawal of the hotbeds for these movements.

E. ECONOMY

Afghanistan's economy has been growing in recent years.³⁸⁰ This statement is, of course, too simplistic, and needs more analytical depth. The central government in Afghanistan has presented the Afghanistan National Development Strategy³⁸¹ (ANDS) as an interim strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction,

³⁷⁷ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 23.

³⁷⁸ Johnson, *On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan*, 119.

³⁷⁹ Guido Steinberg, *Die Wiederkehr Von Al-Qaida* (Berlin/Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, [2007]).

³⁸⁰ Jane's Information Group, *Economy, Afghanistan*, 1.

³⁸¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy* (Kabul/Afghanistan: Afghan Government, [2006]) (accessed April 9, 2008).

which is a medium-term vision describing the fiscal framework until March 2010.³⁸² Additionally, this document reflects the “strategic priorities and mechanisms for achieving the Government’s development vision.”³⁸³ The Afghanistan Compact, which is the succeeding document of the Bonn Agreement and “provides a framework for the international community to help Afghans build a state and develop their countries,”³⁸⁴ defines benchmarks on certain sectors, which should basically be fulfilled by 2010. Neither the ANDS nor the Afghanistan Compact is subject to this work; however, they represent the strategic basis for Afghanistan’s development. The economy plays an important role within both documents. Afghanistan’s economy can generally be subdivided between the opium and non-opium economy. Both are analyzed with the following sections whereas the black market, which consists of more than poppy cultivation, drug production and trafficking, is mentioned briefly because it is an issue specifically related to Afghanistan and contributes tremendously to the Afghan economy.

1. Economic Visions due to the ANDS and the Afghanistan Compact

The Afghan government’s economic goal, defined in the Afghanistan Compact, is to pursue high rates of sustainable economic growth, which should be fulfilled with the support of the international community. This should be realized by promoting the role and the potential of the private sector in accordance and ensuring macroeconomic stability. Concurrently, the Afghan government intends to stimulate the public and non-profit sector as well, and attempts to curb the narcotics industry by accepting that this sector cannot be substituted or even eliminated easily. For the purpose of economic and social development, the Afghan government has defined six sectors. These are:

- Infrastructure and natural resources
- Education
- Health

³⁸² Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy* (Kabul/Afghanistan: Afghan Government, [2006]) (accessed April 9, 2008).

³⁸³ Afghan Government, *The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS): Key Facts on the ANDS* (Kabul/Afghanistan: Afghan Government, [2006]) (accessed April 9, 2008).

³⁸⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 18.

- Agriculture and rural development
- Social protection
- Economic governance and private sector development.

The first, fourth and sixth points can obviously be assigned to economic development. The benefits of a growing economy should be redistributed to the Afghans in order to increase their wealth. The overall goal is to use the revenues to reduce hunger, poverty and unemployment.³⁸⁵ Tables 21 to 23 provide an overview of the determined benchmarks regarding the above mentioned first, fourth and sixth points.

Table 21. Benchmarks for Infrastructure and Natural Resources³⁸⁶

Infrastructure and natural resources:

Scope	Benchmark
Roads	Ring road and connecting roads from foreign countries fully upgraded and maintained by the end of 2008.
Air transport	Kabul International Airport (KAIA) and Herat Airport (HA) fully operational by the end of 2010. Other domestic airports will follow.
Energy	65% of households, 90% of non-residential establishments in major urban areas, and 25% of households in rural areas will be supplied with electricity by the end of 2010.
Mining and natural resources	Regulations for profitable extraction of minerals and natural resources will be established by the end of 2006.
Water resource management	Irrigation and potable water supply strategies by end-2006. Waterworks for 30% of the water supply by the end of 2010.
Urban development	Municipal governments will have the capacity to manage urban development and to ensure that municipal services are delivered effectively, efficiently and transparently by the end of 2010.
Environment	An environmental regulatory framework and management will be established by the end of 2007.

³⁸⁵ Afghan Government and International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact*, 5.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

Table 22. Benchmarks of Agriculture and Rural Development³⁸⁷

Agriculture and rural development:

Scope	Benchmark
Agriculture and livestock	Framework for an increased production and productivity for legal agriculture and for agriculture-based rural industries as well as an increase of public investment in agriculture by 30% each year will be established by the end of 2010.
Comprehensive rural development	Community Development Councils will be created with the election of at least 14,000 volunteers to coordinate and promote local governance and community empowerment with the aim of ensuring access to potable water, sanitation, road connectivity, access to markets, employment and social services, irrigation and access to financial services for over 38,000 villages by the end of 2010.
Counter-narcotics	Strategies and programs will be implemented to reduce the amount of land under poppy cultivation by strengthening of licit livelihoods and other counter-narcotics measures by the end of 2010.

Table 23. Benchmarks of Economic Governance and Private Sector Development³⁸⁸

Economic governance and private sector development:

Scope	Benchmark
Financial management	Transparent financial management at central and provincial levels will be established by the end of 2007, agreed on and monitored by the international community.
Domestic revenues	Afghanistan's total domestic budgetary revenue will reach 8% of GDP and the revenues/expenditures ratio will rise to 58% by 2011.

³⁸⁷ Afghan Government and International Community, *The Afghanistan Compact*, 5.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

Private sector development and trade	Regulations and procedures related to easier investments will be implemented by the end of 2007. Divestments of state-owned enterprises will be realized by the end of 2009.
Financial services and markets	Regulations regarding all core sectors of banking and non-bank financial institutions will be developed by the end of 2007.
Regional cooperation	Cooperative border management and multilateral or bilateral agreements regarding transit and trade will be negotiated by the end of 2010.

The above mentioned benchmarks and goals have already partially expired and thus, should have been implemented. However, 2010 and 2011 have been determined as a kind of culminating point in the strategy when several measures should become effective. How realistic this is will depend heavily on the assistance provided by the international community on this sector and on the number of donor nations and foreign investment that will bring capital into the country and the markets. Consequently, this vision requires assistance and guidance with economically qualified personnel and not with military personnel. The designated personnel should be assigned to the central government because an approach from the center to the provinces seems to be the most suitable for implementing all the necessary regulations and for negotiating all the required agreements.

2. Current Economic Situation

The economic situation currently prevailing in Afghanistan has to be seen in relation to the initial point. In this case, the initial point refers to the Soviet occupation beginning in 1979 and the subsequent civil war, as well as the rule of the Taliban regime, when a functional economy was completely eroded. Thus, the economic growth under the Karzai administration hustles in tremendous steps and shows growth rates up to approximately 13 percent.³⁸⁹ Nevertheless, Afghanistan is an economic dwarf. The

³⁸⁹ Jane's Information Group, *Economy, Afghanistan*, 1.

following quote precisely describes the situation since the communist coup, also named the Saur revolution, from 1978, that took place in Afghanistan when the empowering regime backed the Soviets, which eventually led to the Soviet invasion in 1979.

“The successive wars killed over a million Afghans, most of them civilians; maimed and orphaned over a million people, leaving many families without breadwinners; forced about a third of the population into exile as refugees; devastated the villages where most of the population lived; and drove much of the country’s educated class into exile. Agricultural land and pastures were often mined and became unproductive. Fragile systems for managing the country’s scarce supplies of water were devastated. In the course of foreign invasion and interference, most of the roads, bridges, and culverts that this landlocked country had managed to build were destroyed. The few roads and bridges that remained were not maintained. Afghans were unable to use many schools and clinics, which had degenerated into dilapidated structures, unsuitable for their intended purposes. In the course of the war, schools and hospitals were burned down or converted into military bases. One generation or more lost the chance for education. Male-headed families that had supported the gradual education and employment of women now confined them once again, out of fear for their safety. This led to a reversal in the modest advances that had been made by Afghan women.”³⁹⁰

Beginning with the Soviet occupation, the Afghan economy began to gradually collapse. The Soviets implemented their system of planned economy, and thus increased the role of the state in the economic sector by decreasing skilled economic personnel who were either in refugee camps or imprisoned. Subsequently, the initiation of domestic revenues had been neglected, but the need for money arose due to tremendous expenditures for weapons and military equipment, as well as for food subsidies. The result was hyperinflation because the communist regime in Kabul started printing huge numbers of new banknotes. The occurrence of hyperinflation had a direct impact on the public sector because state officials, teachers, policemen, and so on were suddenly no longer able to insure their livelihoods. Thus corruption spread widely in the public sector.

³⁹⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 31.

During these years, huge amounts of subsidized food were imported and had to be distributed, which heavily damaged the economy. Providing food to the population depressed agricultural markets and the people still today expect the state to supply them with food.³⁹¹

Afghanistan's economy of 2001 and 2002 can be compared to a wartime economy dealing with drugs, guns, and religious artifacts.³⁹² The economy can generally be divided into a legal and a black market economy. The main source of income of the black economy is drug-trafficking and illegal transportation.³⁹³ This market has become the only eligible and well-paid employment for a significant part of the Afghan population. Opium cultivation and processing it into heroin in the labs throughout the country is a worthwhile business because it has tremendous profit margins. Not only has the drug economy formed the criminal or black economy of Afghanistan, but also smuggling for instance timber, gemstones, and fuel from Iran have been remarkable factors.³⁹⁴ The poppy sector is mainly controlled by regional leaders, warlords and militias, who pursue their own interests and motives. Not only in 2001, when the Taliban regime was defeated, but also in 2002, 2003 and the subsequent years, under the respective government the production of opium rose tremendously.³⁹⁵ "This (6100 tons of opium production in 2005) made up a staggering 92 percent of total world supply and exceeded total global consumption by 30 percent. This represented a farm gate value of USD 755 million, or 11 percent of Afghanistan's official GDP."³⁹⁶ This indicates that the opium production in Afghanistan is so significant that regional commanders, who are involved in this, have established their own economy. The state has, of course, no benefit from this because it can not apply taxation on this capital. Although the Afghan police supported by ISAF

³⁹¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 31.

³⁹² Donini, Niland and Wermester, *Nation-Building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan*, 41.

³⁹³ Jane's Information Group, *Economy, Afghanistan*, 2.

³⁹⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 32.

³⁹⁵ Jane's Information Group, *Economy, Afghanistan*, 2.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.

forces, “combat the narcotics industry,”³⁹⁷ it is not possible to interrupt this business without creating an adequate substitution because it is a vital economic base from which a lot of people maintain their livelihood. Even if the police, supported by the international military presence, conducted poppy eradication operations, counter-measures including the use of violence would occur and instability would be the result. Regarding the legal economy, the main economic sector is agriculture in which crop shortfalls are not unusual due to droughts and limited available fields because of the mountainous and cleft topography in Afghanistan. Additionally, the country suffers from the plague of landmines which were inherited from the Soviet occupation and limit the available fields. Afghanistan’s economy is also growing by 13.8 percent in 2005, for example, and at an average of 12 percent over the past four years.³⁹⁸ Additionally, it is expected that the real GDP growth for 2008 will exceed 13 percent.³⁹⁹ Figure 22 provides an overview of Afghanistan’s economic indicators from 2002 to 2006, which underlines the above mentioned facts.

³⁹⁷ Gallis, *NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance*, 3.

³⁹⁸ United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, 13.

³⁹⁹ NATO, *Progress in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008*, 13.

Figure 22. Afghanistan's Economic Indicators from 2002 to 2006⁴⁰⁰

Economic Indicator	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Per capita GNI, Atlas method, (\$)
GDP growth (% change per year)	28.6	15.7	8.0	14.0	8.0
CPI (% change per year)	5.1	24.1	13.2	12.3	5.5
Unemployment rate (%)	3.9	3.8	3.6
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)	-0.1	-3.0	-1.2	-0.9	-1.5
Export growth (% change per year)	82.1	46.7	-13.3	-2.6	7.9
Import growth (% change per year)	52.5	50.9	2.3	9.0	10.1
Current account (% of GDP)	-3.6	3.0	1.4	-0.9	-2.0
External debt (% of GNI)

... = data not available, CPI = consumer price index, GDP = gross domestic product, GNI = gross national income.
Sources: ADB. 2007. *Asian Development Outlook 2007*. Manila.
ADB. 2007. Statistical Database System.

However, this growth rate has to be related to the initial point of the economy after the Taliban regime, which was a very low level economy. Although the markets are opened, Afghanistan's economy is still in an early stage of development and prone to external influences which underscore the vulnerability of Afghanistan economically. In 2007, the inflation rate was 17 percent due to the higher prices of imported fuel and food.⁴⁰¹ Furthermore, the redistribution to the population in March 2008 was approximately 60 percent, 6 percent higher than one year before, however, this was only possible with remarkable international assistance. It is expected that revenue collection will be 8.2 percent of the GDP in 2008, which will meet the benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact (see Table 3), although the ratio between revenue and GDP

⁴⁰⁰ Asian Development Bank, *Afghanistan 2007: A Fact Sheet*, 2.

⁴⁰¹ United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, 14.

remains one the lowest worldwide.⁴⁰² Nevertheless, each fulfillment of benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact is a signal that it might be a realistic roadmap to rebuilding not only Afghanistan's economy, but also the other sectors as well.

Unfortunately, domestic and foreign investments in Afghanistan are very rare because of the unstable security situation, not only throughout the countryside but also in the major cities.⁴⁰³ Due to the fact that Afghanistan is not a self-supporter, it is reliant on foreign donations, especially in the economic sector. Therefore, Afghanistan is still and will stay a *Rentier* state. Excluding the financial obligations against Russia, another economic issue is that Afghanistan suffers from the payback of debts, which amounts to nearly 13 percent of the GDP in 2005.⁴⁰⁴

Afghanistan is very poor and highly indebted. An estimated 34 to 42 percent of the country's population live under the poverty level, and without adequate assistance, donations and qualified aid, the Afghan economy can probably not be re-stimulated or become a self-sustaining economy.

3. Macroeconomic Aspects

The long-term impacts on Afghanistan's economy, inherited from nearly thirty years of war, civil war, occupation, suppression, violence, and poverty, as well as invasions and remote regimes, now pose tremendous challenges to the attempts of the central government in Kabul and to the international community to re-stimulate the Afghanistan economy. These costs have resulted in a lost generation and thus, a lack of qualified and highly sophisticated personnel to deal with the economy issues. Nevertheless, an economy with high growth rates, along with new structures and high value exports, is crucial for the overall rebuilding efforts of Afghanistan. For this purpose, a stable macroeconomy is vital.

⁴⁰² United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, 14.

⁴⁰³ Jane's Information Group, *Economy, Afghanistan*, 1.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.


The data on the GDP has already been mentioned in the section above. The growth of the economy and the increase of the GDP over the last few years is the outcome of four basic factors. From 2003 to 2006, high amounts of rainfall occurred contrary to the five years beforehand when drought had been the predominant factor. Consequently, the agricultural sector was able to produce much more output. The rapid growth of the opium economy has two sides of the coin. It contributes overwhelmingly to Afghanistan's economy, but on the other side, it is a remarkable factor in destabilizing the country. However, this appearance underscores the dependence of Afghanistan's economy on this sector, which poses significant challenges to the government regarding its abolition, or at least, substitution. Moreover, the international grants and the return of thousands of economic refugees have contributed to the growth rates. Additionally, the government has lifted some constraints on investments in the private sector, which have led to higher employment rates and economic activity.⁴⁰⁵

Afghanistan's economy suffers from parallel governance structures and weak state capacities in which corruption prevails and reforms are conducted. The parallel structures of the informal and illicit economy operate beside taxation. This structure is strengthened by regional commanders who have control over certain parts of the illicit economy of Afghanistan, which is not only the opium economy. Consequently, the economy can be portrayed as unproductive, or with a low level of productivity. The latter factor, in combination with the already mentioned poor services provided by weak government institutions, has a direct impact on the overall growth of the economy. Assuming that a long-lasting drought might occur, the international grants decline, and that no more economic refugees return, a decline of growth rates is likely.⁴⁰⁶ This means that a stable macroeconomy, along with a strong regulatory framework, functioning financial services, sustainable markets, as well as improvements on the security situation, which will lead to more foreign investments, are compulsory prerequisites for ensuring positive growth rates over the coming years. Figure 23 shows the macroeconomic context of Afghanistan and the illicit production equilibrium.

⁴⁰⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 41.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

Figure 23. Macroeconomy and the Illicit Production Equilibrium⁴⁰⁷



International grants are also a vital factor in Afghanistan's economy due to the fact that government revenues fund approximately 50 percent of its expenditures. Thus, Afghanistan without grants would not be sustainable. For instance, in 2005, 269 million USD were collected by the Afghan government, whereas the expenditures were 561 million USD in the same year. This would not have been possible without an external budget of 3,742.4 million USD. In that year, legal exports were 1,656 million USD; however, the final trade balance was negative due to imports of 3,867 million USD. That was a trade deficit of 45 percent of the GDP.⁴⁰⁸ Ultimately, it is correct to state that the economy is growing. Nevertheless, there are fields, which prevail with tremendously negative ratios that do not lead to a self-sustaining economy and must rely on international grants, aid and investments. It will be vital for the Afghan government to identify the respective sources of economic growth, which can vary year to year, to ensure persistently increasing growth rates and to be able to redistribute the revenues to reduce poverty and unemployment and promote development. Therefore, deep analysis and diagnostic work is necessary for which assistance is essential.

⁴⁰⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 41.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

The Afghan economy is largely dependent on opium production. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) released their most recent report⁴⁰⁹ in cooperation with the Afghan government as a survey and assessment of drug production, and a prognosis of future trends for the winter of 2008, in which it was mentioned that poppy cultivation will slightly decrease in 2008, contrary to the previous years when it was increasing. The report differentiates between the respective provinces regarding the trend for 2008. Figure 24 shows these trends.

Figure 24. Trends of Poppy Cultivation for 2008⁴¹⁰

Cultivation trend in 2008	No. of provinces	Provinces
Poppy-free	12	Balkh, Bamyan, Ghazni, Khost, Kunduz, Logar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktya, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak
Decrease	7	Badakhshan, Baghlan, Hirat, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman
Sharp decrease	3	Faryab, Jawzjan, Nangarhar
Increase	6	Badghis, Farah, Ghor, Kandahar, Samangan, Uruzgan
Sharp increase	1	Nimroz.
Stable	5	Day Kundi, Hilmand, Sari Pul, Takhar, Zabul

Additionally, the opium economy in 2005 earned 2.8 billion USD from which, of course, the drug barons and the traffickers benefit the most with 79 percent. The local farmers received only small margins and the benefits of cultivating the poppy is not given to each farmer equally either. The opium economy is a huge factor in Afghanistan.⁴¹¹ Nevertheless, the Afghan government, assisted by the international community, is to strengthen its efforts to establish a legal framework to reduce poppy cultivation, drug production and trafficking. The effectiveness of the attempts to reduce poppy cultivation is heavily dependent on the farmer. Where farmers are poor, or where landless laborers are involved, the government has to develop and establish viable alternatives for the rural

⁴⁰⁹ Afghan Government and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan: Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey*, 1-46.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 43-44.


poor to ensure their livelihoods.⁴¹² This will be tremendously challenging for the government to abolish or provide adequate substitution for poppy cultivation. If one were able to reject the ethical dimension, it would probably have been best to promote poppy cultivation instead of abolishing it.

The non-opium economy of Afghanistan consists basically of the agricultural sector. Due to heavy rain falls, two-thirds of the economic growth from 2003 to 2006 was made by agriculture. In 2005, 37 percent of the GDP came from agriculture. Cereal crops are the primary product of this sector. Regarding this production, there are several programs to boost the productivity of cereals by providing suitable seeds, fertilizers and an improved irrigation system.⁴¹³ Other sectors include manufacturing, construction and public administration. Figure 25 provides an overview of the structure of the Afghan economy as of 2003.

⁴¹² Christopher Ward and others, *Afghanistan: Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production* (London/UK: The World Bank; Department for International Development, [2008]).

⁴¹³ Ibid.

Figure 25. Structure of the Afghan Economy as of 2003⁴¹⁴



4. Economic Execution


The Afghan government, along with the support of the international community, has precise lines of operations on how to achieve high economic goals. The desired economic growth should not only be redistributed to the poor people, but also contribute to long-term stability through development. Therefore, Kabul focuses on the promotion of the private sector in terms of investment as well as production, while eliminating the narcotics economy, or even the illicit economy overall.

Growth rates alone will not achieve these goals. The economic framework has to be established in a sustainable manner, which would enable a continuous increase over a certain period of time rather than being dependent on unpredictable rainfalls and foreign aid. The Afghan government estimated that an annual rate of real growth in the licit economy of 9 percent over a period of twelve years would meet the goals to reduce poverty, improve employment rates and contribute effectively to stability. This program is called “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” from 2004 (SAF 2004) and is based on a required per capita growth rate of 3 percent per year, which is equivalent to a 5 percent

⁴¹⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 44.

real growth rate of the total economy assuming a conservative population growth rate of 2 percent per year. The difference between the 5 percent real growth rate of the total economy and the estimated necessary growth rate of the licit economy of 9 percent are needed for the compensation of losses due to a planned reduction in the narcotics economy.⁴¹⁵ Figure 26 provides an overview of the necessary and estimated growth rates as planned by the Afghan government. The years on the x-axis are as follows: 1382 is equivalent to 2003/2004, 1383 to 2004/2005, 1384 to 2005/2006 and so on.

Figure 26. Context of Real GDP Growth Rates⁴¹⁶



Besides the question of what the international military forces, in general, or PRTs in particular, can contribute to the promotion of the private sector, the Afghan government has determined four investment areas as sources of growth and assigned them respective priorities. These are first, agriculture, pastoralism and rural enterprises, second, the productive use of state assets, third, mining and extractive industries, and fourth, regional cooperation, trade and transit.

Improvements in agricultural productivity are focused basically on the rural areas, where not only most Afghans live, but also where most poverty prevails. Therefore, this sector is the major contributor to economic growth. As mentioned above, Afghanistan has, besides the poppy cultivation, a long tradition of high-value horticultural crops. An

⁴¹⁵ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 44.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

example of this sector is dried fruits and nuts. Those that have been grown in Afghanistan are considered the best quality in Asia and the Middle East. Another example is Afghan carpets, which are produced from the wool of the animals belonging to the herds of the full-time nomads. These carpets can be sold in the primary markets in the U.S. and in Germany for 800 to 900 USD per square meter.⁴¹⁷ If these markets can be placed better in the global economy by improvements in infrastructure and competitiveness, the products could become export articles.

The productive use of state assets means the sale of public land and the privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs). By doing so, the Afghan government expects development primarily in urban centers and a larger private sector, which enables more employment opportunities and more investment activities.⁴¹⁸

The third sector of economic growth is related to mining and extractive industries, which are all currently state property. The available resources are coal, quarry materials, marble and dimension stone, industrial minerals, semiprecious stones as well as some metals such as copper, iron ore and gold. All these resources and the necessary industry to extract it and to work it up are crucial for foreign investment and for foreign technological knowledge. For instance marble from Herat and Jalalabad, is of such a good quality that it can challenge the marble of Italy.⁴¹⁹

Finally, regional cooperation, trade and transit as a contributor to economic growth, is seen as a significant potential to raise revenues from rents and tolls on transit routes. A prerequisite for this is, of course, that the roads are in better condition and that an effective administration with a functioning toll procedure is established. Moreover, Afghanistan is landlocked, as are the adjacent countries to the north, which means that the historic role of Afghanistan as a corridor again comes into play. Domestic transport companies and workers might rise and provide logistics for goods that have to be transported through Afghanistan. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to reduce illegal

⁴¹⁷ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 44.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

checkpoints run by local commanders collecting tolls for their own profit. Nevertheless, the corridors from Central Asia to the subcontinent and from the west to the east and vice versa have to be used for economic purposes. Not only might the transportation business be profitable, but also the pipeline projects currently planned. The Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP) should, in the future carry natural gas from Turkmenistan's gas fields to Pakistan and potentially to India as well. The Afghan government has estimated that transit revenues could be 160 million USD.⁴²⁰ To realize these projects, it is crucial that the Afghan government improves its relations with its neighboring countries, especially Pakistan. Between them, the unresolved issue of the Durand Line and the question of the Pashtuns are still hampering trustful cooperation.

The question as to what the PRTs contribute to the promotion of the Afghan economy is still left. NATO founded the "Afghan-First" program. This program is to promote the local Afghan economy and is, for instance, in the northern part of Afghanistan, a cooperation between ISAF, eleven local Afghan construction firms, the Afghan International Chamber of Commerce and the Balkh University. Whenever possible, the Afghan economy gets the benefits from the construction measures of the Forward Support Base (FSB) in Mazar-e Sharif, which is conducted by the local firms. Moreover, several workers are hired to support the camp commander by conducting daily business issues and every possible purchase is done within the local markets, even though the prices are higher than elsewhere. These above mentioned examples are only a few out of many. The program is headed toward the local economy and invests in local markets.⁴²¹

5. Conclusion

The Afghan economy is growing. Yes, but as mentioned introductorily, this is too superficial. The macroeconomic approach is the correct beginning. Not only potential foreign investors, but also domestic economic people need a suitable and functioning

⁴²⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: National Development Strategy*, 44.

⁴²¹ Personal experience of the author while deployed as part of the XII German contingent ISAF from October 2006 to March 2007.

framework for investments and economic activities. However, an institutional framework is currently incomplete and has to be realized as determined in the Afghanistan Compact by the end of 2010. Moreover, other economic challenges are an insufficient infrastructure, and underutilized potentials such as electricity and irrigation, the illicit economy, which is dominated by the narcotics industry, as well as poverty, in combination, with too few qualified people or social capital. Moreover, the macroeconomic efforts are not good enough. For a sustainable economic growth, it is just as important to strengthen the microeconomics as well. Michael E. Porter has defined three stage of economic development through which countries evolve microeconomically.⁴²² The first stage is the factor-driven economy. This stage is dominated by factors such as low-cost labor and access to natural resources that lead to competitive advantages and international products. Additionally, small firms produce simple products that are constructed or designed somewhere else. The second stage is the investment-driven economy in which manufacturing and services become more dominant and improve the advantages of economic competitiveness. The technology is usually bought and this stage requires significant improvements in the domestic infrastructure. However, it offers a chance to evolve on purchased technology and draw foreign investment into the country. The third stage is the innovation-driven economy. This final stage portrays an economy that is able to produce highly sophisticated technological and innovative products bargained on global markets. Two facts prevail: Afghanistan is currently in the first stage and their intention to promote the private sector requires severe efforts on microeconomic aspects rather than solely on the macroeconomic side. A favorable business environment for private and foreign investment is crucial. Thus, not only an efficient infrastructure and a functioning administrative framework are necessary, but also available capital, access to financial services, cheap labor, markets with global access, a stock of valuable natural resources, qualified personnel, sophisticated technologies, and education, as well as favorable conditions for the supporting industries, and state subsidies for certain sectors. Only by promoting all these aspects can a

⁴²² Michael E. Porter, *Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current Competitiveness Index* (Boston/MA: Harvard Business School, [2005]).

sustainable economy grow. For Afghanistan, this is mandatory due to the fact that the economy is a major contributor to stability, although it requires a certain security level.

F. CONCLUSION

“The U.S. and NATO/ISAF are not winning in Afghanistan. [...] The U.S. and NATO/ISAF are able to defeat the Taliban and other Islamist extremist movements at the tactical level, and have won important victories in 2007. However, the Taliban still seem to be winning the battle for political and economic space. The U.S., NATO/ISAF, and Afghan forces are not strong enough to hold large areas after the win.”⁴²³

Islam is the second largest religion in the world and the tribal affairs of the Pashtun, which embrace approximately 25 million members and are therefore the largest tribal group in the world,⁴²⁴ clash in Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Both lead to insurgency based on different motivators and both can mobilize the masses. This poses not only a threat to the international community present in Afghanistan and the central government in Kabul, but also to the entire world. Consequently, NATO’s policies have to be directed not against them, but with them.

Afghanistan’s economy is crucial for promoting stability. It is no less important than political, religious and tribal aspects. The most challenging issue is the gradual reduction or even abolition of the illicit economy, basically the narcotics industry, by developing a sustainable legal economy. Unfortunately, the legal economy is currently dependent on rainfall and foreign financial aid. Shortfalls of international funding and long and severe droughts would hamper economic growth and lead back to the narcotics industry with its poppy cultivation. Besides that, it is of utmost importance to develop not only a strong macroeconomic roadmap, but also a microeconomic one. The international military presence has to promote economic efforts whenever and wherever possible.

⁴²³ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Open Letter to the House Committee on Armed Services* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, [2007]) (accessed January, 26 2008).

⁴²⁴ Johnson and Mason, *No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*, 8.

The main findings in this chapter are.

- Islam prevails in Afghanistan and Pakistan with its political dimension seeking political power, but it is no longer a unifying force as it was, for instance, during the Soviet occupation.
- This religious-political force is still a powder keg and poses today threats to the Afghan population and to the international community.
- The Taliban's goals have not yet been fulfilled and thus, they will continue to fight their jihad against weak Islamic leadership in Kabul and the international community.
- The Taliban have imposed structural defects on the Pashtuns due to their relatively long period of activity since their beginnings in 1979.
- The Pashtuns deny external authorities from Kabul and from the international community except their maliks, which are currently marginalized.
- Afghanistan as a state does not function as western states, for instance, in Europe due to tribalism in general, and the Pashtunwali in particular.
- The maliks have to be strengthened and the jirgas have to be involved in the nation-building process in Afghanistan.
- Other Islamist movements such as HQN, HIG and Al-Qaeda are embedded in the same way as the Taliban and thus, fighting the roots of the Taliban automatically means fighting the other movements.
- Afghanistan's economy is growing. However, besides the feasible macroeconomic plans, microeconomic efforts have to be added and strengthened.
- A sustainable economy is major contributor to stability although it requires a certain level of security.
- Financial international aid has to increase.

One has to understand the religious-political force and the tribal environment as well as the respective power-holders, either the mullahs or the maliks, and the social behavior of the respective groups, based on religious or tribal motives, to know what the presence of the international community in a state like Afghanistan, which is definitely not functioning like a Western democracy, means. If one follows the economic analysis, one realizes that a mere military solution for stabilizing the region is not possible, but needs a huge political, social, economic and aid approach headed toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, tailored to the cultural environment.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This work provides insight into the U.S. and German-led PRTs in Afghanistan and scrutinizes their performance. In Afghanistan, history has proven that huge dynamics occur when foreign forces invade or occupy the country. This work focuses on the entire analytical framework as well as influencing factors such as the political-religious force, tribalism, and the economic situation, as major contributors to stability or instability, depending on the perspective. Thus, this work also provides advanced understanding and updated information on Afghanistan, the presence of the international community and domestic issues. The recommendations presented in this chapter are more of a general character rather than a specific one.

Based on the main findings and respective conclusions of each chapter, two overall conclusions are drawn. First, the PRTs are a limited asset and have come to a standstill regarding the fulfillment of their objectives. PRTs are joint military-civil teams conducting stability operations and reconstruction projects and there is little doubt about their initial successes. However, improvements to PRTs are required for certain Afghan districts. The structural capabilities, along with the available resources of the respective PRTs, did what they were able to do. NATO defined the spectrum of intervention and it is obvious that the PRTs, with their structure and capabilities, are most relevant for the stability stage of post-conflict situations where situations are relatively calm and stable. Within this environment, it is the PRT's crucial task to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate. The stage before, in which kinetic operations or high intensity war-fighting prevail, due to an insecure environment, will most likely find that the PRTs are too weak, militarily, to contribute. Furthermore, at the next stage, in which a sustainable development has to occur, PRTs are too weak on the civil side, especially in terms of cooperation with several NGOs, to concentrate the development and aid activities required. This means that the structure of PRTs has to be flexible and must be adjusted to the respective requirements. There is no fixed PRT module that can be deployed to all post-conflict scenarios. Changing the structural capabilities of PRTs may be required at different periods of time, within a few weeks, a few months, or several months. Secondly,

the deployment of more and more troops will not improve the security situation on the ground. When analyzing the political, religious, tribal and economic factors, it becomes obvious that the military is only a small brick in the wall and that there are spheres of problems that can never be solved militarily. It is the conclusion of this thesis that the fewer foreign forces there are on Afghan soil, the more pleased the Afghan population will be. This, in turn (because of traditional Afghan suspicion of outsiders and occupation) will probably improve the overall situation. There is not a single metric in either the political, economic, military or social sector that will guarantee success. A comprehensive, joint and concurrent approach of certain measures over all sectors will lead to synergies, and finally to a culmination point, in which the security situation improves significantly. A holistic approach is worth more than strategies focused on separate issues.

The following policy recommendations are derived from the findings of this thesis. The recommendations are subdivided into two parts. The first recommendations deal with the PRT structure and strategy while the second group of recommendations involves PRT's framework, environment and other influencing factors.

- PRTs in Afghanistan are all part of the ISAF mission and not part of the OEF mission. Stick to the assisting character of ISAF to retain a minimum level of legitimacy provided by the Afghans. The OEF mission has a completely different character and can provoke resentments due to its combat nature, which can lead to collateral damage.
- PRTs do not need a common concept or a joint or grand strategy. Each nation has its own understandings concerning its approach due to available resources, operational requirements and necessities. The deployment of military forces will necessarily reflect a country's foreign policies. Each nation has its own interests as well as the overall objectives defined by the international community and NATO. Caveats for individual countries will always be operable because military forces are part of the national sovereignty and only reluctantly given to the control of a multinational commander.
- PRTs are only a limited asset for post-conflict scenarios. Either the PRT has to be relieved completely or the structure and thus the capabilities have to be changed, depending on the spectrum of intervention in which the PRT becomes involved. PRTs have to have a flexible structure backed

by the will of the respective nation to change the structure as the situation and environment requires. Clearly defined responsibilities, roles and missions are mandatory for each individually participating country.

- For peace enforcement operations, PRTs have to be able to request the support of a QRF (ideally collocated to the respective RCs). This QRF has to be highly mobile and able to conduct high intensity war-fighting. Additionally, air assets to conduct offensive air operations have to be available.
- PRTs are only a small contributor to the rebuilding of Afghanistan and they are not suitable for solving political, religious, tribal or economic issues.

Recommendations that are linked to the framework, environment and other influencing factors:

- The overall political process, initiated in Bonn 2001 and continued in London in 2006, has to be re-stimulated. Both conferences have focused on domestic issues such as the government, the constitution, and the state of Afghanistan itself. But now it is of utmost importance to focus on Afghanistan's foreign relations, especially with its adjacent countries. Talks and negotiations are necessary for resolving disputes and for gaining cooperation as well as diplomatic and economic activities. Issues such as the Durand Line and the question of the Pashtuns have to be addressed.
- The SSR process has to be restructured because the multilateral sector approach is inefficient. Unity of command is recommended to streamline and concentrate the efforts.
- The international commitment toward funding and providing available resources for a sustainable development must be strengthened.
- Coordination of all aid efforts and activities is vital to the success of the international community's Afghan mission.
- The training, guidance and equipment of the ANA, ANP and ANBP have to be strengthened. There is no way to produce stability without reliable internal Afghan security forces.
- Afghanistan does not function as a western democratic state. Democracy is unknown to the majority of the Afghans. Afghanistan's behavior, especially in the rural areas, is rooted in tribal affairs. A high level of cultural understanding is necessary, as well as direct contact with the tribal Afghan population. Tribal elders and jirgas have to be strengthened, as opposed to mullahs and shuras.
- Moderate Taliban have to be integrated into the political development of Afghanistan. In addition, it must be recognized that Islam is a driving factor in Afghanistan.

- The economy has to be rebuilt and economic aid must be provided to determine an economic and development roadmap with sustainable effects. The illicit economy can only be reduced gradually, because the livelihood of too many Afghans relies upon it.

History has shown that nations who have invaded or attempted to occupy Afghanistan have eventually left in defeat. The British and the Soviets learned this lesson well and left Afghanistan defeated. We cannot let this history repeat itself, especially considering the role Afghanistan has played in so many of the terrorist acts of the last decade.

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